ting before his Reader the primary truths of religion and morality, with their oppofite abfurdities; and only begs he will keep in mind the much celebrated advice,-Know thyfelf.

Ask a man of humanity, why he abhors a cruel action, and he immediately recurs to fomething within him that juftifies his fentiments; afk a man of honour, why he difdains a base action, and be in like manner hath recourse to a principle within him that authorifes his difdain; and on common subjects, if you ask a man of sense, why he rejects flat nonfenfe, he alfo will appeal to a faculty of which he is confcious, and of which he fuppofes you, and all rational beings, are confcious but in judging of the primary truths of religion and morality, you fhall not find many who are capable of rejecting the futile furmifes of fceptics, with the dignity and firmness becoming rational beings. On this account, the Author muft again beg of his Reader to keep in mind the much celebrated advice of the ancient fages,-Know thyself.'

:

This volume is divided into nine books; in the first of which Dr. Ofwald endeavours to fhew that reafon requires our admitting primary truths on its authority alone, under the penalty of being convicted of folly and nonfenfe if we do not. The learned, and after them the unlearned, he obferves, have been fo long accustomed to arguments and proofs for almost every truth they believe, that we find them hefitate and waver, and in danger of fcepticism, in judging of the plainest and most obvious truths, when unfupported by thofe arguments, proofs, and reasons, as they are called, to which they have been fo long accustomed. Nevertheless there are truths in nature, he fays, and thofe too of great confequence, which, in all reason, they may, and which, if they do not give up with all pretenfions to reafon, they must believe, without affigning any parti. cular reason, proof, or argument, for this belief. The truths which may, and ought to be believed in this manner, we are told, are fundamental to all the arts and sciences, and fundamental maxims of civil, moral, and religious conduct; and the little acquaintance men have with them, and the little confidence they put in them, is one of the chief caufes of the errors and follies they run into perpetually, both in theory and practice.

It may therefore be fit, continues he, to take thefe truths into particular confideration, and try the strength of our minds upon them ; and this we fhall do, without demanding any degree of credibility to the primary truths of religion and morality, beyond what is allowed to other primary truths, and without being fatisfied with lefs: for as no primary truth hath, or can have, any other evidence than the fimple dictates of reafon and common fenfe; and as this kind of evidence is as full and complete for the primary truths of religion, as for any other firft principles; fo we know no right a man can have to think more nonfenfically on religion than on any other fubject.'

The

The primary truths of religion and morality, our Author tells us, are evidently on a footing with the primary truths of all the arts and feiences, and with the firft principles of wife and juft conduct of every kind. They must ftand or fall together. if we believe the one, we must believe the other; and if we doubt of one, we must alfo doubt of the other; for all have the fame authority. And when this authority is better underfood, more reverenced, and felt more fenfibly, than it is or can be at prefent, he who calls in queftion the being and providence of God, the effential difference betwixt vice and virtue, the punishment due to the former, and the reward due to the latter, will be thought as great an idiot, as he who calls in question the reality of matter and motion, of gravitation or animal life, or of any of the most obvious principles of prudence or common fenfe. We have undoubtedly made progress in learning, our Author fays; but a little further proficiency will fhew us, that we have not yet got clear of the mists of falfe science, are hardly yet confcious of our own dignity, and scarcè dare to pronounce with firmnefs on the fimple dictates of reafon and common sense.

Afk a celebrated philofopher, fays he, whether there is any reafon for believing firft principles and he will tell you, that he knows of none; but being long accuftomed to believe them, he will fay, that we must believe them. Make your complaint to another philofopher of note, lefs heterodox than he, and he will tell you, that we are fo conflituted, that we must believe obvious truths; but chufes rather to have recourfe to an inftinctive feeling than to the authority of reafon. Apply to thofe philofophers who are profeffedly orthodox, and all agree, that we muft of neceffity believe, and exclaim against all attempts to doubt of obvious truth; but are generally fhy of founding on the fimple dictates of reafon, or even of naming its authority. Thefe, you will fay, are frange proceedings in men of understanding, endued with a power of difcerning betwixt obvious truth and palpable falfity, called Reafon, and valuing themselves on that high privilege by which their Maker has diftinguished them. But you are not to fuppofe, that the learned are altogether above the power of prejudice. When they are as much accustomed to the authority of reafon as they have been to the force of reasoning, they will pay as great, and a greater, regard to the former, than is paid to the latter; and then all primary truths will be on a footing; and he who doubts of the primary truths of religion and morality, will be deemed as great a fool as he who hefitates about the axioms of the fchools.'

