to the necessity of establishing connecting communications between Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick; and of erecting military works at Quebec, Halifax, Montreal, Kingston, and Niagara. He further expresses the opinion that naval stations should be maintained on the great lakes, and then adds: "I do not entertain the slightest doubt that if the connections and works proposed by the Committee are carried into execution, His Majesty's dominions in North America ought to be, and would be, effectually defended and secured against any attempt to be made on them hereafter by the United States, however formidable their power, and this without any material demand upon the military resources of the country; so, on the other hand, I am convinced that if these or some measures of this description are not adopted, and if measures are not taken at an early date to manifest the determination of the King's Government to hold these dominions at all hazards, we cannot expect the inhabitants, upon whose loyal and gallant exertions we must in the end depend for their defence, will do otherwise than look for the security of their lives and property to a reasonable submission to the United States. Even by the greatest exertion of the military resources of His Majesty's Government in time of war, these dominions could not be successfully and effectively defended without the adoption of the greater part of the measures proposed. But if they are all adopted, and attention is paid to the militia laws in these countries, and care taken to keep alive the military spirit among the population, the defence would not be a more severe burden upon the military resources of the Empire in war than such defence has proved to be during the late war. The above recommendations upon which the Duke of Wellington comments are no doubt connected with the report of Sir James Carmichael Smyth, R.E., who, in the year 1825, was sent out to examine into the question of Canadian defence, when the Duke was Master-General of the Ordnance. This report was in 1826 printed "for the use and convenience of official people only," but was subsequently, in 1862, embodied in Précis of the Wars in Canada.2 It is of interest to see in this work that Sir James Carmichael Smyth dwells a good deal on the importance of Kingston, which he considered to be a better harbour than Sackett's Harbour, on the American side. "There seems no good reason," he writes, "why we should not command a naval superiority on Lake Ontario," and the Bay of Quinté he describes as "the finest basin in the world." His opinion was that if Montreal Island was fortified, Kingston strongly held, and communication between these points established, back of the frontier (which the Rideau Canal, commenced in 1825, was 1 This paper by the Duke of Wellington was discovered among the public records at Ottawa a few years ago, and was published in the Morning Post, London, April 2, 1904. The date of year only on which it was written is given. 2 By Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who was Commanding Royal Engineer upon Wellington's staff at Waterloo. intended to supply), the British position on Lake Ontario would then be much strengthened; that Montreal was the key of Canada; that if a harbour opposite, at the mouth of the Chateauguay River, were fortified, it would be a great advantage; and that Isle aux Noix, St. John's, and Chambly should be held as advanced posts, to detain an enemy upon the south side of the river. Although the circumstances of Canada have in several respects altered since 1814, the opinions of the Duke of Wellington and Sir James Carmichael Smyth remain of great value to-day. The Duke's remarks, made in 1825, were written, it is to be noted, after the "Rush-Bagot" Convention of 1817 (see Chapter VI.), and so apply to the present situation of Canada under that Convention. They clearly advocate the maintenance of naval stations upon the lakes-i.e., apparently stations which in war could become such-although under that Convention armed vessels, beyond the number authorized, could not be built upon their shores or serve upon their waters. It is interesting also to notice that the Duke of Wellington, who, as an Imperialist, was far in advance of his time, speaks of the Empire and the "dominions" of North America, thus using terms which to many will appear as if written not eighty-five years ago, but subsequent to the period when, under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, the Queen became Empress of India; and after Canada had become a Dominion. With respect to the importance of close co-opera tion between the navy and the army, especially along a frontier such as the lake and river one of Canada, it has been recently said that "the whole history of the British Empire is an illustration of the fact that the two services are interdependent, and that its safety hinges upon their combined action and cooperation." In a special manner do the events of the war of 1812-14 which we have related above illustrate this. They indicate, moreover, how important it may become at times that over the two services should be some supreme authority, competent at a crisis to give prompt directions to both, and with decision enough to do it. In this war the naval and military commanders, each zealous for his country's service, were yet so hard pressed in their respective spheres that they very frequently felt unable to aid each other without evident danger to those interests which they individually had to safeguard. It is under these circumstances that joint and prompt action for the common good can only be secured by a supreme head, capable and ready to assume the responsibility of ordering it; but the necessity for this supreme exercise of authority must arise less frequently in proportion as each service has been trained to understand the wants of the other, to work with the other, and to realize how essentially combined action contributes to their effective power. Mahan thus comments upon the action of 1 Blue Book on the Imperial Conference, London, 1909. Chauncey in connection with the operations on Lake Ontario:1 "The destruction of the enemy's fleet is the means to obtain naval control; but naval control in itself is only a means, not an object. The object of the campaign was to acquire ascendancy on the Niagara Peninsula. Naval control would minister thereto, partly by facilitating the reinforcement and supply of the American Army, and conversely by impeding that of the British." Roosevelt also says:2 "His (Chauncey's) ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created were erroneous, and very hurtful to the American cause. . . . The real purpose was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could only be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land forces." And Sir George Prevost writes to Lord Bathhurst, October 18, 1814: "Military operations are unavoidably combined with naval co-operation, and unconditionally depéndent upon it. This conviction has excited a struggle for ascendancy on the water that has drawn forth on both sides an array of vessels that could never have been anticipated on these inland waters; and the naval commanders have, I am afraid, been led to consider themselves as directing squadrons which, by a trial of strength, were to decide the fate of the war, forgetting their necessary 1 Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812. |