within effective range of each other, while more than one important bridge1 spans the St. Lawrence.

Thus it arises that Canada on her southern frontier, which adjoins that of the United States, has, even along the water portion of it, several stretches of country requiring for their defence a strong land force as well as a naval one, and these stretches border very important cities. In addition, she has a land frontier from Lake Superior westward to the Pacific for many hundred miles.

Therefore it seems that the natural character of her frontier throughout indicates this:

First, that for the protection of her extended stretches of ocean, inland sea, lake, and river, and her water-borne commerce, Canada needs above all things naval power; and this is strengthened by the fact that the country, comprising the silver and mineral districts between the southern shore of Hudson Bay and the great lakes, will (as we have said) within a few years be opened up. It will soon be traversed by rail from north to south, as well as from east to west, and the defence of that bay and of Hudson Straits will become a question to be taken into account.

Next, that at the present day some portion of this naval power, whether embodied in the warvessels of Canada or of Great Britain-if it is to have any certain access before an enemy to the Atlantic ports, Montreal, or the Pacific ports, or

1 For instance, the Victoria (near Montreal), and others at various points. Tunnels also exist under the river at Port Huron (which is termed the St. Clair), and another is just being completed near Detroit.

through the easily-obstructed canals to the great lakes-must not at the outbreak of war be at any distance from the Canadian frontier.

Further, that for the security of that frontier Canada requires, in addition to naval power, a land force, which, owing to the increasing extent of her territory to be defended and its growing importance, must be one of considerable strength; and,

Lastly, that from the nature of her southern boundary along the water portion of it, the land force for its defence must be one working always in very close concert with the navy.

The reference made to the southern frontier of Canada adjoining the United States of America leads us to emphasize here that the view under which we are now writing is not that anything is likely to disturb the friendly relations existing with that Power.

On the contrary, it is because Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are on their present cordial footing of friendship, as well as that they understand each other's aspirations and feelings fully, and that of late years so many citizens of the United States, crossing the frontier, have become good citizens of Canada and made the Dominion their home, that it becomes now both possible and desirable to write unreservedly as to Canadian defence.

It may, indeed, under the national combinations of the future, though these are too uncertain to discuss, be very important to the United States that the frontier of Canada should not lie too open

to attack; and Great Britain and America appear intended, for many reasons, to be closely united in friendship; but, however this may be, every Government and every nation has its own duties to perform, and one is to prepare for the defence of its frontier if attacked, no matter by whom.

How severe a condemnation would be justly passed by any court of law or equity upon a trustee-and Governments are national trusteeswho neglected to safeguard a ward's interests, even from the closest friends, upon the ground that the cordial relations which prevailed made it unnecessary. And for a Government to put aside preparation for national defence upon any such pretext, is quite as unjustifiable towards a nation.

It is most improbable that any good is ever done (although harm may be so) by those British subjects, however well-meaning, on both sides of the Atlantic who proclaim to their American cousins that on no account would Great Britain or Canada go to war with America, for their hearers must either doubt their sincerity or sense of honour, and this engenders want of confidence, if not a contempt, which can never promote cordiality. Under certain circumstances America might, and must, go to war with Great Britain, and Great Britain might, and must, go to war with America ; but those circumstances, it is hoped, will never

now arise.

A frontier left too open to invasion is a fruitful cause of war in itself, and has produced bad feeling between Great Britain and the United States on more than one occasion in the past. It may be

said, for instance, that the temptation of an inadequately guarded frontier encouraged the socalled Patriot raids of 1837-38 on the Canadian border, and the Fenian raids of 1866; and, in proportion as that border is known to be efficiently protected, these incidents are in the future less likely to recur.

In these matters it is frankness which most frequently among friends prevents misunderstanding. Mr. Roosevelt, late President of the United States, has in this respect invariably set a good example, and the present President, Mr. Taft, is reported very recently to have said, and most reasonably said, that he himself could see no inconsistency in speaking in favour of peace by arbitration, while also using every effort to obtain from Congress two more battleships yearly till the Panama Canal was opened.1 Similarly no inconsistency is here felt in anticipating peace with America while discussing what seems desirable for the security of the frontier of her friend and neighbour, Canada.

America must be unavoidably and constantly alluded to merely because she, and no other Power, happens for a long distance to adjoin that frontier, and also because certain lessons in Canadian defence can be learnt only from the war in which she was engaged with Great Britain in 1812-14.

1 At the Hotel Astor, New York, March 22, 1910 (from the Morning Post of March 24, 1910).

CHAPTER III

The war of 1812-14 on the Canadian frontier-Comparatively little known, and why-Its importance and the lessons it teachesOrigin of the war-Situation in Canada when it opened-The respective forces-Naval strength on the lakes-Principal postsCommunications-Strong and weak points on both sides.

We now turn to the war of 1812-141 upon the frontier of Canada. It is desirable to draw the attention of military students to this war, the events of which should be more widely known than they are. One reason why they have been comparatively little studied is that from 1808 to 1815 public attention was absorbed by the more engrossing contest which was being fought out with France in Europe upon Peninsular battlefields and elsewhere. Another is that the forces engaged were, when compared with Continental armies, small, and therefore the incidents of the war do not illustrate the larger battle tactics of massed armies of the three arms.

In addition to this, the war was one which, to her great disgust, had been forced upon Great Britain. As Sir Charles Lucas writes,2 her

1 For the operations of this war see map facing concluding page, with the enlarged inset on it of the Niagara district.

The Canadian War of 1812, by Sir C. P. Lucas, now Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies, p. 255 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906).