band, it was pointed out at the Hague Conference of 1907 that, owing to modern developments in the means of communication, a belligerent will seldom be able by means of confiscation to deprive his adversary of the supplies of arms and munitions necessary for the continuation of the war, and thereby to affect the course of events. Within the last ten years we have certainly seen this observation verified in the South African War; and in the war of 1870 complete command of the sea and consequent freedom to procure military supplies, though it may have helped the weaker belligerent to protract the war, did not enable him to recover his lost ground.

Proposals to alter the law of contraband were made by the well-known Prussian jurist, Samuel Cocceji, in 1748. In 1856 the American Secretary of State, in his Note declining to accede to the Declaration of Paris unless the immunity of private property' were also provided for, suggested that contraband of war should be exempt from confiscation, except when an attempt was made to introduce it into a besieged or blockaded place. Finally, the absolute and entire abolition of contraband was proposed by Great Britain at the Hague Conference of 1907, so that the right of visit should be exercised only to ascertain the neutral character of the vessel. But these ideas found no support with a majority of the Great Powers.

These two practices-the capture and appropriation of enemy ships and cargoes, and the confiscation of contraband of war and, in certain circumstances, of vessels engaged in its transport-have from a very early period been acknowledged to be legitimate acts on the part of a belligerent. The blockade of commercial ports, however, cannot claim to be sanctioned by equally ancient usage. In 1800 the American Secretary of State, Marshall, writing to Rufus King, U.S. Minister in England, says:

'If we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies destined for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns invested by sea only is an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals.' (Hall, p. 632.)

In the Berlin decree (Nov. 1806) Napoleon adopted this

view, and alleged, as a ground for reprisals against England, that

'she extends to unfortified commercial towns and ports, to harbours and the mouths of rivers, the law of blockade, which, according to reason and the usage of all civilised peoples, is applicable to fortified places only.'

In 1859, on the outbreak of war between France and Austria, Mr Cass used very much the same argument. Prof. Westlake, in a note appended to Mr Latifi's admirably concise treatise, observes, as to 'the immunity which is proposed for the enemy's mercantile flag':

'The proposal now under discussion is not that the enemy's sea-trade shall be exempted from attempts to paralyse him, but that such attempts on it shall be restricted to cases in which it is equally lawful to interfere with it under the neutral flag. Nothing but the blindness of habit prevents us from seeing that commercial blockades, as distinct from the investment of fortified ports, are a war waged against neutrals. But if only sentiment can be gratified by limiting the war against the enemy's commercial flag, the war against neutrals is to continue, with the certainty that commercial blockades, when they have become the sole means of paralysing the enemy's sea-trade, will be practically carried as far as audacity can venture to strain or to violate rules.'

As Admiral Mahan puts it, this operation, as also the capture of 'private property' and of contraband of war, amounts to saying:

'I forbid your citizens the maritime transportation of their commercial property. Articles of whatever character, including the vessels which carry them, violating this lawful order, will be seized and condemned.'

If the views of Mr Marshall and Mr Cass had prevailed, the blockade of the Southern ports in the American civil war would have been contrary to international law, and the subjugation of the Southern States would probably not have been completed. Admiral Mahan considers blockade more effective than the capture of enemy's ships on the high sea; but the process has become more difficult. Such a feat as the blockade of the whole of an enemy's coastline, where it is so extensive and so well-provided with harbours as

that of the Confederate States, still more a blockade of the whole Atlantic coast of the United States, is in these days inconceivable. It is true that the blockade of the German coast would not be so difficult a task; but the stoppage of German foreign trade by this means would to a great extent be mitigated by the free entry and egress of goods through Dutch ports. It seems, therefore, that the effect of blockade on the enemy's commerce is not likely to be much greater than that of the capture and confiscation, or the bottling-up,' of his mercantile fleet. Is it worth while then, it will be asked, to reserve this belligerent right, especially when it is seen that the neutral is as great a sufferer as the belligerent against whom it is exercised? In spite of Sir John Macdonell's comments, it would seem that Sir Edward Grey had a good deal of reason on his side when, in his instructions to the British delegates to the second Peace Conference, he dwelt upon the logical connexion between capture at sea and blockade, and drew the inference that, if the one were abandoned, the other would not long survive.

