dren; for certainly no man was ever able to convince himself by arguments, that he had chofen for his fon that mode of inftruction to which his understanding was beft adapted, or by which he would most easily be made wife or virtuous. Whoever shall enquire by what motives he was determined on these important occafions, will find them fuch, as his pride will scarcely fuffer him to confefs; fome fudden ardour of defire, fome unexamined prejudice, fome uncertain glimpse of advantage, fome trivial competition, fome erroneous conclufion, or fome example implicitly reverenced. Such are often the firft caufes of our refolves; for it is neceffary to act, but impoffible to discover the consequences of our actions, or to difcufs all the reasons which offer themselves on every part to inquifitiveness and folicitude. Life itself is uncertain; and therefore nothing which has life for its bafis, can boast much stability. But this is but a small part of human uncertainty. We fet out on a tempeftuous fea, in queft of a port, at which we are not fure of admiffion; we are not only in danger of finking in the way, but of being misled by meteors mistaken for stars, of being driven from our course by the changes of the winds, and of losing it by unfkilful fteerage: but it fometimes happens, that cross winds blow us to a fafer coaft, that meteors draw draw us afide from whirlpools and fhallows, and that our negligence or errour contributes to our escape from dangers to which a direct course would have expofed us. Of those that by precipitate conclufions involve themselves without guilt in calamities, very few who reproach themfelves with their own folly, can be certain that any other measures would have been more fuccefsful. In this state of universal uncertainty, where a thousand dangers hover about us, and no man can tell whether the good that he purfues is not evil in disguise, or whether the next step will lead him to safety or destruction; nothing can afford any rational confidence or tranquillity, but the conviction, that, however we amufe ourfelves with unideal founds, nothing in reality is governed by chance; but that the universe is under the perpetual superintendance of him who created it; that our being is in the hands of omnipotent goodness, by whom what appears cafual to us is directed for ends ultimately kind and merciful; and that nothing fhall finally hurt him who debars not himself from the divine favour. N° 185. No 185. Tuesday, December 24. 1751. At vindicta, bonum vitâ jucundius ipsâ, Chryfippus non dicit idem, nec mite Thaletis -Quippe minuti Semper, & infirmi eft animi, exiguique voluptas Ultio. Τυν. vicious difpofitions of the mind more obftinately refift, not only the counsels of philofophy, but the injunctions of religion, than those which are complicated with an opinion of dignity, and which we cannot dismiss, without leaving in the hands of oppofition fome advantage iniquitously obtained, or fuffering from our own prejudices fome imputation of pufillanimity. For this reafon no law of our Redeemer is more openly tranfgreffed, or more induftriously evaded, than that by which he commands his followers to forgive forgive injuries, and prohibits, under the fanction of eternal misery, the gratification of that defire which every man feels of returning any pain that he fuffers upon him that inflicts it. Many who perhaps could have conquered their anger, are unable to combat against pride; and pursue offences to extremity of vengeance, only left they should be infulted by the triumph of an enemy. But certainly no precept could better become him, at whose birth peace was proclaimed to the earth. For what could fo foon deftroy all the order of fociety, and deform life with violence and ravage, as a permiffion to every man to judge his own caufe, and to apportion his own recompence for imagined injuries? It is difficult for a man of the ftricteft juftice, not to favour himself too much in his calmeft moments, or his folitary meditations. Every one wishes for distinctions and fuperiority, for which thousands are wishing at the fame time, in their own opinion, with better claims. He that, when his reason operates in its full force, can thus, by the mere prevalence of felf-love, prefer himself to his fellowbeings, is not likely to judge equitably, when his paffions are agitated by a sense of wrong, and his attention wholly engróffed by his pain, his intereft, or his danger. Whoever claims to himself the right of vengeance, fhows how little he is qualified VOL. VIII. B to to judge his own cause; fince he certainly demands what he would think unfit to be granted to another. Nothing is more apparent, than that, however injured or however provoked, fome must at last be contented to forgive; for it can never be hoped, that he who commits an injury, will contentedly acquiefce in the penalty required. The fame haughtiness of contempt, and vehemence of de fire, that prompts the act of injuftice, will more ftrongly incite its juftification; and refentment can feldom fo exactly ballance the punishment with the fault, but there will remain an overplus of vengeance, which even he who condemns his first action will think himself entitled to retaliate. What then can ensue but a continual exacerbation of hatred, an unextinguishable feud, an incessant reciprocation of mischief, a mutual vigilance to entrap, and effort to destroy? Since the imaginary right of vengeance must be at laft remitted, because it is impoffible to live in perpetual hoftility, and equally impoffible, that of two enemies, either fhould think himself obliged by justice to fubmiffion; it is furely eligible to forgive early. Every paffion is more easily fubdued before it has been accustomed to long poffeffion of the heart; every idea is obliterated with lefs difficulty, as it has been more flightly impreffed, and |