ARTICLE IV.- . England always endeavours to connect the liberty of fishing and drying codfish on part of the coast of Newfoundland, granted by the fifteenth article of the Treaty of Utrecht, with the ninth article of the same Treaty, which stipulates the demolition of Dunkirk. It is given in answer to England for the fourth and last time that the two stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht have nothing in common between them, unless that they are both comprised in the said Treaty; and that the concession expressed in favour of the French in the thirteenth article of that Treaty, is a compensation for the cession of Newfoundland and Annapolis Royal, made on the part of France to England by the twelfth and thirteenth articles of the same Treaty.

M. DE VAUDREUIL TO THE DUC DE CHOISEUL.

October 30, 1761.

MY LORD, I was astonished to see, by the historical account of the Memorial of the negotiations between France and England, what I am charged with by the English, with regard to the limits of Canada, as it is entirely false and groundless. I shall give your Grace a true account of what passed between Mr. Amherst and me on that head. When I capitulated, I traced no limits whatever, and in all the messages that passed between the English General and me, I made use of the word "Canada" only. Eight or ten days after the surrender of the country, he sent an officer to me for maps, to inform him of the extent of the colony. I returned for answer, that I had none, my maps having been taken away with my baggage at Quebec, in breach of the capitulation of that place; and the officer then showing me a map which he had in his hand, I told him the limits marked on it were not just, and verbally mentioned others, extending Louisiana on one side, to the carrying place of the Miamis, which is the height of the lands whose rivers run into the Ouabache, and on the other, to the head waters of the Illinois.

What I have the honour to tell you, my lord, is strictly true; I am not afraid that the English can produce any proof of the contrary-for nothing passed in writing, on this head, nor was any line drawn on any map. I take the first opportunity to acquaint you with this, to prevent any further imposition.

DUMAS' MEMOIR ON THE BOUNDARIES OF CANADA, 1761.*

'Tis supposed that the Plenipotentiaries named for the future Congress, are incapable of adopting the frivolous ideas entertained in France respecting our possessions in Canada; statesmen have notions different from the simple vulgar. The French are too volatile and too superficial to trouble themselves about the future; but ministers, whom wisdom has selected and ability directs, will of themselves observe that the interests of commerce, the progress of navigation, the good of the State, and the King's glory necessarily require that the restitution of Canada be laid down as a preliminary in the Treaty of Peace.

In more favourable conjunctures, we would be justified in demanding of the English, damages corresponding to the enormous depredation of our marine, as well commercial as national; but the circumstances which will exist at the conclusion of the peace are to decide the sacrifices we shall be obliged to make, or the advantages which are possibly to result therefrom. Commerce has changed the face of Europe; it is now evident that, in the long run, the more commercial nation will become the more powerful.

We can no longer dispense with America, without falling sensibly from our state of splendour.

On the restitution of Canada depends the fate of the rest of our colonies.

Paris Documents, XVII., p. 1134. This document seems to have governed the conduct of the Duc de Choiseul in his proposition first made to Mr. Pitt, and is appended as serving to elucidate the foregoing correspondence.

These principles, clearer than the day, once admitted, that restitution ought to form the basis and foundation of the Treaty of Peace.

But will the work of our ministers be durable? For want of local knowledge, will they be in a condition to manage beneficially the interests of the king and nation in this regard? Will they prevent the subterfuges in which English trickery will not fail to envelop them? If the English desire peace, do they desire it to be lasting? Will they renounce that system of maritime despotism which constitutes the sole object of their policy? Will they not preserve a constant hankering to render themselves masters of the whole of America? And will they not allow it to appear when we shall be least on our guard? Incapable of accomplishing that project now, in consequence of the exhaustion of their finances, will they not renew it at another time? In front of an enemy so active, so ambitious, so enterprising, conjectures are as good as demonstrations; the past cannot render us too cautious for the future.

