one left standing, which is the object of their love and fervent sympathy.

Truly the simple fact, well ascertained, of the existence of a multitude of native Christians loyal to the Porte might give our latter-day Crusaders pause, since it deflates their diatribes. The Christian churches of the East are many; Turkey has let them all survive together. Would any Christian Power have done as much? They value foreign interference only as it raises one above another. Collectively they stand to lose by any change. Under any other rule they would ere long grow discontented, and sentimentalise about old times,' as do the Copts in Egypt. The majority now know enough of the conditions which prevail in other countries to recognise that even a chaotic, mediaeval Turkey, prolific of disorders and unsafe for travel, is better as a place of residence and less oppressive of the individual than, for example, Russia.

As for Turkish government, rough in the hand, but genial in the head,' I believe that most of them regard it in the abstract with some slight affection. The Orthodox Greek Church of Turkey long ago declined to be the cat's paw of an anti-Moslem Power. Her punishment was the Bulgarian exarch. The Armenian Church has suffered more than any other from the Mohammedan mob, and she preserves the spirit of a nationality; yet it is truly to be doubted if a majority among her members would be found to vote for any foreign ruler but the Turk. The lesser, weaker Churches are protected under Moslem rule from the aggressions of the greater. All have equal standing. As in the hotbed of religious strife, Jerusalem, the Moslem keeps the Christians from each other's throats.

If Christians thus support the Sultan, what of the Mohammedans? Their loyalty is a religious sentiment, extending far beyond the Turkish Empire into ours. The world of El Islâm is still, what Christendom has ceased to be, one mind, one body for religion. The genuine Turks-a small, superior race, enjoying the prestige of aristocracy-alone of all Mohammedans have stepped out from the Middle Ages into modern life. Others have seemed to do so at the behest of Christian tutors and through imitation; but they are subject to relapses one has seen in Egypt. The Turks have made the journey by themselves. They promise to evolve a civilisation as 'modern' as our own and owing much to ours, yet independent and perhaps superior, as building less upon mechanical contrivance, more on culture of its citizens. They are Hanafis, members of the only Sunnite sect of El Islâm which values reason as a guide above tradition. They, therefore, in their faith itself can welcome progress which Mâlikis and Shefa'is would deem ungodly. And their influence

upon their co-religionists is almost boundless. It was they who overthrew the recent tyranny whose ministers were chiefly Arabs of the baser sort. It is they-though not the Young Turk, harebrained section-who rule to-day the counsels of the Empire. To show the influence they can exert on populations commonly esteemed fanatical, and also the sincerity of even ignorant Moslems in the desire for a new era when, in the spring of 1909, the late Sultan was employed upon his counter-revolution, secret emissaries were despatched in all directions to stir up insurrection (which means massacre) with the notion of discrediting the new régime. Only in one district round Mersin and Adana did massacres take place. Elsewhere quite common Moslems of the class that generally loves a riot-at Beyrout it was some boatmen-caught the envoys soon after their landing and led them to the Government for deportation. Turks worked among the rescuers.

At Adana

Upon the Turks, with their prestige as fellow-tribesmen and companions of the Caliph, as liberators of the realm, rests all the hope of the Islâmic world. The indignation felt by Moslems everywhere at their unjust treatment by the Powers of Europe is immeasurable, and may at any moment become dangerous. The Turks are conscious of this peril at their backs, and are doing all they can to ward it off. In the capital they were in a position to maintain good order without the presence of the foreign warships in the Bosphorus. But in the provinces there cannot fail to be some ugly outbreaks when the tidings of defeat are known, as must soon happen, in spite of false news circulated with the best intentions. These disorders the presence of the foreign warships in the Bosphorus will exacerbate, since all the Powers concerned are viewed as enemies to El Islâm. And who can say how far the flames may spread?

It seems to me a great misfortune for the British Empire that a Moslem Power, the Caliphate, should be put down for the mere wish to practise what we have for years been preaching—a nationality that shall be independent of religious differences. For it comes to that. In the four years since religious toleration was proclaimed in Turkey, Turkey has had a number of assailants, no defender. The backward Moslem races will regard these national disasters as a 'judgment' upon Turkish innovations; and that must do incalculable harm.

