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made, enclosing a large sheltered area, but at present a depth sufficient for large vessels at all times of tide has not been provided. Though Boulogne may be more convenient for a terminus of the ferry than Calais for Paris, Switzerland, and the South of France, as it saves the railway journey between Calais and Boulogne, the situation of Calais for Belgium, Holland, and the North of Europe is better. Thus, in spite of part of the harbour work required being already in existence at Boulogne, the balance of advantages of situation may be with Calais, and of course the extra four miles of sea is against the selection of Boulogne, although a longer discrepancy of distance has not prevented the development of a large passenger as well as goods traffic between Folkestone and Boulogne.

With the knowledge of what can be done on sandy shores by modern dredging plant (which has been immensely improved since 1882), it is, I venture to say, merely a question of which position offers the greatest advantages, all things considered. We have only to look at the development and maintenance of deep water approaches to such ports as Ymuiden, Dunkirk, Liverpool, Durban, and Port Said, all on sandy coasts, to see that a good French harbour for the railway ferry presents no difficulties, and would not involve more than a very small fraction of the cost of a Channel Tunnel. It is obvious that money spent on any of the French ports would be for the advantage also of general trade, which is a point not to be lost sight of by our allies in considering the cost of installing a railway ferry with large ships.

It must, of course, be admitted that the journey would be shorter in time by a Channel Tunnel; but here, again, the comparative shortening is not really of much importance. The ferry would, I suppose, provide a speed of twenty-three knots, or nearly twentyseven statute miles, an hour, and the railway speed through the Tunnel may be assumed at about forty-five statute miles an hour. If we may assume that some stoppage for the exchange of electric engines and other matters takes place on the railway at both ends, such stoppage would, wholly or in part, counterbalance the time expended in running the trains on to and off the ferry steamers. Considering the relative velocities of the train and ship, we may probably with sufficient accuracy arrive at a difference in time of about thirty minutes in favour of the Tunnel route. This is but a slight percentage of the duration of a journey to Paris, the Riviera, Switzerland, or Italy. As in the case of sea-sickness, it does not seem reasonable to incur the risks and cost of a Channel Tunnel for a saving of half an hour, more or less, for passenger traffic.

I have said little about goods traffic, as that matter is unaffected by the above contrasts of the two projects. With goods traffic it is simply a question of the amount of accommodation to be provided, and within reason time is not of importance. It is to be remembered

also that in all probability a very large proportion of the goods traffic interchanged between the two countries would continue to be shipped as at present, as the cost of sea transport will be cheaper, except for perishable and express goods, than railway transport can be. The subject of goods traffic by railway ferries was well dealt with in an article in the Times of the 17th of January. It can be developed to any extent, and presents no difficulties on a properly designed railway ferry with sufficient approaches.

There is one other matter to which allusion has not been madeviz., the comparative working expenses of a tunnel and railway ferry. It is a question which must, I think, remain indeterminate. In the case of the tunnel the traffic would be conducted over adverse gradients of considerable length in one or other direction, the cost of which is calculable, but we have no data for the expense of ventilating so long a tunnel, to be worked, no doubt, electrically, but approached at both ends by gradients descending to a very considerable depth. The wind and weather on the two coasts will much affect the question of ventilation from day to day, and we also cannot know what (if any) pumping of infiltrated water in the tunnel may be required. In view of the rainfall and land water on the approaches and condensation, we may, I think, be sure that provision for pumping will be a necessity, but what the annual cost of it may be it is impossible to say. In working the ferry, on the other hand, there would be the expenses of a separate organisation of ships, of shipping and unshipping the trains, of harbour dues, and insurance against sea risks.

On the whole, I think that for present purposes the working expenses may, in the comparison of the two projects, be neglected. It is impossible, as I have said, with our present knowledge to indicate on which side the advantage would be. In the case of the ferry a fairly correct estimate of annual expenses might be made for a given traffic, but this is not the case in regard to a tunnel such as is proposed.

The conclusion from all the above considerations must, I think, be that for a very small part of the cost of a tunnel a railway ferry with the most modern improvements could be installed which would fulfil almost all that a Channel Tunnel could provide. In those things in which the ferry would fall short the issues are nearly immaterial. There could be no difficulty in estimating the cost of the ferry, with its harbour works, and the working expenses could be arrived at, while its beneficial effect in uniting the two countries and increasing interchange of traffic must be undoubted. On the other hand, there are many undefined eventualities in the case of a tunnel, the expenditure must be enormous, and success cannot be guaranteed.

Lastly, and most important of all, the grave military questions of a tunnel are completely avoided by the alternative of a ferry.

J. WOLFE BARRY.

RECENT ATTACKS ON THE ADMIRALTY

QUIET people have recently become aware that there is in progress an agitation against the present Board of Admiralty of a very dangerous character. At first it was possible to ignore it as the ordinary wellmeaning but misinformed criticism of men seriously interested in the welfare of the Navy. With scolding of this kind we are quite familiar, and we listen to it in the distance, if not with pleasure, at least with tolerance, as the index of a lively popular interest in the Service. It came from the usual sources which we know as well as the east wind and the fog, and there was no need for any man to leave his work to protest against ordinary climatic conditions. But lately the disturbance has begun to ring with a different sound. Statements and figures have been sown broadcast so recklessly untrue, to say no more, that they can no longer be accepted as candid criticism. And they have come, not only from the lower ranks of the Press, where the stress and hurry of early editions will excuse a good deal, but also from writers of a higher class who, at least, had leisure to weigh their words and test their allegations. To this has been added a flood of prejudice eagerly poured over every little untoward incident, such as are inevitable in the life of a great Service and are usually passed unnoticed. The rancour and bitterness with which such occasions have been seized are constantly increasing till, incredible as it may seem, we see a naval officer of high standing, and hitherto widely respected, being carried so far as to come perilously near to fomenting mutiny.

