Fatherland and Great Britain would be peculiarly abhorrent. He might, indeed, perceive a divided duty, and be torn by conflicting emotions, but his attachment to his adopted land, the birthplace of his children, would probably outweigh all other feeling and govern his actions. Exceptions to this rule there might be, but these would probably be few.

However, the question forces itself on us now, Is Australia to become a pawn in the game of international politics? A former Governor of New South Wales assured the present writer, at the time one of his constitutional advisers, that he had confidential advice from the Home Government of projected designs by Germany on Australia. For Germany to get possession of Australia now would be a splendid revenge for Morocco. And how dramatically appropriate!

There is thus presented the spectacle of a great European as well as the greatest Asiatic Power longing to get possession of the key to the Pacific. In the steps to reach their end the Asiatic may prove too wily for the European, if the Motherland is not too watchful and too powerful for both. Before Germany could set possessory foot on Australia she must first successfully match her Dreadnoughts and destroyers against the British Fleet; and in the event of the Germans coming out of the struggle alive, and then setting out on a territory-hunting expedition in the South Pacific, with Australia as their first objective, they might, in all probability would, find that the wily Jap had slipped in before them, locked the door, and pocketed the key.

Summing up the whole position, it is the prevailing opinion in Australia that a war between Great Britain and Germany would give Japan her opening for a decisive move on the South Pacific; that if Australia is to remain part of the British Empire and in occupation of the Anglo-Saxon race, she must in the first place attract white immigrants from oversea in numbers at least equal to what Canada is securing; further, that she must be prepared to offer them a prospect of easy acquisition of suitable land.. In the next place, she should understand that her local fleet, to be of any use at all, must be a unit of the Imperial Navy, and under the absolute control of the British Admiralty. Beyond all this, the belief is general that the keeping of this most important outpost in possession of the white race should be not merely the concern of Great and Greater Britain, but of the United States of America and the whole of the European Powers. These should all with one voice raise the warning cry to the Asiatic, Hands off Australia!' This consideration alone, even if there were no other weighty reasons, ought to keep Germany from picking a quarrel with Great Britain, and Great Britain from being a party to thwarting Germany's policy of expansion in Africa.

There remains that deep-rooted internal canker, the virus of Continental syndicalism, with its envenomed weapon the universal strike. Wherever it appears, and here in Australia it has taken. root, it spreads its blighting influence alike on domestic, industrial, and political life, undermines the social fabric, is at deadly enmity with religion in any form, and threatens with destruction all national sentiment and aspiration for higher ideals. Of all dangers to Australia, in so far as concerns her possible detachment from the Motherland, this is perhaps the greatest, since its tendency is to leave her weak and exposed, and apparently no activity of foresight, no appeals to the instincts of humanity or patriotism, can prevail against its growing and baneful influence.

World-wide issues are at stake, and mighty problems are awaiting solution in this twentieth century. A High Court of Destiny is even now sitting which shall yet adjudicate between East and West, which shall for all time settle the question of paramountcy in the Pacific, which shall further determine whether Christianity is to fade before the mystic religions of the Orient, and whether the white man or the yellow man shall dominate the world.

Glebe Point, Sydney.

J. A. HOGUE.

OUR SHORTAGE OF HORSES FOR WAR

A SUGGESTED Scheme FOR MOBILISATION

BEFORE the outbreak of the South African war the question whether there were sufficient horses in the United Kingdom for purposes of mobilisation of the Home forces was one that caused little concern to the War Office, or to legislators who had the welfare of the country at heart.

Since that time two great changes have taken place; firstly, a matter which must give to us serious thought, our position in relation to other Great Powers is altered in that we must now be prepared to mobilise our expeditionary force with almost the same celerity as they mobilise their forces, and consequently be dependent on the horse supply which exists at home, at any rate until oversea communication with our Colonies is safely established; secondly, the number of suitable horses for military purposes has decreased to an alarming extent.

