beginning of 1813 quite able in material power to grapple two out of three parts-Montreal and Kingston. Had they been gained, Lake Erie would have fallen, as is demonstrated by the fact that the whole Erie region went down like a house of cards the moment Perry triumphed on the lake.”1

66

"... The destruction of the British naval force [on Lake Erie] decided the campaign in the northwest, by transferring the control of the water. Its general military results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to modify them during the rest of the war. Detroit and the Michigan territory

fell back into the hands of the United States."

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From Lake Superior to the head of the first rapid of the St. Lawrence, the control of the water was the decisive factor in the general military situation. Immediately below the last lay Montreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean-to that point, therefore, the sea-power of Great Britain reached, and there it ended."

"Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, and Montreal, these four places, together with an adequate development of naval strength on the lakes, constituted the essential elements of the military situation at the opening of hostilities. Why? Mackinac and Detroit, because being situated upon extremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication, their possession controlled definitely all transit. Upon Kingston and Montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada along and

1 In the victory over Barclay's squadron.

above the St. Lawrence with the Sea-power of Great Britain.

"When the boundary on Lake Champlain was reached (by the United States Armies), Montreal was but forty miles distant."

Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who, after the close of the war (1825), was sent to Canada by the Duke of Wellington to report upon Canadian defence, considers1 that as soon as the American flotilla had become supreme on Lake Ontario, a concentrated attack should have been made upon Kingston, the British naval post on that lake.

Finally, General Armstrong, referring to the capture of Forts George and Erie in 1813, and the advance towards Burlington Heights, says: 3

"It only wounded the tail of the Lion-Kingston or a point below it seized, all above perishes because the tree is girdled."

The above criticisms must necessarily carry great weight; and this may be added to them, that if the execution of the American plans had devolved upon experienced leaders of trained troops, acting in close concert under one command, whatever may have been the intrinsic defects of the plans themselves, a larger measure of success would, humanly speaking, have attended them.

In no future war can it be anticipated that the errors of this war will be repeated by any enemy. Further remarks upon the above campaigns are deferred to the conclusion of the entire story of the war. 1 Précis of the Wars of Canada, by Sir J. Carmichael Smyth.

2 Which it was when the campaign of 1813 opened, and York (Toronto) was burnt.

3 Cruikshank's Documentary History of the War-Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 1813, part iii., p. 146.

CHAPTER V

Campaign of 1814, and what it teaches-American plan of campaign—Opening operations-British again in the ascendant on Lake Ontario -Changing character of the war-British offensive operations -Expedition to Maine-American invasion of Niagara frontier -Occupation of Fort Erie-Correspondence between Brown and Chauncey-Battle of Lundy's Lane-Failure of American expedition to Mackinac British operations against Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, and naval reverse on that lake-Bladensburg— Washington-Effect of British reverse at Plattsburg-Termination of the war-New Orleans-Remarks upon the campaign and the war generally-As to ascendancy on the water, and importance of Lake Ontario-Wellington on the defence of Canada-As to naval and military co-operation, and an active, not passive, defenceImpressions left by the war.

In this chapter we consider what the campaign of 1814 teaches, and certain lessons of the whole war.

The campaign of 1814 opened under conditions very different in many respects from that of 1813.

The American plan of campaign, also, for this year, though it had points of similarity with that of the two preceding ones, was less ambitious in extent, and rather more concentrated against the central portion of Canada, from Fort Erie on the Niagara frontier to Kingston inclusive.

There was, as before, to be an advance against Montreal and Lower Canada from the direction of Lake Champlain, but this was to be at first apparently rather of the character of a demonstration in force-which might, under favourable

circumstances, be pushed further than a more determined effort.

In the extreme west the American hold upon Amherstburg and the western district was to be strengthened; but the main efforts of the campaign were to be directed to recover what had been lost; to establish a firm footing on the Canadian shores of the Niagara and of Lake Ontario; and to reduce Kingston.

In pursuance of this plan, Fort Niagara, on American soil but now in British occupation, was to be recaptured; and so was Mackinac,1 between Lakes Huron and Michigan. Fort Erie and Fort George, too, which in the previous campaign had been taken, but afterwards evacuated, were to be seized once more.

Then, if all went well, and Chauncey's naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario could be maintained, there was to be an advance to Burlington Heights; and a portion of the Niagara force, joining with the eastern one at Sackett's Harbour, was to be directed against Kingston.

The American flotilla on Lake Erie was to be partly employed in the expedition to Lake Huron, and partly in other services on the Niagara River

1 The comparatively remote post of Mackinac (or Michilimackinac), captured by Brock's orders in 1812, proved its strategic value in controlling the passage between Lakes Michigan and Huron; and its garrison did very good service in this war, as will appear later on. Its possession by the British did much to interfere with American trade with the Indians, and to keep the Indian tribes staunch to the British

cause.

2 There was at this period no communication between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario as there is now, through the Welland Canal turning the Falls of Niagara, so that the flotilla on Lake Erie could not aid that on Lake Ontario.

near Fort Erie, above the Falls, and in the transport of troops and supplies-i.e., in co-operation with the land forces.

On Lake Champlain the British flotilla had been, since June, 1813, able to hold its own and dispute the control of the lake, but it was not in any dominant strength. Isle aux Noix afforded it a harbour in case of necessity.

Early in the spring an American force, under General Wilkinson, about 5,000 strong, advanced from Plattsburg across the Canadian frontier, but was driven back near La Colle (March 30, 1814) by the garrison of that post, aided by two sloops and two gunboats which had come up

the River Richelieu. After this the Americans withdrew, abandoning the idea of further operations here, and eventually entered Sackett's Harbour, leaving posts at Plattsburg and other points on Lake Champlain, while they awaited the result of the movements of the more western forces.

Fighting also went on in the district north of Lake Erie in repelling raids in that direction; but Drummond's regular troops, with the Canadian Militia, succeeded in pushing back the enemy towards the River Detroit.

There was, however, a considerable delay before the main operations on the Niagara frontier commenced; and to explain why this occurred and the different phase upon which the war was now entering, it is well, before describing further movements, to make some preliminary remarks.

A point to be noted is that at the opening of