a nation in arms; he opposed for the like reason all ideas of colonial enterprise. It follows therefore that it is in our interest to promote German colonisation. M. Hanotaux's policy favoured this movement-that of Edward the Seventh is opposed to it and for this reason I do not think it desirable. The expansion of German Imperialism or Pan-Germanism is for us a pledge of peace; whilst British Imperialism acting in opposition to it is for us a source of danger. My conclusion is that it would be more advantageous for us by means of a friendly exchange of colonies to obtain from Germany the restoration of our lost provinces in Europe.

In the present stage of the debate on the respective advantages of the English and the Continental ententes these arguments in favour of the latter seem to me to carry the greater weight, unless you have on your side arguments which countervail.

Among the reasons which you have so far put forward in favour of an Anglo-French agreement, there is one which I admit merits respectful consideration. In your eyes this agreement is the best guarantee of European peace for two distinct reasons. First, it tends to isolate Germany, and in fact has already almost done so. The Triplice itself has given way under the strain. Moreover British diplomacy is admirably conducted, and King Edward the Seventh shows himself a man of genius, comparable with Bismarck himself. Germany thus isolated will hesitate before putting her armies in motion against a coalition of the nations of Europe. In the second place, since 1870 the economic laws of the German Empire have undergone complete change. You are aware of the enormous extension of German industry in every market of the world; and the marvellous expansion of her mercantile navy. In the event of war this navy would disappear or be swept away, and consequently Germany would refrain from embarking upon a struggle from which she would emerge financially ruined. The entente cordiale would thus constrain Germany to respect the world's peace.

At first sight the argument seems conclusive, but in reality it is not so. A counter argument has been brought to refute it. To protect her commercial marine Germany has been busy constructing and arming a navy-which is to be completed by 1915. The policy of England, therefore, would be to hasten events, to anticipate the crisis and to put a stop to the carrying out of the German naval programme by every means in her power. The entente cordiale will furnish the means, and this agreement, so far from being a guarantee of peace, will be the source of the next war-because it will enable England to undertake it at her own time and pleasure.

These arguments neutralise one another. I shall therefore be glad to hear what on your side you have to say to justify the price to be paid by France for the entente cordiale. You say that the Russian alliance has cost us ten milliards, and that that is too much. I hold that the entente cordiale has cost us still more, for we have paid for it by giving up our rights in Egypt and Newfoundland.

Such are the party views on this question, but, as I said before, I have no decided opinion on the point, and I am ready to be convinced by the arguments which seem to me most solid.

I have been careful to use my interlocutor's own words in order that I may not be open to the suspicion of having misstated his line of argument. In M. Léouzon Le Duc I find an opponent who, as much by clearness and precision of expression as by the impartiality of his mind, is in every way fitted to support his views in good faith and by straightforward reasoning, without appealing to passion

or taking refuge in subterfuge. Moreover, he has been at pains to learn the real grounds on which the more serious members of the 'German' group base their arguments.

In the first place, it is a matter of surprise that the pessimistic note should be sounded by the Nationalists. Ever since 1871 they have persistently been beating the war-drum. They have been unceasing in their denunciation of the Treaty of Frankfort, and in keeping at fever-point the hostility of French and Germans. They have daily repeated that the only way by which France can resume her position in Europe is by the recovery by arms of her two lost provinces. Now, however, a fraction of the same party, and that, although the least numerous, still the most active, is to-day inciting us to come to a Continental agreement with our enemy of yesterday, and endeavours to turn against England that hatred of Germany which up to the present the more progressive portion of the nation has strongly reprehended. Even supposing that they had at last found grace, one must admit that the spectacle they present is far from edifying. However, it is easy to believe what we desire, and it may be quite delightful for the impenitent enemies of our form of government to exalt an ideal all the more because they are abandoning it, and to assert that their reason for so acting is that the Republic has broken up the national defences.

It is needless to dwell upon this change of attitude-it is sufficient to recognise the right of the Nationalists to learn wisdom, and to examine the grounds of their argument. They amount after all to very little. The entente cordiale in their opinion involves the chance of being a cause of war instead of a guarantee of peace, and since our forces are not in a state to hold their own on land against the forces of Germany, it leads to defeat, and to our ultimate ruin. To these fears, according to M. Léouzon Le Duc, there is the further danger, in the event of defeat, of a monarchical restoration, which doubtless on the other hand would be some compensation to its partisans. This, however, is a secondary consideration. If France were capable of the blunder of voluntarily entering upon or of being forced into a war, and if success favoured our German rivals, the Republican as well as the Socialist ideal would not be wiped out in Europe; and what happened in France would be of no importance, for France would have ceased to exist politically. Hatred of war would be inculcated and fostered; and if those who in the past have been so ready to flourish their swords were to adopt views more in conformity with the spirit of human progress, it would be a matter for congratulation. In fact the outcome of all these arguments put forward by the opponents of the entente cordiale is that, in spite of it or by reason of it, a war might break out, and that it would result in a frightful catastrophe.

accept this conclusion with one restriction, for whilst the

Nationalists assert that the dangers would arise by reason of the entente, I maintain that they would arise in spite of it.

What is the conclusion to be drawn? It is that peace must be maintained even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices. My own views on this point are well known. They have drawn upon me attacks from one side, encouragement from the other. I have urged, and still urge, France to disarmament-even unilateral-should she be unable to bring about simultaneous action among the nations of Europe.

In these days, I do not believe it to be possible to induce any nation, Germany or another, to attack an inoffensive and disarmed nation, which by its own act had thus given the greatest example in the history of the world. I hold the dangers arising from such an attitude to be infinitely less than those which Europe now runs from an armed peace. I do not hide from myself, any more than the Nationalists, the peril overhanging Europe, but the study of history has taught me that the possession of imposing military strength often excites a nation to enterprises which it would otherwise have avoided.