By a fatality which cannot be comprehended, the English were better acquainted than we were before the war with the topographical map of our possessions. Aided by similar help, what advantage do they not possess to cheat us? To this object, then, should be directed all the prudence and sagacity of our Plenipotentiaries.

BOUNDARIES.

I limit their labours, respecting Canada, to four general objects:

1st. The entire property of both shores of the River and Gulf of St. Lawrence. 2nd. The property of the lakes and rivers which form the natural communication between Canada and Louisiana; they consist of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and the Ohio. 3rd. That neither of the two nations can form any establishments on the rivers watering the possessions of the other.

4th. That both colonies shall exist and increase by population, without covering their frontiers with advanced posts, which is a principle of jealousy, suspicion, and distrust; an occasion always at hand, or a pretext often specious, for a rupture between the two nations.

As for the first article-to cede to the English, as they pretend, the entire peninsula of Acadia is to reduce ourselves evidently to a precarious possession. That peninsula is sus ceptible of an immense population; its position is one of the most advantageous, both for the erection of fortifications, and of posts there; solid settlements of every description can be formed there; agriculture can be followed with the greatest success. In vain would France flatter herself that she should preserve in peace the possessions of the mouth of the river, if the English obtained the entire cession of that peninsula. Already masters of Newfoundland, they should grant us the property of a country whereof they would guard the entrance.

The peace will scarcely be signed, when the activity of that ambitious people will be revived; soon will they be seen establishing themselves on the north side of that peninsula, and neglecting the remainder, if necessary, in order to transport to that quarter all their industry in favour of plantations.

What service would not the Plenipotentiaries be rendering the State if, by their ability, they would induce the English to consent to a division of that peninsula, so that France should preserve the property of the northern part, from Cape Canso to Minas?

But if their zeal become useless, if English firmness leave no hope on that point, they ought to be prepared to rather break all conference, than to give up an inch of ground on that continent. 'Tis evident that our colony would lose thereby all communication with the metropolis; we should no longer possess the free entrance of the river, except so far as the English would think proper. The lines of demarcation which separate the respective possessions on the map annexed to this memoir,* are drawn in accordance with the largest sacrifices that it is possible for France to make. 'Tis for the Plenipotentiaries to take advantage of favourable events, to obtain the best terms; but in all possible reverses, 'twill be more advantageous for the King and the State to renounce Canada, and consequently, Louisiana, which cannot exist without it, than to cede an inch of territory beyond that division. The blue colour indicates the French possessions.

The red indicates the English possessions.

*[The map is wanting.-ED.]

The green, what can be ceded towards Hudson's Bay-should events require France to make further additional sacrifices.

I have said, and repeat it, Louisiana cannot exist for us without Canada. But 'tis more advantageous for France promptly to cede these two colonies to the English, than to accept conditions worse than those indicated by the lines drawn on that map.

On this hypothesis, let the river Pentagouet be the boundary of the English possessions on the continent, on the N. E., and let them be precluded from settling only the right bank. Let the River St. John bound the French settlements, and let them be precluded from settling only the left bank.

The territory between these two rivers shall perpetually remain neutral and undivided between both nations, as marked on the map by the yellow colour.

The second object of the labour of our Plenipotentiaries relative to Canada, regards the communication of that colony with Louisiana. The projects of the English would be accomplished beyond their hopes, were the freedom of that communication not stipulated and solidly established by the treaty of peace; 'twould be separating two colonies, which cannot sustain themselves except by their immediate affinity. Now that communication can occur only by the Ohio: by every other route it is very difficult, often even impracticable. Tis essential, then, to insist strongly on the entire possession of the Ohio.

That river, navigable throughout all its course for very large craft, threatens Louisiana afar, and combines the advantage of distance in concealing preparations, with that of extreme rapidity of current for promptitude of execution.

To make the Ohio the boundary of the respective colonies, is to surrender it entirely to the English. In fact, already the English population is advancing towards that river; it has only one step to take to clear the Apalachies, and that step would be taken on the day after the signing of the treaty. The left bank of the Ohio would be under English cultivation in less than four years, whilst our population would not reach that point in the space of a century. Who does not perceive in that explanation the approaching and inevitable fall of Louisiana ?

