frontier-Aeroplanes, etc.-Value of close concert in naval and military action-Facilities for defence possessed by Canada —Creation, under the Imperial Defence Conference recom- MAPS MAP OF PART OF EASTERN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 122 MAP OF PART OF NORTH AMERICA, SHOWING THE CHARACTER OF - 136 "I HAVE told Ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a sine quâ non of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be solely defensive." (The Duke of Wellington to Sir George Murray, December 22, 1814, "Wellington Despatches," Gurwood, vol. xii., p. 224.) Upon Kingston and Montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada, along and above the St. Lawrence, with the Sea Power of Great Britain. then was the direction for offensive operations." There (That is, for offensive operations against Canada in 1812-14— Mahan, "Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812," 1905, vol. i., p. 305.) "The conditions of modern warfare make it probable that great naval and military events will immediately follow, even if they do not precede, a declaration of war. If, therefore, organizations have to be improvised, staffs created, transport and equipment provided, and plans matured, after the outbreak of hostilities, the value of any assistance, however willingly and enthusiastically given, will be greatly lessened, even if such assistance be not altogether belated." (From the Blue Book as to the Imperial Defence Conference, 1909.) X CANADA AND CANADIAN DEFENCE CHAPTER I National defence as a subject―The Imperial Conference of 1909 and its outcome-Relations of Canada to Great Britain and the Empire -Her past contributions to Imperial defence-Two main objects of her land forces-Some advantages of a Canadian Navy-Its sphere of action-Danger from political party pressure-The present a fitting moment to consider Canadian defence-Proposed method of doing so-Duke of Wellington on the sine quâ non of success in war on the frontier of Canada. ALTHOUGH to any nation upon the near prospect of war the subject of its defence becomes all-absorbing, especially if invasion is to be dreaded, it is difficult -at all events, throughout the British Empire-to arouse serious interest in it in time of peace. This is probably partly because some defensive details require a professional training to understand them; but, nevertheless, defensive questions, in their broader aspect, are mere common-sense questions, which can be perfectly grasped in their main and important principles by every educated citizen of a civilized State. It is for this reason to be regretted that proposals for national defence, even when officially brought forward, are so commonly approached by the majority of the public in the attitude often unwisely adopted towards those for the insurance of life or property in general-viz., that they are to be some day looked into, but in the meantime put aside, and that the premium to be paid seemed most unattractive. Were they to be more constantly in the thoughts of the people of a nation, the hands of those who are responsible for national defence would be greatly strengthened: It is, therefore, a matter for serious congratulation that a few months ago, the naval aspirations of a Continental Power drew-for the moment, at all events an exceptional degree of attention towards Imperial defence; and it became recognized from one end of the British Empire to the other that the whole question in both its naval and military aspects must be frankly faced by the MotherCountry and her dominions beyond the seas, for the security of their mutual interests and respective territories. With regard to Canada, this feeling developed into a resolution, passed by the Dominion House of Commons on March 29, 1909, recognizing "the duty of Canada, as the country increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in a larger measure the responsibilities of national defence, and approving of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with, and in close relation to, the Imperial Navy."1 1 Blue Book as to the Imperial Conference with the representatives of the self-governing dominions on the naval and military defence of the Empire (1909). The Canadian Government further suggested that its Defence Ministers should come to London, in order to confer with the Imperial naval and military authorities upon various technical matters. As the result of this, as well as of communications received from other self-governing dominions of the Crown, the Imperial Defence Conference was subsequently convened, and sat in London in July and August, 1909. At this Conference it was pointed out that the ideal upon which the military organization of the Empire should be based involved acceptance of the following principles: 66 "1. That without superiority at sea the Empire cannot be maintained." "2. That it is the duty of each self-governing portion of the Empire to provide, as far as possible, for its own territorial security." "3. That schemes of mutual assistance in time of need should be prepared upon a definite system." Finally, the result of the Conference may be summed up in the words of its President, Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister,1 that the outcome had been this: With respect to naval matters, an agreement that any fleet to be built up by one of the dominions "must be of a certain size, in order to offer a permanent career to the officers and men engaged in the service; the personnel to be trained and disciplined under regulations similar to those established in the Royal Navy, in order to allow 1 Statement in the House of Commons, August 26, 1909. 2 Until Canada can entirely supply this herself, certain officers and men required are to be lent by Great Britain. |