The truth is that all three forms of war on commerce between the enemy and neutrals hang together, and are merely varieties of one kind of warlike measures. Obviously, so long as the introduction of arms and other supplies useful for an army is permitted by land, while under the designation of contraband of war it is prohibited at sea, continental Powers have an advantage over island States. It is argued that the one category of operations should be discontinued because it is not sufficiently harmful to the enemy; the same may with equal justice be affirmed of the other two. Prosecuted energetically in combination, their usefulness may be considerable. It is out of the question that any one of the three should be given up separately. They must all be abandoned or maintained together. The question is a momentous one for island States. If they consent to be deprived of their principal instrument for putting pressure on an enemy who can only be attacked by sea, and of using such means as their geographical position admits of to bring about a stagnation of his commercial

* See the 'Contemporary Review' for March 1908.

prosperity, what other method of compulsion remains? As Admiral Mahan observes :

'As a matter of European politics, the right of maritime capture is the principal, if not the only, strong weapon of offence possessed by Great Britain against the nations in arms of the Continent.' ('Times,' Nov. 4, 1910.)

One result of abandonment seems evident. Island States would have to undertake military operations across the sea and endeavour to occupy a vital portion of the enemy's territory. To compensate for the diminished usefulness and efficacy of their naval armaments, they would have to increase their land forces and probably to follow the example of continental nations in enforcing military service on the whole male population of suitable age. Such a decision ought not to be based on sectional interests, on abstract arguments as to what is right or wrong between belligerents and neutrals, or on so-called humanitarian considerations, but on those of public policy, directed to the defence of the national welfare and of the whole body of States which constitute the Empire. In the decision of a matter which concerns our very existence, the deliberate judgment of statesmen and seamen, impartial discussion by men accustomed to treat of public affairs, and an enlightened public opinion, must all have their proper place; but certainly no abrupt or hasty reversal of traditional policy ought to be approved by the nation, for the weapon, once thrown away, can never be recovered.

Art. 2.-THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY.

1. Anthologia Polyglotta. By Henry Wellesley. London: Murray, 1849.

2. The Greek Anthology. (Bohn's Classical Library.) By George Burges. London: Bell, 1853.

3. Amaranth and Asphodel. By A. J. Butler. London: Kegan Paul, 1881.

4. Grass of Parnassus.

Longmans, 1892.

By Andrew Lang.

London:

5. Studies of the Greek Poets. By J. A. Symonds. Two vols. Third edition. London: Black, 1893.

6. An Echo of Greek Song. By W. H. D. Rouse. London: Dent, 1899.

7. Paraphrases and Translations from the Greek. By the Earl of Cromer. London: Macmillan, 1903.

8. Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology. By J. W. Mackail. London: Longmans, 1907.

9. A Book of Greek Verse. By W. G. Headlam. Cambridge: University Press, 1907.

10. Greek Love Songs and Epigrams. By J. A. Pott. London: Kegan Paul, 1911.

ALL departments of human activity tend to reflect and to affect the spirit of the age in which they are exercised; and in no one of them is this tendency more marked than in literature. It would be difficult to find any period of one hundred years in the history of the Western nations in which their literature has not undergone some marked change alike in matter and in form. For the change in matter it is not difficult to account, since it is exposed to the influence of ever-changing circumstances. Modifications in form and style are partially due to the same cause, but are still more attributable to that psychological evolution which is ever at work in the minds of men, the various phases of which we try to reproduce in that vague word-picture, 'the spirit of the age.' There are times, too, when literature ordains for itself some more or less durable form, whether through criticism, or through the creation of some great example which sets a fashion for ages after that in which it is produced.

But the purist has never yet succeeded in stereotyping any particular literary form; and the work of even the