were, apparently over two-thirds were either acquitted or sentenced to be detained in lunatic asylums. Collier's Weekly has calculated that for a man committing a murder the odds against execution are about eighty to one. We have never heard that other offences can be committed in America with such high hopes of impunity. On the other hand, we have heard a great deal of the enormous difficulty of getting together a jury free from persons who object to capital punishment on principle. Would it be utterly preposterous to assume that this glorious security which the murderer enjoys is not wholly unconnected with the practice of capital punishment?

In a recent contribution to the Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, in which he advocates the retention of the death penalty, Professor Wundt, of Leipzig, the eminent philosopher, writes as follows:

The most formidable objection to the deterrent' theory of capital punishment consists in the figures furnished by statistics. These show that the effect of the death penalty-more especially when carried out for purposes of intimidation after the manner of a public spectacle—is an increase, rather than a decrease, in offences which violate the sanctity of human life.

It is, however, wholly unnecessary from the present point of view to claim as much as this for the various figures given here. If they have merely shown that there is no empirical ground for assuming the deterrent qualities of the death penalty they will have served their purpose. For I hope to have already demonstrated that there is no basis of reason upon which this assumption can be made, and that apart from its supposed deterrent virtue capital punishment can have no possible justification."

A. F. SCHUSTER.

It may be worth mentioning that, since this article was written, at the Deutsche Juristen-Tag, a meeting of representative lawyers from all parts of Germany and Austria held this year at Vienna and very largely attended, a motion in favour of the abolition of capital punishment was only rejected by a very narrow majority.

PANAMA: THE DIFFICULTY AND ITS

SOLUTION

THE Panama policy of the United States has caused much surprise, disappointment and irritation in Great Britain, and the angry protests against America's 'breach of faith' which have lately appeared in the British Press have very naturally aroused much resentment on the other side of the Atlantic, and have led to vehement attacks upon Great Britain in the American newspapers. The possibility of a serious Anglo-American quarrel has filled with great joy those who are not friendly to the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and with great concern those who, like the writer of these pages, hope for an Anglo-Saxon reunion, and believe that the peace of the world can most firmly be established, not by unpractical schemes of international disarmament advocated by visionaries, but by the hearty, determined and practical co-operation of the British Empire and the United States.

Quarrels between States and between individuals arise most frequently from hastiness, lack of thought and mutual misunderstandings. The Panama controversy is no exception to the rule. The American politicians and pressmen whose views we have heard on this side of the ocean have perhaps not sufficiently considered the ultimate consequences of the policy. which they have forced upon their Government. Their views. will probably before long be influenced by the opinion of their statesmen, their military and naval experts, and other public servants. American diplomacy, being constantly hustled and driven by immature and ill-informed public opinion, is apt to act rashly and impulsively, and to make initial mistakes. But usually it corrects these mistakes in time, for Americans, above all men, are open-minded. On the other hand, the British publicists, who have loudly complained of the Panama policy of the United States, have shown that they are, practically without exception, insufficiently acquainted with the facts and with the American view of the case and the peculiar difficulties of American diplomacy. I have had the opportunity of discussing in Washington the Panama problem in all its bearings with some of the leading American statesmen, admirals and

generals, and with the heads of the Government departments concerned in it. Let us, then, study dispassionately the Panama question in the light of information much of which will be new to the British public, and let us especially try to understand and appreciate the American point of view.

The Panama problem has a politico-military and an economic aspect. Although the politico-military aspect is undoubtedly by far the more important one of the two, the economic aspect has monopolised public attention. It has exclusively been discussed on both sides of the Atlantic, as if the Panama question was not one of the greatest national questions affecting England and America, but merely a question of pounds, shillings and pence and a shipping question. However, let us first consider the economic aspect of the Panama problem.

The Panama policy of the United States, considered from the economic point of view, is part of their shipbuilding and shipping policy. Very little is known in Great Britain of America's maritime policy and conditions, and of her maritime history, disappointments, hopes and ambitions. Yet a knowledge of America's maritime conditions and ambitions is essential for understanding her Panama policy.

Few people in Great Britain know how incredibly quickly American shipping has declined. Its downward course during the last sixty years will be seen at a glance from the following table:

TOTAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY SEA
(From the Report of the Commissioner of Navigation)

In 1850 more than seven-tenths of the American foreign trade was carried in American vessels. Now less than one-tenth of the American trade is carried in such vessels.

In the United States and elsewhere it is frequently asserted that the Civil War destroyed' the American merchant marine. That assertion is not correct. The American shipping engaged in the foreign trade was diminished not only by the attacks of hostile cruisers, but still more by being transferred from the

foreign to the coasting trade; for, in the absence of adequate railways, the coasting trade had received an enormous impetus through the war which made huge transports of food and war materials necessary. The rapidity with which the American ships were so transferred will be seen from the following figures : TONNAGE OF AMERICAN VESSELS

In the course of the war the tonnage of American vessels engaged in the foreign trade diminished by almost 1,000,000 tons, whilst that engaged in the coasting trade increased by almost 700,000 tons. The actual war losses suffered by the American merchant marine through capture and through the placing of American shipping under foreign flags were not as great as is generally believed.

Since the time of the war the character of the American merchant marine has curiously changed. The shipping engaged in the foreign trade has slowly and almost continuously diminished, whilst that engaged in the coasting trade has almost continuously and very greatly increased, as follows:

During the decade 1900-1910 the American coastal shipping has increased by considerably more than 2,000,000 tons, a truly wonderful progress.

Many causes have contributed to the decline of the American merchant marine. Of these the Civil War is only one. Another cause lay in the evolution of the ship towards the middle of last century. During the sailing-ship era the United States had, as far as the shipping industries are concerned, an enormous advantage over the nations of Europe, and especially over thinly wooded Great Britain, through the cheapness of timber and of the other important raw materials required in shipbuilding, which were plentiful and extremely cheap in America, and which were very scarce and very dear in Europe. That advantage was lost with the advent of the iron ship.

Many people in the United States and in Great Britain believe that the decline of the maritime industries of the United States has been caused by the policy of Protection. However, according to the best American authorities, the former prosperity of the United States shipping was due not to Free Trade, but to rigorous Protection, and the decline of the United States shipping was due not to Protection but to the withdrawal of Protectionto Free Trade. On that point the very important Report of the American Merchant Marine Commission, which examined all the leading shipping people in the United States, contains the following weighty pronouncement:

The American merchant fleet from 1800 to 1860 was the second in size and the most enterprising, efficient and profitable in existence. But throughout most of that time it was a protected industry-protected at first by discriminating duties and tonnage taxes, which were not completely removed against our most formidable rival until 1849; protected later by the California gold discovery and the Crimean War. When these factors lost their power, as they did in 1855-1856, there came the sharpest and most significant decline that American shipbuilding has ever suffered in the half-decade from 1855 to 1860.

How powerful the American shipbuilding industry was even during the very period of 1855-1860, when, as we are authoritatively informed, it suffered the sharpest and most significant decline that it has ever suffered,' will be seen from the fact that the output of shipping of the United States was then equal to the tonnage built in Great Britain, whilst the tonnage which the United States built for foreign countries was far greater than the tonnage which Great Britain built for foreign countries. On this interesting and important point Mr. E. T. Chamberlain furnished the following figures to the American Merchant Marine Commission:

TONNAGE BUILT DURING THE FOUR YEARS 1858-1861

In the United States
849,307 tons

In Great Britain

883,495 tons