1849.] Exposition of John I. 1. 421 and Winer. As to New Testament usage, Mark vi. 3; Matt. xiii. 56; Mark ix. 19; Matt. xxvi. 55; 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 7; Gal. i. 1, 18, and iv. 18, - afford sufficient confirmation of such a meaning. The same thought is more plainly expressed in i. 18, “ Ο ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός,” and in xvii. 5, 6 παρὰ σοί.” It is evident from the expression, that John had not in mind the immanent Logos, but the λόγος προφορικός. Of the last proposition in the verse, “Καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος,” ὁ λόγος being regarded as the subject of the proposition, there are two possible explanations. The first is, that John, by the assertion of the unity of the Logos with God (xaì Oròs ǹv ó hóyos), designs to guard against the idea of such a difference between the Logos and God being implied in the expression, "and the Logos was with God" (лgos Tov Oεór), as would cause this expression to be understood in a sense more or less polytheistical. In this case, the proposition" and the Logos was God" would mean that the hypostatical Logos was no other than God himself, or the immanent Logos. The second explanation is, that John designs by xai Oros lóyos to define more closely the idea of the fellowship, or the immediate relation, of the Logos with God, which is implied in лgоs tòν Ocóν, so that it may not be understood in too wide or loose a sense. The first explanation is that of the ancients. It lies at the foundation of the Church doctrine of the Trinity. But, with all its plausibility, I must reject it, on the following grounds : First, why has not John more definitely expressed the supposed antithesis by a d or an all? The particle xai is too feeble and ambiguous to express the meaning above mentioned. Secondly, why does he not, in the second verse, which has so close a connection with the first, resume the entirely new thought which the words, according to this explanation, would contain? Further, if he had intended to express the personal unity, or unity of being, of the Logos with Oós, then the expression Otós, that is, Orós with the article, might have been expected to be used. On account of the possible ambiguity of Otos without the article, the latter should not have been omitted. Finally, what obliges us, with Theodore of Mopsuestia, to press the idea of the Ergor, the tregóτns, of the Logos, which is, it is true, implied in noos tov Otór, so closely as to be compelled to regard the following proposition, xal Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, as a monotheistic qualification or removal of it? In fact, the personal difference of the Logos would in this way be not merely limited, but altogether annihilated. But this could not have been the design of John, who in a special manner proceeds on the idea of the λόγος προφορικός. The second explanation is, on the contrary, justified by the connection, as well as by the phraseology. John intends to say that the ante-mundane Logos is лgos tov Otór, that is, in such fellowship with God, stands in such a relation to him, that he may be called God. If now there is any historical, though it may be a mediate, connection between the representation of John and Philo, then is sós to be taken in the same sense in which Philo, in order to distinguish the Logos from the absolute God, ( Otós,) calls him simply Otós," without the article, and even & deuregos Osos, the second God, but with the express addition that this last expression is used only figuratively (v narazonσe). If, as we have seen, John understood by the Logos a real Divine person, and yet, as a Christian apostle, certainly adhered to the monotheistic ideal of God in a higher and far purer degree (xvii. 3, 1 John v. 20) than Philo, then must he, not less than Philo, have understood the Osos v o lóyos, "the word was God," in a figurative sense (ἐν καταχρήσει). Thus the meaning of Θεός would be nearly the same as that of Ocios, "Divine." But this [that is, the exact equivalence of Orios and Otos] is not allowed by New Testament usage. We must, then, take Osos without the article, in the indefinite sense of a Divine nature or a Divine being, as distinguished from the definite absolute God, ὁ Θεός, the αὐτόθεος of Origen. Thus the Θεός of John answers to the image of God (sixov rov Oɛov) of Paul, Col. i. 15. This agreement of the doctrine with that of Paul is no mean historical confirmation of our interpretation, although, in the dogmatical analysis of it, there is the disadvantage of being obliged to regard the Aóyos in a subordinate relation to God. Still, however, the idea of unity of nature is implied in the representation of John. Having now finished our grammatical explanation of the prologue of John, we are able to answer the question, whether and how far John has succeeded in the object proposed to * De Somniis I. 599. Comp. Origen. Comment. in Ev. Joan. Tom. II. § 1-3. 1849.] Prologue of John. 423 himself, that of expressing, in the form of the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos, the unity of the ante-mundane and eternal with the historical personality of Christ, that is, his personal preexistence; a doctrine which the Evangelist has plainly expressed in ch. viii. 58, and xvii. 5. The question is two-fold. The first claim to a satisfactory solution of it belonged to the first readers of the Gospel. Did John give an explanation of the subject satisfactory to those readers, and to those who were at the same stand-point of Christian philosophy with them? This purely historical question undoubtedly lies within the limits of an exegetical commentary. Another question, however, remains, namely, how far the doctrinal representation of the prologue is satisfactory at the present day, at our present stand-point of Christian philosophy. If the Gospel be a truly apostolical and canonical writing, this question is theologically necessary. It is a question, however, which belongs to the province of dogmatic and systematic theology, and the discussion of it belongs to an excursus rather than to a commentary on the Gospel of John. But since a comparison of the earlier and more modern modes of thinking, and of the essential idea with its forms of manifestation, must essentially contribute