The entire possession of the Ohio cannot, then, be too much insisted on, the Apalachies constituting the limits; but if events were such as to force us to give way on that important article, the only middle course to adopt is marked on the map by the yellow colour, viz., to leave the course of that river neutral, unsettled, without ownership, free to both nations to convey on it their goods for moveable trade, with express reservation to France of the communication between both those colonies.

The possession of lakes Ontario and Erie, which are the continuation of that communication, is a point of the greatest interest to us, the rather as for want thereof, those lakes assure another passage by the Miamis and Onabache rivers, more difficult, more uncertain, but which furnishes nevertheless a resource in times of misfortune. I admit that very

favourable events would be required to reduce the English to abandon the south shore of Lake Ontario, of which they are a long time in possession, through Fort Chouequen—a possession usurped, but constant, and, as it were, unopposed: an empty protest by the French Government, when the first foundations of that post were laid, is the only contradiction they have experienced.

If circumstances were such, on the conclusion of the peace, as that France had to make good its advantages, that would be the moment to protest against that usurpation. This important object merits the greatest attention of our Plenipotentiaries. It is sufficient to consider the course of the waters to perceive that that lake commands the whole of Canada. General Amherst has found no route more certain for invasion; the event has not over-justified his principles and mind.

If, on the contrary, we are reduced to take back Canada in the same condition that we possessed it before the war, France might consent to confine its cultivated settlements to the north shore of Lake Ontario, leaving the south shore free from the Bay of Niaouré to the River Niagara.

The English would preserve the freedom of conveying their merchandise for moveable trade to the mouth of the Chouequen river, and could extend themselves only to the Onondagan river on one side, and as far as the River à la Famine on the other.

But nothing should make France give up the property of the soil, so that the free

dom of trade granted to the English could not at any time invest them with a title thereto.

Let their possessions be always confined to the heads of the rivers by which they are watered, and let the height of the land be constantly the limit between the two

nations.

The entire possession of Lake Erie ought to belong to France incontestably up to the head waters of the streams that empty into that lake on the south side; the rivers flowing towards the Ohio are included in the neutrality proposed by that river.

The third object proposed at the head of this Memoir will be rendered clearer by a brief reflection.

The English are ten to our one in America. But if passing the height of lands, we should push our posts as far as the heads of the rivers which water the English colonies, all their superiority in numbers, means and resources would not guarantee them against an invasion when it should please us to attempt it.

He who meditates an expedition, prepares it secretly, and when 'tis time to put it in execution, if he have in his favour the current of the stream which conveys him with rapidity, he surprises his enemy and infallibly succeeds; the same is not the case where the aggressor has to ascend the rivers, has portages to make, lakes to traverse, and mountains to pass. The immense preparations necessary to be made for that purpose discover the movement, and the slowness of the execution affords time to the menaced province to place itself in a state of defence.

The English Colonies are in the latter position in respect to Canada, and Canada would be in the first relative to the English Colonies were the English to advance their settlements on Lake Champlain, Lake Ontario, or the Ohio.

I am fully convinced, and every man of sense who is conversant with the manner in which war can be carried on in that country, will agree with me that all the resources of the State will never preserve Canada if the English are once settled at the head of our rivers. 'Tis, again, one of the conditions that must never be consented to. Should peace be concluded under favourable circumstances to France, I point out the only middle course to be adopted, which is the neutrality of certain districts; such might Lake St. Sacrament be without prejudice to us, provided the English confine their settlements to the sources of the waters flowing into the River of Orange [the Hudson].

Come we now to the fourth principle:

I know nothing more useless in that country than forts to cover the frontiers; they are equally a burden to both nations, which have an equal interest in demolishing them; they are, in time of peace, a source of useless expense, and experience has demonstrated that, in time of war they would be good for nothing. These frontier posts are adapted only to create difficulties, to afford umbrage, and sometimes furnish pretexts for a rupture.