In the remaining part of this book our Author goes on to fhew, that it is a reproach to a man of fenfe to have recourse to any other authority than the fimple dictates of reafon for the belief of primary truths; that we have the authority of reason more full and complete for the belief of primary truths, than for the belief of any truths deducible from them by the art of REV. July 1772. reafoning;

E

reasoning; and that we ought never to despair of men's giving up idle reasonings, and admitting primary truths on the authority of reason.

In the fecond book he confiders the existence of God, and endeavours to fhew, that it is too obvious and facred a truth to be fubjected to the reafonings of men. Too much encouragement, he says, hath been given to the cavils of fceptics by entering into reasonings about the being of God. Hear part of what he advances on this head; it appears to us very judicious and pertinent:

No procefs of reafoning can be employed in favour of this capital truth, that will not be found either falfe or frivolous. For if the premises are taken for granted, the reafoning is frivolous; or if the premifes are admitted to proof, there can be no juft conclufion. The premises are thefe: a work that indicates defign, muft be afcribed to an intelligent author; the world is a work that indicates defign, &c.; propofitions to which any man of understanding affents on the first hearing, or from which it is not in his power to withhold his affent when he comes to a clear understanding of the terms. But if they are fubjected to proof, it will not be fo eafy eftablishing their truth as is commonly thought; for this plain reafon, that, like all other primary truths, they are too obvious to receive any addition to their evidence from any medium of proof, or form of argumentation.

Let us try the first propofition, which logicians call the major. A work that indicates defign must be ascribed to an intelligent author. Nothing is more obviously evident, or more readily affented to by a man of found understanding; but if a wrong-headed man chufe to afcribe this work to chance, he is not to be confuted by arguments. It is vain to tell him, that we know of no fuch works being produced by chance; because he will affirm, that we are not acquainted with all the powers of chance. You may infift on the improbability, or, if you will, the impofiibility, of producing the Iliad or the Eneid, by cafually jumbling the letters of the alphabet; but he will tell you, that he does not aicribe the formation of the univerfe to any fuch cafualty as we are capable of producing, but to a cafual revolution of atoms, immenfe and eternal. He will tell you, that by repeated throws of the dice, one may caft up any number called for within a given time; and therefore will infift, that any poffible ftate of nature may refult from unlimited revolutions of matter and if he is difpofed to put more confidence in the art of reasoning than in the fimple dictates of reafon, he will not fubmit.

Mr. Hutchifon has undertaken to demonftrate the abfolute impoffibility of producing any fuch complicated fyftem as this world, or even a fyftem inferior to it, by chance, on account of the infinity of oppofite chances that muft occur in every part to obstruct the defign. And this ingenious author, it must be confeffed, has gone as far as human kill can go, to make out the proof. But Mr. Hutchifon was too good a philofopher to think it ftrict proof; and therefore contented himself with calling it almoft demonftration: which is in fact giving up the caufe to fceptics; for no man will think

himfelf

himself bound to reft in what is not altogether, but almost demon

itration.

A man of found understanding fees at once, that order results. from defign, and diforder from chance; and that infinite revolutions of chance, if any fuch thing can be fuppofed, would produce infinite diforder: but argumentation on this fubject can have no other effect, than to put unhappy men on abufing their understanding with › chimerical fuppofitions about the origin of the world, and to give. them the boldness of maintaining abfurdities, on a most important fubject, in contradiction to common fenfe.

