system which is adopted by foreign countries. There is on first appearance one drawback to it, namely, that owners might send unsuitable animals and the worst of their stud; but if their horses have been properly classified, in the manner which I have attempted to describe, and if instructions have been given to them in an intelligent way, there should not be a great risk of this happening, especially as the price (a war price) would be rather over than under the value of the average animal; and, supposing a few owners did act in the above-mentioned manner, a purchaser could be sent, when convenient, to buy such horses as he wished at the owners' stables. Should owners not send their horses to 'collecting stations' for purchase, the only way in which to attempt to do the work would be by increasing the number of purchasers. They would have to travel from one place to another to buy the horses (two or three or four at a time) at their stables; each purchaser would have to be accompanied by a veterinary surgeon, and an orderly with his tools for branding or marking the purchased horses; and a clerk may also be required. Even supposing that the deputy assistant director of remounts of the county or area could find a number of voluntary purchasers in the various districts capable of selecting horses fit and suitable for the troops, and of putting a price on them, it would take a long time, and, what is more serious, it is impossible to estimate precisely how long; and each purchaser would probably have different ideas as to what a suitable horse should be. as If the work were carried out in this manner it would be exceedingly complicated, and it leaves the purchasing' in a state of uncertainty as regards the length of time it will take, well as the efficiency of its accomplishment; but, in a matter of such serious moment as mobilisation, there should be scarcely any room for doubt or uncertainty in any of the steps that lead up to its culmination. The first method suggested, the bringing together of the horses for purchase, would be the most satisfactory and least expensive one to adopt; it would be simpler, less likely to break down, and the horses would be the better purchased 'to stamp,' in that considerably fewer purchasing agents would be necessary; and the number of veterinary surgeons and other personnel would be lessened, yet be of greater value, being, so to speak, under the master's eye. The deputy assistant director of remounts could in these circumstances do the work efficiently with the help of two or three voluntary purchasers, whom we presume he would have chosen with the greatest care; these purchasers should preferably be retired officers, or, if they were not available, gentlemen of stand ing in the county; and, obviously, anyone who had been engaged in classification should also act as a purchaser. I may remark that regulations have been in vogue for some time by which certain pay is given to voluntary purchasers, veterinary surgeons, and clerks who are employed when mobilisation takes place. The veterinary surgeons should be chosen by the deputy assistant director of remounts, and their names submitted to headquarters of the command. Instructions will have been given to the deputy assistant director of remounts from headquarters of the command as to the day of mobilisation on which horses should arrive at their destination; he must make arrangements accordingly for timely purchase, but there is no necessity to hold back purchased horses which are going to the same place of mobilisation,' even if some of them are not necessarily required till two or three days later than others; the convenience of the railways, train loads, and so on, must be considered. If desirable, purchasing can be carried out at two collecting stations on the same day, and it would probably be found necessary to arrange for this from the second day onward; I think that 100 to 120 horses could be efficiently purchased (which includes veterinary examination for workable soundness, branding, and sending off by road or loading in trucks) at each collecting station per diem; if this surmise is correct, all the horses required for mobilisation (not including a reserve) could be bought by the fifth or sixth day. There is one question more concerning purchase which requires consideration whether (bearing in mind that the horses are purchased under the Impressment Act) it would be well to attach a gentleman of standing in the county, or some civil authority, to the purchaser at each collecting station for the purpose of assisting to fix the price to be paid for the horses, especially in cases of dispute; the Impressment Act says that 'due payment,' which presumably means a fair price, will be made. It would perhaps be desirable that some such civil authority should be so appointed. With regard to purchasing horses for the Territorial forces : it has been suggested that adjutants of the various units should classify horses and 'turns-out' for their own requirements, under guidance of the deputy assistant director of remounts of the county or area acting under instructions from the headquarters of the command. The purchase of horses and turns-out' would be conducted by a small committee of the regiment or brigade (artillery), consisting of the adjutant and one or, maybe, two officers; this committee should be given powers similar to those possessed by the deputy assistant director of remounts of purchasing animals by impressment. The adjutant would be responsible for: (1) Making arrangements for collection and purchase under the supervision of and instructions from the deputy assistant director of remounts. (2) Conveyance of the horses to the place of mobilisation' of the regiment. He should submit his proposed arrangements to the deputy assistant director of remounts, who would forward the same, when he considers them satisfactory, to the headquarters of the command for sanction. Having now considered the question of the remount staff, it will be observed that, for the purpose of acquiring about 44,000 horses for the expeditionary force, and 86,000 for the Territorial forces, forty-four deputy assistant directors of remounts should be appointed to counties and areas, in addition to one attached to the staff of the headquarters of the command. At first sight it appears to be a large increase to the Remount Department, but its establishment even then would be small when compared with that which is kept up in Continental countries; the expense entailed would be