Sir Edward Watkin's favourite expression, a 'hobgoblin.' But hobgoblins scare-at all events the timid and excitable, who are never few or without influence; perhaps never more common or with greater influence than now."

A third consideration must be present to every student of international law. Of late years there have been many instances of wars begun without a formal declaration or even any clear warning; a sudden march is made, the frontiers are crossed, a fortress or position of vantage is seized, and a victory is won; while the diplomatist is still speaking, the soldier strikes. In this respect there has probably been deterioration instead of improvement in international law. The rules of pre-Christian warfare were as to this superior to ours. The majority of modern authorities hold that such notice is not obligatory. There is a very strong body of opinion that, with the conditions of warfare in these days, the giving of such a notice is impracticable. Many of the older writers thought otherwise; they looked forward with confidence to a time when civilised nations would submit to such a restriction. They were mistaken. It can scarcely be doubted that, if the great military States of the Continent were asked to bind themselves to-day not to go to war without always giving reasonable warning to an adversary, they would decline to pledge themselves. Such refusal is compatible with honourable conduct; for the acts of nations are often better than the doctrines or maxims of their advisers. But can one dismiss as preposterous and chimerical the fear of a sudden attack or surprise raid, so long as nine-tenths of modern writers declare it to be permissible and the chief States of the world reserve to themselves the right of going to war without notice?

6

It is difficult to abstain from exaggeration of any kind, and to give due weight to conflicting considerations in making my point-to recognise fully the advantages of rapid transit and the moral benefits of free intercourse between people of different nations, and at the same time to take note of dangers and guard against them. In fairness it is to be remembered that our physical isolation has often been to the interests of peace. The wet ditch' of the Channel has saved us from entanglements in the amities or enmities' of the Continent; it has served us better than could any equivalent of the Monroe doctrine; it has kept foreign nations from meddling with us, and, in some degree, England from meddling with them. If the construction of the Tunnel were in any way to alter this-if it encouraged, for example, plans for military co-operation with the forces of a Continental ally-we should have lost what no commercial gain would make up for; one would be tempted to harbour some such wish as that expressed by Jefferson, when contemplating the effects of

3 Le gouvernement d'un peuple, à certains moments de son histoire, est aux mains de demi-fous' (Ribot, Essai sur les Passions, p. 113).

drawing the United States into the turbid political waters of the Old World.1

Parenthetically, it may be remarked that it would be desirable to obtain from the legal advisers of the promoters answers to one or two questions. What complete security is there that the ownership of the undertaking and eventually its control or management will not pass, largely, if not wholly, into the hands of foreigners, some of them nominees, it may be, of their Governments? Another matter is of interest-theoretical interest, it may be-to students of international law. Assuming that England and France can give a company rights over the bed of the sea within the three-mile territorial belt surrounding the two countries-which is doubtful-can any such right be given over the sea bed, or the underlying strata, outside that limit? A somewhat similar question has arisen with respect to the pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf and off the coast of Ceylon. To say the least, the point is doubtful; and it would be instructive to know whether the promoters can answer it with confidence.

To return to the main question and to conclude: the construction of the Channel Tunnel seems the natural sequel to an unmistakable pacific movement among nations; the fit work for two Governments which had not merely by words and banquets, but by deeds-by measures of disarmament, by large reductions in naval and military expenditure, and by adopting less barbarous rules as to warfareshown that their fair promises meant much. It would be the appropriate monument to commemorate such a victory. But the monument ought to follow not precede the victory. The Tunnel can wait; it ought to wait, I think. Some of my friends from whom I rarely differ would be glad to see not only one tunnel but several. At present, I think, one would be too many. In better times, when wisdom and love of peace count for more than they now do, it will be otherwise.

'I can scarcely withhold myself from joining in the wish of Silas Dean that there was an ocean of fire between us and the old world' (Jefferson's Works, iv. 173).

VOL. LXI-No. 360

JOHN MACDOnell.

THE REVIVED CHANNEL TUNNEL

PROJECT

VI

In the discussion of means for improving the railway communications between England and France, and so further cementing the present admirable relations between the two countries, we certainly should not fix our thoughts exclusively on a tunnel beneath the Channel. No one can deny that there are very serious issues involved in any scheme for a tunnel. The most important is no doubt the military question, but there are others also, physical and financial, of much consequence, which deserve great attention. I do not here wish to do more than merely allude to the military and national points of view of the Tunnel, as these have been and will be discussed by expert authorities far more competent to do so than myself. Speaking as a layman, but having as such studied the conflicting professional opinions of soldiers and sailors, I cannot but look upon the piercing of our frontier with what I hold to be well-grounded alarm.

Leaving, then, the military issues to others, I would point out that physically the difficulties in making the Tunnel might prove to be insuperable, for if any serious fissure in the chalk were encountered no human beings could work under such a water-pressure as would be developed. I do not mean to prophesy that such a fissure will be met with; on the contrary, I think the information collected points the other way, but the non-existence of a fissure cannot be demonstrated until the full-sized Tunnel is completed throughout its entire length, and even the making of a heading from shore to shore will not guarantee that no fissure will be encountered in the larger cross-sectional area of the Tunnel itself. No one can deny the possibility of such a disaster, and it is a matter which certainly ought to be considered as of grave weight in the balance of pros and cons of a Channel Tunnel.

