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THE

STANFO

QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 478. JANUARY, 1924.

Art. 1.—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

To most people the League of Nations is merely the expression of a pious hope of better things to come; to some it is the panacea for all the evils of the world, whether social or political; to others its aims are a source of derision and of complete scepticism as to the possibility of their ever being realised; while to a few, the chosen few, the League of Nations is a second star of Bethlehem leading to peace on earth and goodwill towards men. To these elect the League is an institution of which the maintenance of peace and the suppression of war as a monstrous anomaly are the principal objects to be held in view; but they intend that it shall also embrace humanitarian ideals of an international character, by which the inhabitants of countries within the League shall be gradually brought, through the suppression of vice and by increased opportunities for intellectual culture, to a happier and more perfect state of existence. There can be no doubt as to the genuine enthusiasm of these few and the beneficial effect of their fervour; but it is just the sincerity of their idealism which constitutes one of the principal dangers to the League and may even in the end wreck its existence.

Four weeks spent in Geneva during the fourth meeting of the Assembly of Delegates from fifty-two nations represented in the League give ample opportunity to arrive at a just appreciation of the value of its work, and to weigh without prejudice its successes and failures. It was unfortunate that the opening of the Assembly coincided with the Italian-Greek incident on the Albanian Vol. 241.—No. 478.

frontier, since it threw a shadow over the meeting and provoked angry discussions and threats which were unworthy and futile. Still it had this advantage in that it provided an object lesson for the future, and proved that, unless the Council of the League acts with more prudence in similar cases that may occur, the future of the League risks being compromised.

The principles which form the cornerstone of the League are the equality of all nations whether great or small, and their right to have their independence and territory respected. Just as in private life a citizen of a State cannot deal with a recalcitrant neighbour by taking the law into his own hands, so also a State, Member of the League, is precluded by the Covenant from taking violent action against another State without previous recourse to the League for its mediation or arbitration. Consequently, the Greek Government were in every sense justified in making their appeal to the League on the occupation of Corfu by Italy; but the League should have recognised the limits of their right of interference, and should have had the wisdom not to encroach upon the province of the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris-confided to that body by the Signatories of the Treaty of Versailles-in endeavouring to lay down the actual steps to be taken and the measures of reparation to be exacted for the cruel and barbarous massacre of the Italian Mission. The Council of the League should have acted in co-operation with the Conference of Ambassadors, reserving the right to adjust the question of the occupation of Corfu and the incident at Janina in the event of the Conference failing to do so.

The Italian Government were, on their side, justified in opposing the claim of the League to interfere in the solution of the incident at Janina. To make this clear it suffices to point out that, had the Italian Government not taken the law into their own hands and seized Corfu as a guarantee for reparation due at the hands of the Greek Government, whom they regarded as responsible for the murder of the Italian Mission, there need not have been any ground for an appeal by the Greek Government to the League of Nations. As stated above, the execution of the Treaties of Peace was after their signature confided by the Allies to the Representa

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