What does it all mean? We cannot tell. It is in any case needless to peer into the unsavoury background of which our senses make us painfully aware. For there is on the surface one plain meaning which concerns the very life of the country, and which the country should no longer endure.

For some years past a little band of men, whose services the country has never sufficiently recognised, had been awakening us by patient and persistent effort to what was meant by efficient naval administration and real preparedness for war. Some have been in the most honoured ranks of the Press and some in the Services, but all were of one mind. In season and out of season they preached the gospel

of Von Moltke and the German Great General Staff and the possibility of adapting it to our own widely differing case. They taught us that the Navy needs a brain, that it needs direct responsibility each man for his own department-responsibility for war plans, for personnel, for material, for supply, and all that makes the active power of a great fleet. They have pointed out to us that the problem has never been solved except by a sound organisation which permits us to choose the right men and fit them in the right places to the best of our ability, and then without meddling to trust them to carry out our work and to hold them responsible if they fail. Above all, they have taught us that this method must apply in its strongest form to the man entrusted with plans of war. For plans of war imply secrecyultimately even secrets which must be locked in the breast of the war director alone-secrets which may involve his calling on his colleagues for measures and material which cannot fully be explained to them. In this way and for these reasons your man responsible for war plans must inevitably step into the position of the chief of the General Staff, and when that was done you would have a system under which efficient warfare and efficient preparation for war were possible. Every Commission that sat to consider the question more or less approximately endorsed these views. The country was at last converted and the whole Press took up the cry 'responsibility,' preparedness for war,' 'definite plans of operation.' The system was set on foot, the man was found, the thing began to move. Maybe it has not reached to so high a perfection as it will do some day; but with the Sea Lords sitting a Board that is responsible for working the general policy, a First Sea Lord responsible for war plans, with a strong Intelligence Department assisted by the War College at Portsmouth, we have practically all the machinery of a true General Staff suited to our needs and methods.

Then what do we see? Under a masterful hand the machinery begins to move; war plans begin to shape themselves hand-in-hand with diplomacy, finance, and the Army; material begins to shape itself to war plans, and strategical disposition of the Fleet to both. Then incontinently, just as we are realising the good dream which we have dreamed so long, a crowd of little or anonymous men begin to cry an alarm, and demand that the machine shall be stopped and opened up for all the world to see what work it is doing. Such folly would be ludicrous were it not our own, and so full of peril. Can they not see? Amongst the loudest of the rioters are men who were the aptest pupils of those who led the good movement, and who a year ago were shouting most shrilly 'efficiency,' 'preparedness for war,' 'Moltke' and 'General Staff.' Did they really think that such a system could be worked without trust and without secrecy? Did they really think they could demand a full and categorical answer to every question their want of understanding or lack of information

might suggest? Let them for a moment picture a band of journalists and unemployed officers cross-examining the German General Staff in the 'sixties.' Is it even thinkable? And yet the task for which Moltke had to prepare was simplicity beside the problems which confront the British Admiralty. Surely all those who are honest in the outcry have only to think a moment to see that no Staff system under heaven could work under such conditions. Already you have forced out information which as Englishmen you would not have sold to a foreigner for all he could give. And now when there is resistance, and you are answered according to your folly, you cry out that the country is being deceived, that the Admiralty is not to be trusted. Sir Alexander Cockburn, sitting in his place as Lord Chief Justice of England, once laid it down that there is no duty to tell the truth in answer to a question that a man had no right to ask. We may not care to adopt such a principle in civil life, but it is the essence of war. And if you find that in reply to one of your ill-judged demands you have received from the Admiralty less than the whole truth, for most of us it is a reason for trusting them more and not less. To deceive the enemy is a vital part of the work of a General Staff, and you too who hamper and thwart its work are the worst of enemies for you are within our gates. Nor must you forget when Admiralty Memoranda are issued to satisfy your importunity, and you find them not guiltless of obscurity and even contradiction, that such memoranda are possibly not always intended entirely for home consumption.

This is especially the case where the disposition of the fleet is dealt with, and it is just here where the agitators are most active and the folly of their attitude most glaring. By events almost without parallel the whole political balance of the world has been upset. Europe itself has been metamorphosed almost as completely as it was on the eve of the Seven Years' War. The relations of the Powers are without precedent, and the Admiralty, in concert with the other Departments of State, has to work out from the beginning a disposition of the Fleet to meet the new and unexampled conditions. It is a work not only difficult, but requiring the utmost delicacy. The comity of nations demands that it shall be done decently. The bludgeon must not be flourished rudely in the face of sensitive neighbours with whom we have no quarrel and are on visiting terms. Let us see for a moment how the matter looks to them. In dealing with the reorganisation and redistribution of the Fleet in 1904 Admiral Baron von Maltzahn, one of the highest authorities on strategy in the German Navy, writes as follows:

It is no longer a matter of preparation in peace for the approach of war.'... The British Fleet is actually ready for war and is drawn up against Europe. It only remains for it to take up the positions which have been arranged beforehand in the event of war.... Never have such measures been carried so far in time of armed peace.

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