not think that units raised and trained on a Militia basis can be made fit to do justice to themselves without some final preparation; yet I would prefer a good Militia battalion composed of, say, 800 serving soldiers and 200 reservists to any ordinary Regular battalion composed of 400 serving soldiers and 600 Regular reservists. Even a Regular battalion composed in equal parts of serving soldiers and reservists would be the better of a few weeks' time to'shake down.' I consider that the standard of immediate efficiency in the Militia should be, and could be, almost comparable with that of the lastmentioned battalion under the conditions of training that now prevail in the Regular Army; but I have no doubt that after a month's preparation, in each case, the improvement in the fighting value of the Regular battalion would be at least double that of the Militia battalion. 10. To produce the required standard of training and to assure an adequate supply of recruits I believe that the following conditions would meet the case: (1) Enlistment 12 years; 7 years with the colours and 5 in the Reserve. (2) Six months' training on enlistment; 22 drills and exercises and a course of musketry annually, and one week in camp, not less frequently than in alternate years, during the seven years of colour service. Reservists to fire a modified course of musketry only. (3) The Militia units to be liable for service abroad in the event of a great war. (4) Pay and allowances at Army rates while in camp, and proportionately for other attendances on parade. (5) 'Wasters' to be rigorously excluded. This is an essential condition to obtaining the right sort of men. My original belief in the acceptability of the above conditions has been fortified (as already explained) by the readiness of sixty-two men of the Spectator Company to enlist under them, and by the unanimous opinion of the company that those conditions would be popular. 11. I venture to assert that a plain lesson of the Spectator experiment is that drill and tactical knowledge quite sufficient for all practical purposes can be taught in six months; and to this I add my opinion that by the system of intermittent training proposed the necessary understanding and experience, and a reasonable approach to the ‘habit of discipline,' would be acquired. Those who saw the Spectator Company at Aldershot will, I think, admit that if, instead of its own young sergeants and corporals, it had had its sergeant instructors for section leaders, its tactical efficiency, for manœuvre purposes, would probably have left little to be desired. I contend that by the Spectator experiment it has been proved that, provided the necessary numbers can be obtained, a reserve army fit to do what is required of it can easily be created. Further than this, I would point out that, from the very fact that the performances of the Spectator Company, after only six months' training, were deemed satisfactory, it seems to follow that if the captains of Regular companies enjoyed advantages similar to those which I possessed at Hounslow the Regular Army itself would be much more efficient than it is. In proof of this contention I would quote the manifest superiority of Guardsmen over Linesmen, and this I attribute entirely to the more thorough training of the recruit. It will, no doubt, be objected that in the Line the favourable conditions of Hounslow cannot be realised; but this reasoning is fallacious. I had at Hounslow only nine ex-soldiers for fatigue duties; all that these men were unable to do-such as a general cleaning up on Saturday mornings— the recruits themselves had no difficulty in performing without any interference with their attendance at parades being thereby occasioned. There is no squadron or company that has not more than nine old soldiers serving in its ranks. Why should not these men be fully at the disposal of their captain, and be excused, as a rule, from all parades except during the period of the year when battalion or other higher training is in progress? Of course there are garrison duties that must be done; but many of these might easily be abolished or altered so as to fit in better with regimental arrangements. The constant activity and interference of staff officers is the greatest obstacle to efficient training. If our generals would only be content to keep an eye upon work done by the regimental officers, instead of preventing it by vain attempts to train the soldiers themselves, we should do far better. The fact is we are running continually, though having never learned to walk. I myself achieved some success at Hounslow solely because, almost for the first time in my life, I was permitted to do my own work in my own way. If we want an efficient army we must allow the regimental officers a free hand during the greater part of the year, and judge them by results to be worthy of promotion, abasement, or rejection. The Army proved itself untrained in South Africa as testified by Sir Evelyn Wood in vol. ii. p. 252 of his recent autobiography-solely because our officers and men had been so constantly 'messed about' by their generals that they had been prevented from learning their military alphabet. We have some first-rate general officers, in spite of the system under which we groan, but the majority are the natural product of that system. How can men be expected to train or lead brigades when they have never learned properly-and some have never even tried-to train companies? Our system of military education, and the examinations by which it is tested, cannot have the best results, because the authorities overlook the fact that all men are not alike. Some have the science fitting them to be staff officers and generals, while others, though scientifically deficient, possess the requisite art to be good regimental officers; there is room for both, because Admirable Crichtons are very rare. A. W. A. POLLOCK. 'WINDOW-DRESSING' IN THE THIS subject has been talked about, written about, and argued round and round about for years, and now it seems that something is going to be done. So much has been said already that a truce to discussion might with advantage be called, pending the appearance of the expected measures of reform, were it not for the existence of misconception in the public mind as to what is the matter with the money market and as to what remedies are needed for its cure. The controversy which has been carried on so long and so vigorously in the City, and in the financial columns of the press, has not been very clearly studied except by those immediately interested; and since, as has been said, there is reason to hope that something is about to be done, it is perhaps worth while to try to put the facts of the case before those who are not brought into daily contact with monetary problems. Put into a nutshell, the evil to be remedied is the fact, now agreed upon by all parties to the discussion, that London conducts its business. as banker to the world at large on an insufficient store of gold. Consequently there arise