raised by our real wants: not only because those wants are more numerous, which give constant exercise to the appetites; and more unreasonable, which make the gratification proportionably difficult: and altogether unnatural, to which there is no measure; but, principally, because vicious custom hath affixed a kind of reputation to the gratification of the fantastic wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that when things are in this state, we have shewn above, that even the most provident Laws, without other assistance, are insufficient. But in a state of nature, unconscious of the arts of life, men's wants are only real; and these wants, few, and easily supplied. For food and covering are all which are necessary to support our Being. And Providence is abundant in its provisions, for these wants: and while there is more than enough for all, it can hardly be, that there should be disputes about each man's share.

And now the reader sees clearly how it might well be, that this rabble of Atheists should live peaceably in a state of nature, though the utmost force of human Laws, in the improved condition of Society, could not hinder them from running into mutual violence. But the sophistry of this enthymeme is further seen from hence. Not even Mr. Bayle himself would pretend that these Atheists, who live peaceably in their present state, without the restraint of human laws, would live peaceably without this restraint, after they had understood and practised the arts of life in credit amongst a civilized people. In Society therefore, which the arts of life inseparably accompany, an imposed curb, he will own, would be necessary. I then argue thus, If a people, who out of Society could

live peaceably without the curb of Law, could not live peaceably without that curb in Society; you have no reason to believe, that though out of society they might live peaceably without the curb of religion, they could live peaceably, without that curb, in Society? The answer to this must bring on again the question, How strong the curb on man, in Society, should be? which we have fully examined in another place. This argument, therefore, proves nothing but the folly of pretending to conclude, concerning man in Society, from what we see of his behaviour, out of it.

And here, in conclusion, once for all, it may not be amiss to observe, the uniform strain of sophistry which runs through all Mr. Bayle's reasonings on this head. The question is, and I have been frequently obliged to repeat it, he so industriously affecting to forget or mistake it, Whether Atheism be destructive to the body of a Society? And yet he, whose business it is, to prove the negative, brings all his arguments from considerations, which either affect not the gross body of mankind, or affect not that body, in Society: in a word, from the lives of Sophists or Savages; from the example of a few speculative men far above the view of the common run of citizens; or from that of a barbarous crew of savages much farther below it. All his facts and reasonings then being granted, they still fall short and wide of his conclusion.

But the last stroke of his apology is more extravagant than all the rest: for having proved atheism very consistent with a state of nature, lest it should happen to be found not so consistent with civil society, but that one of them must rise upon the ruins of the other, he gives a very palpable hint, which of the two

he thinks should be preserved; by making it a serious question, discussed in a set dissertation*, WHETHER

CIVIL SOCIETY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY

FOR

THE PRESERVATION OF MANKIND†? and very gravely resolving it in the negative.-And here let me observe, that these PHILOSOPHERS (as Mess. Voltaire and D'Alembert call all those who despise Religion) never suffer a good hint to lie unimproved. The famous citizen of Geneva building upon this before us, hath since written a large Discourse, to shew that CIVIL SOCIETY IS EVEN HURTFUL TO MANKIND.

SECT. VI.

I HAVE here given, and to the best advantage, all the arguments Mr. Bayle hath employed to prove Religion not necessary to civil Society; by which it may be seen, how little the united force of wit and eloquence is able to produce for the support of so outrageous a paradox.

The reader will imagine, that now nothing can hinder us from going on to our second proposition; after having so strongly supported the first. But we have yet to combat a greater monster in morals, before we can proceed.

As the great foundation of our proposition, that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to civil society, is this, that religion is necessary to civil society; so the foundation of this

* Contin. des Pens. div. c. cxviii.

+ Si les societéz sont absolument necessaires pour conserver le genre humain.

latter

latter proposition is, that VIRTUE is so. Now, to the lasting opprobrium of our age and country, we have seen a writer publicly maintain, in a book so intitled, that PRIVATE VICES Were PUBLIC BENEFITS. An unheard-of impiety, wickedly advanced, and impudently avowed, against the universal voice of nature: in which moral virtue is represented as the invention. of knaves; and christian virtue as the imposition of fools: in which (that his insult on common sense might equal what he puts on common honesty) he assures his reader, that his book is a system of most exalted morals and religion: And that the justice of his country, which publicly accused him*, was pure calumny.

But I shall undertake to shew, and that in very few words, to the admirers of the low buffoonry and impure rhetoric of this wordy declaimer, that his whole fabric is one confused heap of falsehoods and absurdities.

I. First then, it is to be observed, that though his general position be, that private Vices are public benefits, yet, in his proof of it, he all along explains it by Vice only in a certain measure, and to a certain degree. And, as all other writers have deduced the necessity on private men in society, to be virtuous, and on the magistrate severely to punish vice, from the malignity of the nature of Vice; so he enforces this necessity, on both, from the malignity of its excess. And indeed he had been only fit for Bedlam, had he not given this restriction to the general sense of his proposition.

By the Grand Jury of Middlesex.

However,

However, this is full enough to expose the falsehood of that assertion, which his whole book is written to support, namely, that vice is absolutely necessary for a rich and powerful Society. For whatsoever is absolutely necessary to the well-being of another in matter of morals, must be so, by its essential properties; the use of which thing will be, then, in proportion to its degree. And this the common moralists observe of Virtue with regard to the State. But whatsoever is useful to another, only when in a certain degree, is not so by its essential properties; if not by its essential properties, then, of course, by accident only; and, if by accident, not necessary.

The first part of the former assertion may be proved thus. If A be absolutely necessary to B, it is, because neither C, nor D, nor any thing but A can supply the wants of B. But if nothing but A, can supply these wants, it is because the supplial is afforded by the essential properties of A; which essential properties are incommunicable to all other beings; the communication of them to C, D, &c. making C and D the same as A, which is absurd: for if the supplial of the wants of B were caused by what was not essential to A, but accidental; then might these wants as well be supplied by C, D, &c. as by A; because that which is accidental only, may belong in common to several different beings. The second part may be proved thus: These essential qualities can never be excessive; as for instance, There can never be too much Virtue in a state. Specific Virtues, indeed, may be pushed to excess; but then they lose their nature, and become Vices; in which state of things, Society will be so far from having too much, that it will have too little

Virtue.