Then again there is the financial side of the question, assuming that all is well in the matter of construction. Is it possible that the net realizable traffic from a Channel Tunnel can pay interest on such an expenditure as is talked of, say sixteen millions of money, or on a cost of some 600,000l. per mile? Under the circumstances of the case, and with water competition both for goods and passengers still

remaining, it seems to me impossible that the financial result can be even moderately successful. So far as this country may be asked to bear its share of the financial burden, it may be said that the capital expenditure and working expenses should be apportioned in view of the mileage affected, inasmuch as the Tunnel is expected to increase the traffic on the mileage of the existing railways in the two countries. If so, the shorter mileage between London and Dover as contrasted with that between Calais and Paris would indicate that the lion's share of the expenditure should fall on France. However this might be arranged between the two nations, the expenditure of 16,000,000l. of hard cash for improved means of communication-while the sea competition will always exist not merely between Dover and Calais but also between all the ports of the two countries, strikes me as a financial difficulty of the first order. From this point of view the Channel Tunnel is obviously very different from the great tunnels which pierce mountain ranges.

But, as I have said, we are not under the necessity of considering a tunnel as the only alternative to the existing means of communication; for there cannot be the slightest doubt that a railway ferry offers many comparative advantages, and avoids the difficulties to which allusion has been made as inseparable from a tunnel.

A railway ferry across the Channel was propounded in 1872 by Sir John Fowler, and was almost authorised by Parliament. It is said that the project was defeated by the casting vote of the Chairman of a Committee of the House of Lords. If any one desires detailed information on what was then proposed he cannot do better than read the article written by Sir John Fowler in this Review of March 1882, when (ten years after his defeat in Parliament) Sir John Fowler, with all his experience as a railway engineer, returned to the charge and put the case for a ferry before the public by many cogent arguments. He quoted in support of his views such authorities as Mr. T. E. Harrison, engineer of the North-Eastern Railway, on the railway questions; as Mr. G. Fosberry Lyster, engineer of the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, on the required harbour construction and pier arrangements; as Sir E. J. Reed, Mr. Samuda, Mr. Laird, and Lord Armstrong on the shipbuilding and mechanical questions; and as Sir James Anderson, of the Great Eastern steamship, Captain Sherard Osborn, Captain Halpin, and Vice-Admiral Robinson on the navigation matters involved.

Much has happened since 1882, and the views of that date have been amply borne out by much subsequent experience. We know of railway ferries in many countries by which both goods waggons and passenger railway rolling stock are conveniently interchanged across intervening seas and lakes for distances far exceeding that between Dover and Calais, and under conditions of sea exposure at least as great

as between Dover and Calais. On the line of communication between Berlin and Copenhagen, as an instance, but also in many situations, we know that, besides the ordinary rolling stock, restaurant and sleeping cars cross the ferries, and that passengers habitually make their journeys in the cars.

It cannot thus be denied that the scheme of a railway ferry across the Channel is perfectly feasible, and could be made convenient and even luxurious, avoiding all break of bulk for goods, and all change of carriage by passengers, unless a change to the deck of a large steamship be preferred. Sir John Fowler proposed to treat his ferry ships for passengers as large railway stations, with waiting rooms, refreshment rooms, and every modern requirement. The only obvious drawback is that all risk of sea-sickness cannot be eliminated by a railway ferry. But with ships of the large size required for the traffic between England and France, the chance of sea-sickness would certainly be immensely diminished, and its discomforts would be palliated by improved cabin accommodation for those who could not sleep in a sleepingcar through the hour of sea transit, or could not afford the expense of a train de luxe. The experience of most persons going down Channel in an ocean liner is that the effects of the sea are not often much felt till Dover has been passed. I do not mean of course to suggest that this is the case with all passengers, nor do I wish to advance the idea that in heavy weather a large steamer will not occasionally be unpleasant between Dover and Calais. That sea-sickness, however, would be very greatly mitigated there can be no doubt, and we may well ask whether for the total elimination of occasional sea-sickness of an hour's duration for a comparatively small number of persons, it can be worth while to spend many millions or to incur grave national risks.

In other respects the question of a Channel ferry has made marked advance since 1872. At that time there was no sufficient harbour at Dover, and a heavy expenditure would have been there necessary, for the protection and accommodation of the large ferry steamships. Now we have a superb harbour at Dover, with ample depth of water at all times of tide, and the works to instal a railway ferry on the English side are, comparatively speaking, negligible.

On the French side of the Channel better harbour accommodation than now existing would undoubtedly be necessary. Whether this should be given at Calais or Boulogne, only four miles further away from Dover, or at some intermediate point, such as Audrecelles (one mile nearer to Dover than Calais), where the forty-feet contour line of depth is only about six hundred yards from high-water mark, is a matter on which one could not without considerable study express an opinion. The matter is not merely one of engineering but also for commercial investigation, in view of the requirements of the French system of railways.

As at Dover, so also at Boulogne long breakwaters have been