Our fuccefs with the minor propofition will be no better than in proof of the major. For though nothing is more evident than the order of the univerfe, one will have difficulty in maintaining it against a pertinacious difputant. Explain a fire engine, or any fuch complicated machine, to one unacquainted with the fubject, and he will at firfl be aftonished, and in high admiration of the contrivance; but if he is captious, he will find fault, without your hav ing it in your power to give him fatisfaction. He will alledge, that many things have an aukward appearance, and that fome things are made in fo bungling a manner, as not to bespeak the hand of an artift, You may tell him, that you are not enough maf ter of the fubject to account for every thing, nor has he capacity to comprehend the whole; but he will infift upon his objections, and ftand out against the truth. In this manner do ignorant and felffufficient people object to plans of government, and to all works of defign, which they do not thoroughly underftand: and in the fame manner do petulant wits object to the plan of providence, and even to the fyftem of nature, and pertinaciously perfift in their objections, without the poffibility of being confuted by arguments.

It is easy to fhow them a connection of parts, and unity of defign, which they cannot gainfay; but they, on the other hand, point out ftrange and uncouth appearances, which can as little be denied. You alledge, that they have no right to found any argument upon their ignorance; but they affirm, that, as disputants, they have a right to with hold their affent until they are fatisfied. You tell them that they may be deceived by appearances; but they contend, that until thefe appearances are cleared up, they are bound to hold their minds in fufpence. It deferves notice, that feeptics, and even infidels, do not deny the primary truths, or alledge that they are altogether void of evidence, but that they have not that full evidence that is neceffary to create a firm belief; and this evidence you cannot procure them by any, or by all the forms of argumentation. All they aim at is to with-hold their affent; and that they will do; and that, it must be owned, they have a right to do, if the fubject in question is to be determined by the rules of reafoning, and not by the authority of common fenfe.

You may unriddle many difficulties, and give fatisfaction to feveral objections. You may do more: by careful inspection, you can fhow, to the fatisfaction of the fceptic, that what appeared irregular, is regular in the highest degree; that feeming difcord is harmony Lot understood; and that a feeming blemish is a beauty in the works of God; but you will not filence him. You have fomething farther

to explain, and fomething farther fill; and cannot give a full anfwer to his objections, until you explain the whole; and that you cannot do. Good fenfe requires, that he should be contented with lefs fatisfaction; but he demands proof; and as you have undertaken: it, so you must give it without referve or limitation.

Whether the fceptic is actuated by impertinent curiofity, a fpirit of contradiction, or yet a worfe principle, it must be owned, that, as a difputant, he has a right to infift in his demand; and on being refufed, to with-hold his affent; which he can do with more eale, and with a much better grace, in the courfe of a difpute, than he could have done, if you had fubmitted the truth to his judgment by a fimple appeal.

It is furprising, that this inconveniency attending the method of argumentation, fhould have been fo long overlooked by fo many friends of religion, diftinguished by their good fenfe, as well as by their learning: yet any one may recollect fimilar inftances of men of good understanding, difappointing themfelves in common life, by too great eagerness to prove truths too obvious to admit of proof or demonftration.'

In the remaining part of this book, the Doctor fhews, that the chief effect of analogical reafoning for the being of God is, to put the grofs abfurdity of the contrary fuppofition in its fatl light; that any one above the level of an idiot, may fee the invifible perfections of God from the vifible harmony of the univerfe; and that a man of fenfe will reft in the belief of one God, till he fees ground to fufpect that more than one exist.

The third book treats of the attributes of God; and the Author endeavours to fhew, that to acknowledge the being, and difpute the attributes of God, betrays great ftupidity or grofs prevarication; that the experience men have of the goodness and juftice of God, renders all hefitation about these attributes utterly inexcufable; that the little fenfe men have of the goodnefs and juftice of God muft be imputed to the badnefs of their hearts, &c.

Providence is the fubject of the fourth book; wherein the Doctor endeavours to make it appear that it is impoffible for created beings to exift, or act, independently of their Creator for one moment of time; that particular difpenfations of providence take place, without the leaft infringement of general laws; and that, without pretending to comprehend the plan of God, we fee plainly, that all things are fo ordered, as to favour our pursuit of virtue and happiness.

Without pretending to comprehend the plan of God, fays our Author very judiciously, we may filence the common complaints against providence on account of the unequal distribution of external goods, with great eafe; becaufe they flow merely from the lownefs of mens conceptions, and the falfe judgments they entertain of the chief good. As gold to filver, virtue is to gold," is a fentence no less just than beautiful. But do they who feem to admire

the