The most disheartening fact revealed by the collapse of the so-called Concert of Great Powers is that England with her millions of Mohammedans has no settled Moslem policy. Is it too much to expect that harassed statesmen should have some faint conception of Pan-Islâmism in its higher meaning? Perhaps it is. But mere humanity demands consideration of the

problem offered by the poor Mohammedan. The Allies may say, at the conclusion of the war, that the said problem is no longer of importance in the European provinces, so few of the Mohammedan inhabitants remaining. The trouble will be thus transferred to Asia, and rendered more acute by more congestion if the aggressive policy of Europe is maintained. Who can say, after this exhibition of their impotence, that the Great Powers can guarantee the integrity of Turkey in Asia? The raids on any trifling pretext are as likely to continue till not a scrap of independent Moslem territory is left. Conquest is no true solution of the difficulty; it only bottles up a spirit which must have an outlet, and prevents the Moslem population from its own development. The principles formulated at the revolution, and since adopted by the Turkish nation as a whole, were as hopeful for the Moslem as the Christian. There seems a danger that in any settlement arranged by Christian Europe the claims of the Mohammedan may be ignored.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL.

VOL. LXXII-No. 430

4 D

THE OUTLOOK IN THE NEAR EAST

(II)

THE BALKAN CRISIS IN A NUTSHELL

HUMANITY has been staggered, to borrow Krüger's prophetic phrase, by the result of the war in the Balkans. But to those who happened to be acquainted with the true state of affairs this result has not come as a surprise. To them it was a subject for marvel that Bulgaria had delayed so long, as her army was second to none in efficiency, and it could be confidently assumed that it could at any time make its way to Constantinople in the course of a few weeks. The only explanation was that King Ferdinand, who is a consummate diplomatist but no soldier, was instinctively reluctant to take the field. He has since shown that he waited to some purpose, as he rendered success a certainty by securing the co-operation of Servia, Montenegro, and Greece. If Bulgaria with her own unaided efforts was sure of victory, the collapse of Turkey with the four States against her was bound to be tremendous, as it has proved to be. There can, under such circumstances, be no return to the status quo ante bellum, and the only question now before us is the partition of the conquered territory.

Will the victors divide all the spoils between them, or will certain portions be ruled out of their spheres and receive some measure of independent autonomy? Then will Servia be permitted to attain her cherished desire of securing one or more ports on the Adriatic? As regards Albania the case is clear enough. Servia has no right to lay claim to a province which is inhabited by an alien population which detests her very name.

Well founded is Austria's objection to the Adriatic port programme, which, if carried out, would expose her to the presence at such a naval station of a hostile fleet within easy distance of Trieste. Austria has given unmistakable evidence of readiness to come to terms with Servia, and if complications are to ensue it will be through no fault of hers.

As for all the speculation regarding the eventual fate of Constantinople, the idea that it might be retained by Bulgaria is based on utter misconception of the real state of the case. The Greeks have always looked forward to recovering their old Byzantium if the power of the Turks were broken, and they have every

historic and moral right to it. Politicians who never get below the surface are too prone to miss the fact that it was through the dissensions of Greeks, Slavs, and of Bulgarians, who are of the Ugrian race, and therefore quite distinct, that the Ottomans were enabled to establish their empire in the Balkan Peninsula, and that it was owing to their rivalry that it was maintained. They argue, too, as if Austria had no voice in the question, forgetting that her armies were the first to arrest the Mussulman tide and to free or to secure better terms for some of the vanquished races. Russia has not been the sole champion of the Christians of the East, and Servia in particular has every reason to be grateful to Austria for her action in the past centuries.

When this fateful war began, experts in the Eastern Question turned curious eyes to Roumania, as the appearance of an army on her south-eastern frontier would have considerably hampered Bulgaria's operations. Some time ago there was a rumour, which obtained a certain amount of credit, that Roumania had actually concluded an alliance with the Porte. It was impossible to obtain any direct confirmation or contradiction of this report, which is now shown to have been utterly unfounded. But there is no 'doubt that a mere hint from Austria would have led to such a demonstration, and here, again, her Government has proved its desire to abstain from any step which might complicate an already sufficiently tangled situation. Roumania is the strongest, and is by far the most advanced of the Balkan States, and it is with her and with Austria that the future rests, as, while the Allies have been signally victorious, they are in some degree exhausted by the struggle, and although they may defy the European Concert such as it is, they would soon be compelled to lower their tone if Austria or Roumania showed any disposition to step in.

And what of Russia, who is suspected in Vienna of inspiring for her own ends Servia's reluctance to treat? It has often been argued that Austria took advantage of Russia's weakness after the great war with Japan to proclaim the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet years before that war broke out Austria was regarded in competent military quarters as more than a match for Russia. If a downright quarrel were unhappily to break out, the result could be predicted with complete confidence-that is to say, if such a war were confined to these Powers: and why should it not be?

There is too much disposition to represent this question as one between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, the fact being lost sight of that not one of Austria's or Russia's allies or friends is bound to assist either party under such conditions as these. To take one case alone. The French Republic, whose policy is so practical and pacific, would resist any attempt to drag