Let us suppose France disarmed. Enlightened Germans and English would undoubtedly attach great importance to her friendship from an economic and intellectual point of view; but the statesmen of both countries would cease to seek her alliance, since it could give no help to their ambitions. No one would be able any longer to say to us, as Germany almost said recently, 'Be with us or against us.'

Such are my own convictions, and I have no power to force them upon others. The bourgeois will have none of them, and the Socialists who follow M. Hervé reject them equally as tinged with moderation and bourgeoisism. The latter declare themselves to be equally indifferent to both Germany and France, and maintain that in the event of any act of aggression we should not attempt to defend ourselves against the invaders, but should turn our arms against the enemies at home, the bourgeois and the capitalist-in a word, to achieve the social revolution; for in presence of a victorious and feudal enemy such a revolution would be within the range of possibility.

Such vapourings must be put aside. We must look at things, political and social, as they are, and consider the question in its actual surroundings. We have an army, and the Chambers are not likely to disband it; and although it daily becomes more unlikely and more difficult to kindle, still the danger of an international conflagration is within the range of possibility.

The question of alliances for us may be thus briefly summed up: (1) As between the two possible alliances, which of them most puts aside the danger of war?

(2) Should a war break out, in spite of all attempts to prevent it,

which alliance offers the better chance of success, and involves the greater probability of defeat?

(3) Which is the alliance which, supposing peace to be maintained, best harmonises with our democratic sentiments: and in the event of a successful war would assure us after victory the more advantageous position?

And lastly (4) which is that which in time of peace is the more favourable to our economic development, and in the event of defeat would leave us least weakened ?

With regard to the first question, M. Léouzon has already shown the interest of the British Government to precipitate the struggle before the completion of the German naval programme. At the same time he admits that if the British Government is animated by no warlike views, its diplomacy is a trustworthy element of peace. He places these two considerations in the balance and finds them of equal weight. Moreover, he admits that both alliances offer similar dangers and similar guarantees.

His views might have found some support so long as the Conservative Government was in office in England, but since the advent to power of the Liberals the situation has changed. M. Léouzon's inference that the constantly increasing German population demands a colonial outlet is more important: for should England check it, Germany would seek compensation in Europe, and could find it only in France and that by war. This second consideration is of even less weight in my mind. In the first place, the increase of population in Germany already shows signs of slackening. In Berlin now the birth-rate is scarcely higher than that of Paris. The German capital comes next after the French, and with a very small difference. So far this tendency has not spread to the country districts, but it will do so. Such movements once started in the large cities invariably spread to the more sparsely populated country districts. This is a law which nothing can reverse. Moreover, were it the fact that Germany would still need new outlets for the excess of her population, pacific penetration in France, in South America, and in the English colonies, open to trade with everybody, would suffice. At any rate this method would meet her requirements quite as well as forcible occupation, and she would be in no better position if she had seized upon neighbouring territory at the point of the sword. In bygone days, it is true, this latter was the way of solving the question. The vanquished were carried away into slavery and their lands divided among the victors. Although disgraceful confiscations, recalling ancient ways, are still, to the shame of civilised nations, winked at when dealing with barbarous tribes, it would be impossible to apply them in the case of those countries where modern civilisation, as we call it, reigns. In 1871 the Germans did not confiscate the cottonmills of the Alsatians nor the farms of the Lorrainers, nor would the

French, had the fortune of war leant to their side, have dealt otherwise with German private property.

The argument, therefore, that the Anglo-French entente might provoke a war by forcing Germany to let loose her surplus population on France, it seems to me, may be safely disregarded.

Added to this, and supposing M. Léouzon Le Duc's conjecture to be realised, however contrary it seems to probability, namely that if the majority of the English people, instead of uniting with us in our efforts to avoid a war, were to do their utmost to provoke it, nothing would oblige us to follow their lead. Between an entente cordiale, or even between a defensive alliance and an offensive alliance, there is a vast gulf; and from our point of view France should keep aloof from any such entanglement with any Power as is implied by the last named. On no account should she bind her hands and consent to a state of things which at any moment might force her, in spite of herself, to take part in the confusion of arms.

It is therefore altogether unfair to say that in the entente cordiale there lurks the danger of our being drawn into war. At any rate it removes us one degree further away from it than would a Continental entente, and leaves our hands more free. With Germany as our ally, we should find at some critical moment that she was possessed of means of constraining us in a way that England never could do.

The other argument put forward by the Nationalists is that our army would be unable to hold its own against that of Germany on account of our inferiority in point of numbers, of unity of command, and the anti-military tendency, still undeveloped among our neighbours. This ground, as I have already said, may be a solid one for such as insist upon peace as a necessity, but it is valueless as against the entente cordiale. To give it weight it must be supposed that any agreement with one nation implied a cause of war with another, and that in the event of our taking the German side we were certain beforehand that we should be on the side of the victors. The Nationalists of the 'German' group do not seem to have regarded this eventuality. They have omitted to discuss the probable results in the case of victory or in that of defeat, in the event of a struggle between the Continental and the maritime Powers-they seem to assume that in such a war we should be inevitably the victors. This may be possibly the case, although my friends do not share in the belief that the British fleet will be swept aside by that of the Continental Powers combined, and British soil invaded by their troops. Nevertheless it is an hypothesis not the less tenable because its realisation seems to one absurd. The fleets of the United States and of Japan would in such case join forces with those of Great Britain; and it seems scarcely probable that the united fleets of all the Continental Powers all together—if a coalition could be arrived at-would be able to hold the seas.

Let us however examine the matter from both sides, looking at