Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

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Cambridge University Press, 28 mrt. 1997 - 340 pagina's
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Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
 

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Inhoudsopgave

Introduction
3
Duvergers propositions
13
STRATEGIC VOTING
35
On electoral systems
37
Strategic voting in singlemember singleballot systems
69
Strategic voting in multimember districts
99
Strategic voting in singlemember dualballot systems
123
Some concluding comments on strategic voting
139
COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
223
Coordination failures and representation
225
Coordination failures and dominant parties
238
Coordination failures and realignments
251
CONCLUSION
267
Conclusion
269
Formulaic structures in 77 democracies circa 1992
279
Notation and proofs for Chapter 6
303

STRATEGIC ENTRY
149
Strategic voting party labels and entry
151
Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality evidence from Japan
173
ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
179
Putting the constituencies together
181
Electoral institutions cleavage structures and the number of parties
203
Data and sources for Chapter 11
308
References
312
Subject Index
329
Authors Index
339
Copyright

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Over de auteur (1997)

Gary W. Cox is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. In addition to numerous articles in the areas of legislative and electoral politics, he is author of The Efficient Secret (winner of the Samuel H. Beer dissertation prize in 1983); co-author of Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (winner of the Richard F. Fenno Prize in 1993) and Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution (Cambridge, 2002); and author of Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (1997), which was awarded APSA's award for the best book in political science (Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award), the best book in comparative politics (Gregory Luebbert Prize), and the best book in political economy. His latest book, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives, with co-author Mathew McCubbins, was published in 2005. Cox is a former Guggenheim Fellow and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996.

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