the object of aggression on either side. If we look at the example of former periods, we shall not find that any powerful country was ever vanquished through the losses of individuals. It is the conflict of armies by land and of fleets by sea that decide the great contests of nations.

These words remain true, though he afterwards changed his mind not because he thought that the change would be injurious to us, but, as Mr. Choate pointed out, because

if we adopted these principles we should almost reduce war to an exchange of diplomatic notes.2

We reply, as Sir John Lubbock (now Lord Avebury) did in the House of Commons: 'Well, that would be a result which we could contemplate not only with equanimity, but with satisfaction.'

In 1889 the London Chamber of Commerce asked me again to bring the question forward in the House of Commons, but I suggested that before doing so I should see Lord Salisbury, which I did. Lord Salisbury said he was entirely with us, and that if I moved a resolution the Government would support it, that, in his words, we should be pushing at an open door'; but he asked me before doing so to see our Ambassador to France, as he feared that France would oppose. This I did, and Lord Lytton said that if we made such a proposition France would certainly object. He suggested that if some neutral State could make the suggestion it would be more likely to be adopted. Under these circumstances it was thought better to wait for a more favourable opportunity.

Sir Henry Maine, a great authority on international law, writing in 1888, said:

These, of course, are economical reasons, but I also look upon the subject from the point of view of international law. Unless wars must be altogether discarded as certain never again to occur, our situation is one of unexampled danger. Some part of the supplies which are matter of life and death to us may be brought to us as neutral cargo with less difficulty than before the Declaration of Paris was issued; but a nation still permitted to employ privateers can interrupt and endanger our supplies at a great number of points, and so can any nation with a maritime force of which any material portion can be detached for predatory cruising. It seems, then, that the proposal of the American Government to give up privateers on condition of exempting all private property from capture might well be made by some very strong friend of Great Britain. If universally adopted, it would save our food, and it would save the commodities which are the price of our food, from their most formidable enemies, and would disarm the most formidable class of these enemies.

The following States, to their great honour, voted in favour of Mr. Choate's proposal to make private property at sea free from capture or seizure: Germany (with some reservations on * Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, tome iii. p. 775. March 1878.

points of detail), Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Denmark, Equador, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Norway, Holland, Persia, Roumania, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.

Those who opposed were Colombia, Spain, France, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, Panama, Portugal, Russia, Salvador, and, alas! Great Britain.

In 1905 the late Lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn), in a letter to The Times, most emphatically endorses the American doctrine. He says:

It may be asked: What prospect is there of altering the law in this respect, even if we desired it? An answer may be found in the history of this question upon which, instructive though it is, a few words must suffice. During the last fifty years or more the United States have persistently advocated this change, even to the point of refusing to abandon the right of privateering in 1856, unless all property, other than contraband, should be declared free from maritime capture. Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia have all within the last half-century either adopted in their own practice or offered to adopt the American view, and Continental jurists have almost without exception denounced the existing law. Last year President Roosevelt declared in favour of a new international conference at The Hague, and notified that among other matters for deliberation the United States intended again to press this very subject on the attention of the Powers. Unquestionably the American President, with the immense authority he now wields, will exert every effort to maintain his point. I trust that his Majesty's Government will avail themselves of this unique opportunity. I urge it not upon any ground of sentiment or of humanity (indeed, no operation of war inflicts less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels at sea), but upon the ground that on the balance of argument coolly weighed the interests of Great Britain will gain much from a change long and earnestly desired by a great majority of other Powers.

This being the view of one of the principal ministers, it was a great surprise, as well as disappointment, to many of us that our representatives were instructed to vote against the proposal of the United States.

What, then, were their reasons? They did not, I am happy to say, allege that it was opposed to our interests.