When the South African war was over, and experience had taught us that arrangements for horse mobilisation were not all that they should be, an attempt was made to create some sort of organisation by which the necessary supply for war could be obtained. The ideas The ideas then formulated can be seen in the Remount Manual of 1906, the book on remount matters which exists at the present time. Since this edition of the Remount Manual was published, the authorities have issued three different schemes aiming at a solution of the question as to how horses can best be obtained for mobilisation. According to the first or original scheme, referred to above, a remount officer was appointed to the administrative staff of each command; so far as mobilisation went he was supposed to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the horse-producing capabilities of his area, consisting generally of some twelve counties-a somewhat impossible task for one man to undertake; but in some commands a rough outline of the numbers was arrived at through the kind assistance. of chief constables and their subordinates. The next step which had to be taken was to map out the command into requisition areas' calculated to provide on emergency 200 to 300 horses, and to find qualified gentlemen willing to act as purchasers in these areas when required on mobilisation taking place; but no

military classification of the horses could be made or the actual location of them be found out, so that this work was of no practical use. Enough has been said to show that the first scheme was scarcely good enough for the making of a rapid mobilisation, though credit should be given to its originators for some of the ideas contained. During the period that this scheme held sway there existed one method of obtaining horses rapidly for war which was of practical value-namely, the registration of horses, about which I speak later.

In 1908 a slight modification was made in the mobilisation arrangements by deputing to county associations the responsibility of obtaining horses for their own Territorial Forces.

In January 1910 an altogether new scheme appeared in a circular memorandum (No. 231), which was commented upon at length, about that time, by the military correspondent of The Times. This memorandum aimed at putting the whole responsibility on the county associations of providing both the Regular and Territorial Forces with horses when mobilisation occurred.

The system advocated therein, a mere outline, was based on the fact that the police authorities had undertaken to make a census of horses in each county annually; most of the horses enumerated in the census were apparently considered to be suitable for war purposes, as no mention of a military classification was made throughout the memorandum; though it expressed hope that with the aid of the police census and such local information as might prove available a fairly accurate estimate of the suitable horses could be made!

The scheme entirely overlooked the chain of responsibility which is a recognised and necessary adjunct to all military organisation and action, and so was doomed to failure from the first; unfortunately valuable time, some eighteen months, has been spent in attempts by various county associations to evolve out of it a practical system. The scheme outlined in this memorandum has been dropped, and a new one, which is a step in the right direction, was promulgated in August 1911. Earlier in that year Section 114 of the Army Act was amended so that power could be given to certain officers of entering stables and inspecting horses belonging to business firms and private individuals, with a view to making a classification of their horses for military purposes; on these powers and the police census of 1910 the provisions of this, the present scheme, are founded. It lays the responsibility on general officers commanding-in-chief of classifying and selecting horses in peace time for the requirements of war, and of purchasing, collecting, and distributing them to their various units on mobilisation. For purposes of classification, the first important work to be done, it delegates

the powers referred to above to adjutants of the Territorial Force, who are to be employed in the work of travelling round and inspecting horses at such times as will not interfere with their other duties. It is difficult to see how exactly this can be accomplished, or in fact how those adjutants who have not a large experience of horses can efficiently make a military classification of horses at all.

When it is considered that the army is almost as dependent on its acquirement of horses as it is on the munitions of war, for without either it is powerless, it would seem of utmost importance that clear directions should emanate from the responsible head authority on all such details as to how horses should be classified, purchased, collected, and distributed, so that each command shall work on the same lines and in such a manner that the country can feel satisfied that the necessary number of horses required for mobilisation will be forthcoming in the required short space of time. Each of these steps requires considerable thought, embodying knowledge of horses and the horse question generally; and one at least-collection-requires more than a dictum of will be responsible for this,' without thought or reference to the means of its accomplishment. The matter is of such vital importance to the nation that no trouble, statutory powers, or expense should be spared to place us in the same position of security in this respect as exists among other Great Powers.

It is impossible to feel with confidence that the few instructions contained in this scheme, with the haphazard methods. therein suggested, can successfully bring about the rapid mobilisation of horses for the expeditionary force so absolutely necessary for the work required from it. It is well to remember that we cannot say that our expeditionary force can mobilise unless we can also say that each unit will undoubtedly get its full number of horses in the required time.

The British Isles, especially Ireland, have been for some generations considered the home above all others of the well-bred horse, and of its production; with the advent of the motor, and the increase in the breeding of cart-horses (Shire horses principally) by many who formerly bred nothing but light horses, it is a somewhat difficult matter to say what numbers of well-bred horses exist in comparison with years gone by.

We are very much in the air' as to our knowledge of the horse supply in the country. There are no reliable statistics on which an opinion can be adequately formed; no real census has ever been taken, at any rate in modern times. The Board of Agriculture, certainly, collects information annually from farmers, and renders a return dealing with horses used on the farms, brood