one was for Philippe I., the other for Philippe V. The one for declaring the throne vacant by the departure of the elder branch of the Bourbons, the other for filling it by the choice of the people.

The natural bent of these two parties would have led them to diverge even wider than they did. The enthusiasts for liberty would have taken the republicthe advocates of order would willingly have declared for Henry V. But there was a third party-the personal party of the Duc d'Orléans, which appealed to the sympathies of the republicans-to the ideas of the legitimists. To the first it said, I fought with you in the days of July, and I propose to you the soldier of Jemmapes. To the second it said, the Duc d'Orléans is a Bourbon, and remember the revolution of 1788. In this manner the revolution which had been commenced and continued without a plan, was constituted and confirmed with one.

Its natural consequences were vast concessions to popular opinion in the moment of passion. The triumph of the party in favour of order and tranquillity, when tranquillity and order were restored. And lastly -since in order to overthrow the former government the personal friends of the Duc d'Orléans had been obliged to side rather with those who were for destroying than with those who were conserving-they would, when the principles of the present reign became conservative, be obliged to separate, either from their party or their patron.

In order to have a proper idea of the present king's policy, it is necessary to be perpetually referring to the policy by which his election was dictated. Very few of the French understand their own revolution. They cry out against the "juste milieu.” Their revolution, as I have said, was the " juste milieu." Louis Philippe was the " 'juste milieu." If they had expected, through peaceable representa. tions, the respect, the attention, the confidence of the despotic governments of Europe, they should not have taken Louis Philippe: if they had expected war

with those governments, a reign of glory and action, they should not have taken Louis Philippe. If they had expected from the crown the continued perpetual concession of popular rights, they should not have taken Louis Philippe; for they should not have taken a man with the passions and the ambition of a man. If they had expected tranquillity in the South of France,-submission in La Vendée on the one hand-or an abhorrence to hereditary rights, and a detestation of the royal name of France on the other, they should not have taken Louis Philippe. Directly they chose their sovereign, they ought to have considered that they had traced, for ten years at least, the direction of their revolution. They had chosen the Duc d'Orléans to satisfy those who were against the family of Charles X. They had chosen a Bourbon, in order to reconcile the friends of legitimate succession; they had chosen a monarchy, in order to pacify those who were afraid of a republic; they had made that monarchy the commencement of a new era, in order to satisfy the republicans and more than all, they had chosen peace in the selection they had made, and evinced a dislike, if not a fear, of war;-and yet there is not one of the parties to whom Louis Philippe was a compromise, that has not alternately claimed the triumph of its own opinions.

Was Louis Philippe's government the one likely to allow the family at Holyrood to enter France? Was Louis Philippe's government the one to pull down from the public edifices the fleurs-de-lis? Was Louis Philippe's government the one likely to march hand-inhand with the Americo-republican Lafayette? was Louis Philippe's government the one best calculated to remonstrate effectually with the Emperor of Russia, or to march with the tri-colour flying, in favour of the Poles? Was Louis Philippe's govern

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ment the one which would command the ear of Prince Metternich-or Louis Philippe's the name that would speak to the Austrian veterans of Austerlitz and Marengo! No; Louis Philippe's government was a gov

ernment of peace-of peace to be obtained by an unpretending posture abroad, by a sober, quiet position at home. It was the government of the "juste milieu," as Louis Philippe himself was the "juste milieu" between a variety of thoughts and things. It was a government of the "bourgeoisie," in which we were neither to look for the chivalry of ancient France, nor the turbulent energy of the Republic, nor the military greatness of the empire, nor the hereditary majesty of the Restoration.

It was a government of the "bourgeoisie" in action as in ideas, of that order which is least susceptible to imaginative impressions; the most likely to be conducted by material interests; of that class which looks to the enjoyment of the ordinary rights and pursuits of life; and which occupies itself the least with the governmental theories and the state of Europe; of that class which, in the present state of civilization, forms the bulk of every nation, but rarely the force; given, too much, in every crisis, to cry, like the Italian marquis when hoisted on the shoulders of the Carbonari, and proclaimed chief of the Piedmontese revolution, "Faites ce que vous voulez, messieurs; mais, ne me chiffonez pas."