offset by a reduction in the numbers of registered horses which are automatically disappearing. The provision of horses to the expeditionary force in due time is of such supreme importance to its fighting power that the consideration of a few thousands of pounds should surely not weigh heavily in the balance. In conclusion, I would lay emphasis on the necessity of, firstly, obtaining full knowledge of the state of our horse supply, and, secondly, of keeping ourselves acquainted with the changes that occur in it from time to time. The only guide that gives any indication of the number of horses in the kingdom is the police census taken in 1910; it includes horses of all ages, sound and unsound, fit and unfit; it gives us little encouragement to believe that, even at the present time, there exists a larger number of horses than is required for mobilisation, and a small reserve for casualties in war. In these circumstances it is quite probable that the time is not very far distant when the State will have to resort to those methods which are adopted on the Continent for ensuring a supply of suitable horses for the Army when engaged in war. H. N. SCHOFIELD, THE TRUTH' ABOUT THE FRANCO- A REPLY TO M. PHILIPPE MILLET ... The French Parliament, by an abuse morally if not constitutionally unpardonable, was kept in worse than ignorance of this policy [the AngloFrench agreement of April 1904]. It was not altogether hidden. One side alone was shown: the advantages, but not the price. . . . Why was the French Parliament only told half the truth when it was asked to pronounce upon our accord with England? Why was it not allowed to suspect that this accord had, as a complement and corrective, secret clauses, other Secret Treaties? It is this double game towards Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of trust. . . . To-day the accord of 1904 appears in its truth and in its vanity. It was a treaty of friendship with England, recognising our freedom of political action in Morocco, and proclaiming also our intention to respect the integrity of that country. That is what the Public knew and approved. But the Public was ignorant of the facts that at the same time, by other Treaties or by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between France and Spain had been prepared-of that Morocco whose integrity we guaranteed. We understand now, among many other motives, why the Franco-German Convention of February 1909 could not work. situation remained vitiated. There were two irreconcilable French policies in Morocco: that of the public arrangements—that is, the policy of the integrity of Morocco-which was not the true one; and that of the secret arrangements, postulating the Protectorate and the partition of Morocco.PARON D'ESTOURNELLES DE CONSTANT, speaking in the French Senate on February 6, 1912. ... The M. PHILIPPE MILLET, colonial editor of Le Temps, has undertaken to defend Franco-British diplomacy in the Morocco question from the criticisms levelled at it by myself in this Review. Apart from his own contribution to that end, the fountain at which he draws his supplies is, he tells us, a volume entitled Le Mystère d'Agadir, by his colleague on Le Temps, the foreign editor, M. André Tardieu. We are, therefore, to understand that it is the machinery of Le Temps that is turned on to defend that diplomacy. This circumstance will not be without interest to anyone who has followed, with any degree of attention, the fierce polemics which have raged in France round the part played by that machinery in this and other delicate problems of international importance. 2 A case developed in some forty pages of this Review,' and in a book of nearly four hundred pages, which is also attacked by M. Millet, cannot be summarised in a couple of paragraphs, especially when a proper appreciation of the elements which compose it involves a study of events covering a considerable number of years and an examination of numerous public documents inherent thereto. 3 Broadly speaking, what is the case I have presented for study, and which M. Millet describes in his own fashion, forgetting the saying of one of his countrymen that an argument is not met by caricaturing it? It is, that the British national interest has not been well served by the attitude of our diplomacy, either during the recent Morocco crisis or in the course of the events which preceded it. It is, that the British national interest did not lie in the direction of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of the French military and colonial parties, who wished to swallow the Morocco plum before it was ripe. It is, that in secretly assenting in October 1904 to a secret Convention providing for the partition of Morocco between France and Spain (now actually accomplished) British diplomacy was unfair to the British people and unfair to Germany. Unfair to the British people because it made them, without their knowledge, residuary legatees of an inevitable Franco-German conflict arising out of the French design to ostracise Germany from a voice in the ultimate solution of the Morocco problem. Unfair to Germany because Germany possessed de facto and de jure an indisputable right to be treated as a factor in that problem, having previously co-operated for twenty years in upholding against French intrigue Lord Salisbury's policy of the independence and integrity of Morocco; kept an embassy at the Sultan's Court since 1873; played a prominent part in the first international conference concerning Morocco in 1880, known as the Madrid Convention, which established the open door for the trade of all nations; concluded a commercial treaty with Morocco; cordially supported Lord Salisbury's envoy to Fez, whose mission was upset by French manoeuvres; developed between 1880 and 1904 considerable and 1 November 1911 and February 1912. * Morocco in Diplomacy. (Smith, Elder & Co.) * See in above, Appendix VI. • Concluded by the German representative at Fez in 1890. The Treaty was communicated by the German Government to the signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention, accompanied by the intimation that Germany would only ratify it subject to their approval. See Morocco in Diplomacy for text of Treaty, Appendix II. C. 6821 and C. 6815, Times, July 18, 22, August 13, 1892. Also Times, July 19, 1892. ... Count Tattenbach, the German Minister, has been especially prominent in supporting the British attitude to obtain rights which would benefit all European nations.' VOL. LXXII-No. 425 Ꭰ |