periods when the measures taken for the protection of its store have to be drastic in their nature and inconvenient in their results. So far unanimity rules among those qualified to debate the matter; disagreement appears when the argument proceeds to decide as to whose fault it is that the store of gold is too small, and at whose expense the defect should be remedied. But since this article is an attempt to elucidate these matters for those who are not familiar with monetary problems, except those of the inevitable and domestic order, and are compelled, in view of the prospect of legislation on the subject, to acquire a closer acquaintance with them, it may be as well at the outset to give a brief explanation as to why it is that London finds itself in this unquestioned difficulty of being expected to act as banker for the world at large and trying to do so with an insufficient store of gold. Among the many causes which contributed to the more rapid development of banking in Great Britain than in any other country the most obvious are its long freedom from invasion and internal revolution, and the consequent start that it obtained in the financial and industrial race, an essential part of the training for which is freedom from anxiety on the score of external or internal disturbance. These very patent considerations are, of course, set out in all the text-books on the subject, and merely repeated here to refresh the memory of those who have not recently been under the necessity of studying text-books. A more recondite cause was the early adoption by England of gold as the sole metallic currency for the payment of any debts above a trifling amount, with the result that British finance was freed from all the difficulties and uncertainties experienced by those countries which struggled to maintain both gold and silver as legal tender, and to keep a fixed ratio between them in spite of fluctuations in the supply and demand. But these are merely accidental influences which time and experience might have been expected to eliminate. And we must look for a deeper cause to explain why it is that, although the more settled conditions of modern civilisation give commerce, and finance its handmaid, a free hand in all the leading countries, and the advantages of a single currency have been admitted by the action of the whole world, commercially considered, yet London still remains the only real banking centre, that is to say, the only centre in which a credit instrument can and must, immediately and without question, be turned into gold on the demand of the holder. Like most other things, the matter is really at bottom one of temperament. The Briton is still not only the best, but in some senses the only Banking Man. This is not written in any spirit of collective self-glorification, though in these days, when it is the fashion to shout 'Ichabod' from the housetops, those of us who are convinced of the soundness of our country's core may be excused for laying a little stress on the fact. The Banking Man, ready to take a huge responsibility and face the consequences with unruffled countenance, but always keeping his head and disinclined to 'see red' under the influence of financial excitement such a being is not necessarily an ideal result of civilisation, but, such as he is, he is produced most readily by British temperament and training. In the matter of thrift and in some forms of financial cleverness our friends across the Channel can give us many points and a beating. As hoarders and investors the French are unrivalled, but their habit of mind does not encourage them to take big risks. Apart from occasional and exceptional ebullitions of speculative spirit, they like to play for safety. Consequently, though they walk steadily round the financial billiard table piling up a constant succession of useful twenties and twenty-fives, they seldom bring off a brilliant break. It is not their game, and very likely they are right to prefer their own system, which wins for them a position of enormous strength and solidity and leaves them unexposed to risk and inconvenience. The net result, however, is that in this matter of banking, Paris makes no pretence at being open for business. She will lend money to any extent on security that she considers good, and her credit is always at the service of an attractive borrower, but her gold she keeps to herself-except on special occasions-retaining the right to meet her obligations in silver token money if it suits her to do so. An issue of Pennsylvania Railroad bonds was recently placed in Paris, and the mere fact was seized on as another instance of the decadence of London; but when New York, being in monetary difficulties, applied for part of the proceeds in gold, Paris produced, not gold, but a draft on London. In New York we find the other extreme. In boldness and enterprise, and in the fine confidence which will consign costly machinery to the scrap heap on the chance of an improvement, the United States may claim to be ahead of England. But the country suffers from the defects of its qualities, and its very audacity, and aggressive tom-boyish juvenility, lead it to outrun the constable with remarkable regularity and thoroughness. Its abounding natural resources and its high tariff have accumulated enormous resources in the hands of a few individuals, giving them a power which it is difficult to realise on this side of the Atlantic. But it can hardly be contended that that power has been used in a manner calculated to inspire the confidence of others, so essential to the success of the Banking Man. Given steadiness, self-control, and a reasonable currency system, New York might well be a formidable rival to London as a banker. But these things are not given yet. Finally, Berlin, viewed as a banker, is a dark horse that has never yet been stripped for a gallop but is only allowed the gentlest exercise, hooded to its ears and sheeted to its tail. With their earnestness of purpose and thoroughness of method, our Teutonic cousins can learn to do most things; and it is possible that Berlin may some day take its place as a considerable financial centre, if only the drillsergeant exactitude with which its growth is guided gives its limbs sufficient freedom to develop healthy and self-reliant activity. But this, again, is not yet. When once this cardinal fact is grasped that London is the one centre to which everyone who has a claim for gold can turn with the certainty of immediately converting it into the metal, it is very easy to see why it is that London has recently found some difficulty in maintaining its store. Agricultural and industrial development has been on an enormous scale all over the world. New fields have been opened on every side. Prairies have been turned into sata lata, rippling with the smile of harvest, and the pace with which mechanical appliances have been devised and constructed for the service, or destruction, of mankind has been unprecedented. All this has meant a demand for currency and credit, and so for gold |