It was this feeling which created the first reluctance to fire upon the insurgents of June, and produced, after it was put down, the cry of " Vive l'état de siège!" It was this feeling which, on a late occasion, sanctioned the barbarities of the troops, and permitted an innocent family to be butchered in cold blood, because somebody, in somebody's part of the building they inhabited, had disturbed the order so beloved by the bourgeois of Paris.

Such is the government of Louis Philippe; such, if he remain, must his government remain; a government of order and peace. If a foreign war break out, there is the chance of a military republic; if internal agitation long continue, there is a chance for the Bonapartes; there is even a chance of Henry V. The sovereign's policy is distinctly traced, nor can he

govern by any other party than that which, possessing the ideas conformable to his origin, is alone compatible with his existence. They who exclaim against the policy which is the destiny of Louis Philippe's reign, exclaim against Louis Philippe himself.

Now who are the men by whom the inevitable policy of Louis Philippe can best be supported?

The principles of those who are placed at the head of a government, more especially when that government is a government of principle, and has a peculiar line traced out for it, is no doubt an object of great importance; but neither must we forget that to individuals and to names there is also an importance which it is never wise wholly to despise or to neglect.

The cry of "à bas les Jésuites" was fatal to the ministry of Polignac. The cry of "à bas le doctrinaires" was raised against the administration of the Duc de Broglie. "What do you mean by doctrinaries?" is the question that a foreigner is perpetually asking in France, and it is very rare indeed that he gets an answer from which much can be understood.

During the time of the "Restoration" there was a small party in France, consisting chiefly of young men, affecting to consider the Duc de Broglie as their head, and conducting a paper called "The Globe." M. Guizot was their historian, M. Cousin their philosopher. This party was a party of system, which laying down certain ideas as the general basis of all good government, admitted few exceptions to its peculiar plan, and allowing little for time and circumstances, measured by a fixed rule the goodness or badness of all that was meditated or proposed. It was not a school that answered to that of our utilitarians, since it supported the intrinsic merit or demerit of actions, and defended virtues altogether independent of utility. Its metaphysics were German, its politics English. It combated the government of the time by appeals to the reason--and never by appeals to the passions-and from the kind of doctoral tone in which it lectured the public, obtained the name, at that time popular, of "Doctrinaires."

The great misfortune of this party was to have accepted power directly after the days of July, when the minds of men were in that state of agitation which made it necessary to govern them rather through their passions and their imagination than through their judg ment-when there was something more than absurd in speaking with book-learned pedantry of a liberty which had been conquered in a moment of drunken enthusiasm; and measuring out the refinements of legislation to a mob who had conquered with the barricade and the bayonet. The name which had been given as one of respect became then a by-word of ridicule and reproach; and for having at an unfavourable moment wished to govern the nation by its reason, the Doctrinaires lost all their hold upon its sympathies.

The cabinet of M. Lafitte failed through want of administrative skill; and the nation, placed between a bankruptcy and a change of ministers, cheerfully accepted his resignation. The administration of M. C. Périer, unwise and impolitic in many respects, was the administration which, more than any other, represented the destiny and the genius of the existing government; and this was so generally felt and acknowledged, that the overthrow of the minister and the overthrow of the monarch were considered almost synonymous. The system was a weak one, but it was sustained by a man of energy and force.

At Monsieur Périer's death it was necessary to maintain, and difficult to avoid changing, the policy he had pursued. The three alternatives were:-M. Dupin; the Duc de Broglie; M. Odilon Barrot. But M. Dupin would only enter on the condition of forming his own cabinet; and the discontent, or retreat, or expulsion of M. Périer's friends, would necessarily be taken, for the time at least, as the sign of that change which was to be avoided. M. Odilon Barrot could not enter without the real change of which M. Dupin would have been the appearance. The preference then was given, not without some intrigues, to the Duc de Broglie.