The reasons given seem so insufficient that I must give them in the actual words of Sir E. Satow, who was deputed to speak for us. Sir E. Satow said:

Je vous demande la permission de dire quelques mots pour motiver le vote que nous allons déposer. La Délégation de Grande-Bretagne n'a pas cru de son devoir de répondre en détail à tous les arguments présentés en faveur de l'abolition du droit de capturer les navires marchands ennemis et leurs cargaisons. Mais il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que l'abolition du droit de capture entraîne nécessairement l'abolition du blocus commercial. Car l'une et l'autre mesure ont pour but d'entraver le mouvement commercial de l'adversaire, et de le priver, dans la mesure du possible, des fournitures VOL. LXXII-No. 430 4 C

qui lui sont indispensables pour le maintien de la vie économique. D'un autre côté, comme l'ont fait remarquer plus d'un des Délégués à la Conférence, tant que le terme contrebande de guerre' ne sera pas strictement limité aux articles qui par leur nature même peuvent immédiatement être utilisés dans un but militaire, et tant que chaque Puissance individuellement se croit autorisée à comprendre sous cette rubrique toute sorte de vivres et de matières brutes servant aux industries pacifiques, rien ne sera plus facile que de donner à l'exception une étendue aussi large qu'à la règle. Il est donc évident que la proposition d'exempter de la capture et de la confiscation les navires marchands belligérants et leurs cargaisons, n'est qu'une équivoque capable seulement d'égarer l'opinion publique mal instruite. On a fait beaucoup de cas des opinions exprimées par plusieurs écrivains et hommes d'Etat anglais à l'appui de la proposition. Ces opinions datent pour la plupart d'une période assez éloignée où les conditions du commerce et de la guerre maritime étaient tout autres de ce qu'elles sont aujourd'hui. Il ne nous serait pas difficile d'opposer à ces citations d'autres encore provenant de la même source, mais il nous suffira de signaler à l'appréciation de la Commission, l'examen approfondi de la question qui a été fait par un auteur transatlantique contemporain, dont l'autorité prééminente dans cette matière est universellement reconnue, et qui s'est déclaré d'une manière non équivoque en faveur du maintien du droit actuel.

Quant à l'aspect soi-disant humanitaire de la question, l'opinion de la Délégation de la Grande-Bretagne a été exprimée dans une séance antérieure. Il nous paraît donc inutile de faire remarquer encore une fois, que l'abolition du droit de capture, même accompagnée de l'abolition de la contrebande de guerre ainsi que du blocus commercial, ne diminuerait en rien l'inhumanité de la guerre.

Il nous semble entendre une voix qui nous enjoint d'observer modération toutefois-le huitième commandement, mais quand nous lui tendons l'oreille pour écouter ses conseils au sujet du sixième commandement, cette voix reste muette.

On a fait allusion aux paragraphes deux et trois de la Déclaration de Paris, et l'on s'est efforcé de prouver que cette déclaration, en accordant immunité à la marchandise ennemie sous pavillon neutre, ainsi qu'a la marchandise neutre sous pavillon ennemi-à l'exception de la contrebande de guerre dans chaque cas-avait pour but de rendre la guerre moins désastreuse pour le commerce maritime en général. Mais il ressort de l'histoire de cette déclaration que son vrai but était de concilier la règle française de navires libres, marchandises libres' avec la règle anglaise de l'immunité de la merchandise neutre sous pavillon ennemi. Il est clair que l'effet de la règle nouvelle était de sauvegarder les intérêts des neutres, en protégeant leurs marchandises contre la capture et leurs navires contre la saisie, et que l'intention était nullement d'accorder une protection au commerce belligérant. Nous regardons donc notre proposition d'abolir la contrebande de guerre, dans toute l'étendue de l'expression, comme le seul pas en avant qu'on ait fait de nos jours pour le développement du vrai principe de la Déclaration de Paris. Au sujet de la proposition de la Délégation belge (Annexe 14) amendée par la Délégation des Pays-Bas (Annexe 15), nous croyons ne pouvoir l'accepter non plus. Les avantages pour les propriétaires des navires cargaisons saisis et sequestrés seraient à notre avis très douteux, tandis qu'en même temps des devoirs fort onéreux seraient imposés aux belligérants. Pour ces raisons la Délégation de Grande-Bretagne donnera un vote négatif.