to a full understanding of the prologue of John, such an excursus would seem to be I. When John says, that Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, was the Logos made man, and that the Logos was an ante-mundane, eternal, ever active, revealing hypostasis (offenbarungs-hypostase), and as such, a different hypostasis from God himself, a personal, self-conscious Divine being, it appears plain, how, according to the prevalent philosophy, or gnosis, of the times, Christ could assert that he existed before Abraham, yea, before the foundation of the world. The conception of the Logos in this sense, and in this application, was admitted and intelligible. But John says, moreover, that the Logos "became flesh." This was the peculiarly Christian word of the problem, and in this sense the conception was foreign to the Alexandrian philosophy, and in itself attended with difficulty. The greater importance John attributes to it, the more exactly, one would think, should he have defined so enigmatical a proposition. But this he has not done. When, in another part of the prologue, he speaks of the coming of the Logos" into the world," and "to his own," this presupposes the "aos ¿yivero," but does not exσὰρξ ἐγένετο,” plain it. In the Gospel, we find also the figurative represen tation of the coming down of Christ from heaven (ch. iii. 12, etc.); but this is only a metaphorical expression for the ô λóyos σὰρξ ἐγένετο, - not an explanation, - not a more exact definition of it. This will be the more evident, when we consider that the representation of the descent of Christ from heaven, his ascent into it, and his continual residence in heaven, seems almost to confound the difference between the historical and ante-historical person of Christ. More definite and clear is the representation of the sending of the Son by the Father. But here the question arises, whether this sending is to be conceived of as analogous to a prophetic call, (Comp. i. 6; Matt. iii. 1; Hagg. i. 13,) or to the mission of an angel. Only the last conception, which implies a superhuman person as sent, would express the λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. But still the peculiar enigma remains unexplained, how we are to conceive of the proper human birth of the preexistent personal Logos into the historic person of Jesus Christ, without confounding the Divine and human form of being. That John, by the terms o loyos odo̟š éyévero, intended to express a proper human birth of the Logos, admits of no doubt. The expression, geodai év σagxi, (1 John ἔρχεσθαι σαρκί, iv. 2,) also implies actual birth in human form. If, however, an angel could not, according to any Biblical mode of representation, be conceived of as being born in a truly human manner, it follows that the proposition, ó óyos oaps éyéveto, could not be made intelligible to the Jews by a representation borrowed from the mission of angels into the world. Now it must be assumed that John, by this expression, "the word became flesh," could not have meant to utter a conception that would be unintelligible to the readers of his time. As he has said nothing for the purpose of explaining it, he must have supposed that the proposition, with all its singularity and mysteriousness, was not too difficult to be apprehended by his contemporaries. The most expressive analogy relating to it was afforded by the Platonic doctrine of the preexistence of human souls. So peculiar and mysterious a fact as the incarnation of the Logos could be made conceivable only by analogy. That this doctrine of the preëxistence of human souls was prevalent among the Jews of Alexandria before the time of Philo is evident from the Wisdom of Solomon viii. 19, 20. Philo also expressly 1849.] Incarnation of the Logos. 425 asserts it, in the book De Gigant. (Mang. I. 263, etc.) If, according to Philo, the rational human soul existed before its manifestation in the body as a real person, and even as an image of the absolute, original Logos, then the proposition of John, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, though it may have continued to be incomprehensible to the idealistic Philo, must, to the Christian thinker, who had faith in the historical Son of God, have been conceivable by reason of the fact that it was analogous to the corporeal birth of the preexistent human soul. It is true that no distinct traces of this mode of explaining the matter are to be found in the Apostolic age. But since this view distinctly appears afterwards in the Alexandrian Fathers, especially in Origen, it must be supposed, that, though undeveloped and unexpressed, it was the view which lay at the foundation of the Apostle's conception of the incarnation of the Logos. Under these suppositions, John has, by his representation of the word becoming man, succeeded in making intelligible, to his contemporaries at least, the unity of the ante-mundane and eternal with the historical and temporal personality in the consciousness of Christ. But Christian faith in the only-begotten Son of God has in the proposition of John, ó óyos odos éysveto, not only the original explanation of his problem, but, so far as this explanation proceeded from the genuine Apostolic spirit, the permanent rule for its explanation in the Christian Church. The whole development of the Christian doctrine respecting the person of Christ rests in a preeminent manner on the prologue of John. We can plainly perceive in history how the most diverse and free modes of thinking have found their true position and have been united in this canon or form. But while John may have explained the great problem of the Christian faith according to the philosophy or mode of thinking prevalent among Christians of his age, he did, by his proposition, ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο, tie a new knot in relation to modes of thinking which were to prevail among Christians in later times. The history of doctrines authorizes the conclusion, that, the more this proposition has been taken in its original historical sense, the greater difficulty has been found in the dogmatical exposition of it. If we regard it as an established point, that John understood by the Logos, the absolute, eternal, revealing hypostasis of God, not a mere relation of God in himself, or to the |