Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail CounterinsurgencyQuarto Publishing Group USA, 15 aug 2008 - 306 pagina's It is the new way of war: Everywhere our military tries to make inroads, insurgents flout us—and seem to get the better of the strategists making policy and battle plans. In this book, an expert with both scholarly and military experience in the field looks at cases of counterinsurgency gone wrong. By examining the failures of strategies against insurgents in Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel James S. Corum offers rare and much-needed insight into what can go wrong in such situations—and how these mistakes might be avoided. In each case, Corum shows how the conflict could have been won by the major power if its strategy had addressed the underlying causes of the insurgency it faced; not doing so wastes lives and weakens the power’s position in the world. Failures in counterinsurgency often proceed from common mistakes. Bad Strategies explores these at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Above all, Corum identifies poor civilian and military leadership as the primary cause for failure in successfully combating insurgencies. His book, with clear and practical prescriptions for success, shows how the lessons of the past might apply to our present disastrous confrontations with insurgents in Iraq. |
Inhoudsopgave
7 | |
17 | |
31 | |
British Strategy Against the Cyprus Insurgents 19551959 | 79 |
VietnamAmericas Longest War 19501975 | 123 |
American Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq 20032007 | 181 |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency James S. Corum Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2008 |