D'accord donc avec nos instructions, basées sur une logique et un

raisonnement à notre avis irréfutables, nous nous voyons obligés de voter contre la proposition de la Délégation des Etats-Unis.

The reasons then given were (1) that

l'abolition du droit de capture entraîne nécessairement l'abolition du blocus commercial.

The abolition of the right of blockade would be, however, a great advantage. This, therefore, is in reality a reason for, and not against, the American proposal. The second reason was (2) that:

tant que le terme 'contrebande de guerre' ne sera par strictement limité aux articles qui par leur nature même peuvent immédiatement être utilisés dans un but militaire, et tant que chaque Puissance individuellement se croit autorisée à comprendre sous cette rubrique toute sorte de vivres et de matières brutes servant aux industries pacifiques, rien ne sera plus facile que de donner à l'exception une étendue aussi large qu'à la règle.

We ourselves, however, had a proposal to do away with the right of declaring any goods contraband of war. Our resolution

was:

1. La marchandise appartenant à un ressortissant d'une Puissance Contractante neutre embarquée à bord d'un navire neutre ou ennemi ne peut pas être condamnée comme étant de contrabande.

2. Le pavillon d'une Puissance Contractante neutre couvre toute la marchandise à bord.5

The American proposal would have led up to this, and the second reason given by Sir E. Satow against the American proposal was again really one in its favour.

It seems remarkable that, after having voted against the proposal to make private property at sea free of capture and seizure, we ourselves proposed to abolish contraband of war. I confess I cannot understand this apparently inconsistent action.

The third reason we gave was (3) that the American proposal would not diminish the inhumanity of war. Surely it would; but at any rate it would tend to diminish the disastrous effects. It was not put forward as a cure for all evils. It would not abolish gout, cure cancer, or prevent earthquakes, but that is no reason for not supporting it. The British reasons for voting against the excellent resolution proposed by America seem to me unworthy of us, contradictory, and insufficient. Our objection was not that it went too far, but apparently that it did not go far enough! Let us now consider the material reasons which ought surely to have induced us to give it our hearty support.

Under existing circumstances the mere apprehension of a war practically diminishes the value of every ship afloat-not merely the fact of war, but even the fear of war. Recollect, moreover, • Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, tome iii. pp. 832-3. Ibid. tome ii. p. 1166.

the immense damage which three or four vessels inflicted on American shipping during the war between the North and the South.

We have heard a great deal in this discussion about the Navy; but let me ask, Is our Navy intended to protect our commerce, or our commerce to support our Navy?

Our rule as regards the Navy is that it should be as strong as those of any two Powers, but our Mercantile. Marine is as great as those of all the rest of the world put together.

That the proposal to make private property free from capture or seizure would be desirable in the general interests of mankind no one probably would contest; and that being so, even if it were contrary to British interests, we ought not, I think, to withhold our consent.

But let us consider whether it would be contrary to our interests.

The greatest of British interests is not only the peace but the prosperity of the world. A selfish policy is not only wrong but foolish. The country would, I am sure, by an overwhelming majority, give up any claim which could be clearly shown to be unjust, ungenerous, or injurious to the general interests.

The proposal to render ships free from capture and seizure is one clearly for the general advantage, and it is therefore for those who oppose it to show that it would be so dangerous to this country as to justify us in resisting. This, however, I not only deny, but maintain that we ourselves should be great gainers by the change.

No one can have read the various debates and discussions that have taken place on this subject without feeling that on one point there is an overwhelming consensus of opinion—namely, that the present state of things is unsatisfactory, and may become dangerous.

On the other hand, while statesmen and politicians have been much divided in opinion as to the course which we ought to pursue, the representatives of our commerce have been almost unanimous in considering that we ought to proceed on the lines of the Declaration of Paris.

The fact is our statesmen think of our Navy and our power of inflicting injury on our opponents in war; while mercantile men think of our Mercantile Marine and the material interests of the country.

The provisions of the Declaration of Paris to which we have agreed are as follows":

(1) Privateering is and remains abolished.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Declaration of Paris must not be confused with the Declaration of London.