They would favour that nation which would preserve the desire to seize the possessions of the other. By aid of the stand-points, it would pounce on its enemy when least expected, whilst every considerable enterprise becomes more difficult, more tedious, were they no longer in existence. If entrepôts must be established, the step forward is a cry,

"to arms!"

The French Plenipotentiaries will labour usefully for that Colony, and more profitably still for the Royal Treasury, if they agree with the British Ministers on not preserving any post on the frontiers on either side; thus Chouequen and Niagara will be demolished.

That does not exclude useful settlements in the interior of the possessions, either relatively to trade or otherwise, which each nation is to be at liberty to direct, according to its interests, but merely on what is called frontier, an outlet which may tend to supply means of an invasion.

To place matters at the worst, if the fortune of war be unfavourable to France this campaign, and peace be concluded in an unpropitious moment for us :

If, in order to obtain the conditions I propose, we be under the necessity of making new sacrifices in any part of Canada, the least dangerous for us would be to allow more extent to the English possessions in the direction of Hudson's Bay. Let us cede to them the whole of Lake Superior, rather than one inch of territory in the south part, at this side

the height of land or the Apalachies. That sacrifice which is to be made by France at the most critical moment, is marked by the green colour on the map.

Anything beyond those lines of demarcation, and France inust give up Canada, inasmuch as it is evident she cannot preserve it; moreover, to maintain ourselves in that state, the Minister must essentially and constantly occupy himself therewith; but above all things must men be carefully selected, to whom the Government, the Police and Finances are to be confided.

Otherwise we shall labour for our enemies. Canada, bathed in the blood of our unfortunate colonists, will soon be the appenadge of the English. Our clearances, our settlements, our villages, will be so much fruit to be gathered by them when they have arrived at maturity.

Let the height of land and the Apalachies be the limits between the two peoples. Nature appears to have marked them expressly.

The caprice of man cannot change that barrier, always permanent, and always ready to protest against the usurper. People aspire to a factitious peace when they seek to establish it on arbitrary lines which the revolutions of time or the interests of men can destroy. "Tis, perhaps, a fault into which have fallen our ablest negotiators, yet 'tis the most important object of a treaty of peace, since it destroys or foments the fatal germ which is the occasion of most wars. The height of land and the Apalachies once determined on as the line of separation between the two colonies, the modifications, the compromises I propose, neutralizing certain districts, may be admitted according as circumstances will be more or less favourable to France, when peace will be concluded.

One reflection more remains to be submitted, which, although not bearing directly on the boundaries, is, nevertheless, very intimately connected with them.

Considering the enormous expense entailed on us by the service of Indians in the war, I have always thought that the King would maintain at much less expense in Canada, a permanent corps of troops, capable of defending it at all times; and when I have weighed with reflection the utility of their assistance, I have found it to be only one of opinion and prejudice. But this prejudice is founded on the terror inspired by their cruelty and barbarity in their customs; it consequently will preserve its power.

This terror will be always very useful to the nation which will best be able to manage the alliance and attachment of those people. We possess one real advantage over the English in this regard; let us carefully avoid doing it the smallest damage by any convention with our enemies which would cause the Indians to suspect our alliance and good faith. However simple and natural such an accord might be, the English would not fail to present it to the Indians in the light that would render it odious to them. These people are proud, jealous, suspicious, and vindictive; an appearance of defection on our part, after all the blood they have poured out in our defence, would render these irreconcilable to us from generation to generation, and that would be the greatest of misfortunes for both our colonies.

Our Plenipotentiaries ought to be distrustful on this point. I am fully convinced that the British Ministers will set snares for them on this point, which is of more importance for them in America than the gain of many battles.

As for the rest, a Governor-General, instructed and attentive, will know how to maintain the alliance of all the people of this continent, in peace as in war, without those enormous expenses which knavery conducts and ignorance tolerates.

Paris, 5th April, 1761.

DUMAS.