House of Commons so clamorously protests, but aggravated to this extent that the latter body has access to a Court of Appeal and the former has not. Nothing can be done save by consent of both Houses. Mending the House of Lords implies of necessity strengthening it. The object of its Radical critics is to weaken or abolish it. Under these circumstances it seems probable that, if the House of Lords passes a wise and moderate measure of reform, the House of Commons will throw out the Bill.

DUNRAVEN.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AS A PRACTICABLE SCHEME

THE Army Order published on the 14th of January shows merely the framework, the skeleton, of the army that is to be. What that skeleton will develop into depends upon the flesh and blood which is to clothe it, and make it a living, fighting, force-an army 'in being." There is nothing absolutely new in the framework. It groups the various units composing the army into divisions instead of into army corps, on the continental system-a system, as pointed out by the Times, unsuited to the size of our armies in war and incompatible with the distribution of our troops in peace.' To this extent the new organisation is a great improvement on that which it is to replace. There is, however, one thing that is new in the Army Order. It shows that, in order to mobilise the army, it will be necessary to draw on the auxiliary forces for some 30,000 men to complete the first line, and some 56,000 more to reinforce that line during the first six months of war. This is new. Heretofore the mobilised army scheme contemplated the first line of an expeditionary force being entirely composed of regular troops, auxiliaries being used during war as drafts, to replenish the fighting line, or as units to relieve regular battalions in colonial garrisons, or, as in the case of South Africa, to occupy posts on the lines of communication. Mr. Haldane does not show how he proposes to qualify the auxiliaries for the more important service he would impose upon them. It is unfortunate that we do not follow the example of Switzerland in our official schemes of army reorganisation. When a recent reorganisation was contemplated in Switzerland, it was prepared by the War Department and circulated in full detail to commanding officers and others for report, before being adopted by the Federal Government.

We do not adopt so wise a course. The first complete knowledge the nation gets of any great scheme of army reorganisation is when the War Minister introduces the measure into the House of Commons, which he must thus do without the advantage of a complete knowledge of the views of non-official military experts on the details of his scheme, or whether his proposals will be favourably or unfavourably received by the public. The English people are slaves to precedent,

and the Government, following precedent, will probably announce its completed scheme, and is not likely to make such an important measure non-political, by leaving its followers free to vote as they please. The 'business of the Opposition is to oppose' all Government measures, and the business of the Government is to defend them, from a party point of view, and, as usual, the big battalions will score a success.

Though we cannot know the details of Mr. Haldane's scheme until it is laid before the House as a completed measure, one thingand that probably the main principle of the scheme-is revealed in the Army Order. It is most desirable that the nation should realise and discuss the main principle of the impending reorganisation before it is finally framed. The Government will thus have the advantage of knowing what the trend of public opinion is, and, if that opinion should be in favour of, what I believe must be, Mr. Haldane's views, it will strengthen his hands with some of his lessinformed and more hesitating colleagues, and tend to avert the adoption of compromises, resulting in half measures, which have always been so fatal in army matters.

Mr. Haldane having announced that the first line of his mobilised army, to the extent of one-fifth of its total strength, is to consist of auxiliary troops, it is quite clear that he contemplates a complete revolution in their organisation, for, as they at present exist, they are absolutely and admittedly incapable of such service. In their present state they would not strengthen, they would dilute, the first line to a very dangerous extent. It is the organisation of his second-line army, which, I take it, must involve the main principle of Mr. Haldane's impending reorganisation, and it is to that principle I would draw public attention. A witty American has said this country has no climate, it has only samples of weather.' It may with greater truth be said this country has no army, it has only samples of military forces. We have the regulars, with their reserves, admirable in almost every respect except in numbers. In support of these we have the Militia, the Yeomanry, the Volunteers, and some minor organisations. These are all under different conditions of service, on different rates of pay, and on different planes of efficiency, or, may we say, of inefficiency. These regulars and auxiliaries taken in the mass do not constitute an army. They are only samples of military forces' that, as at present organised, do not constitute a homogeneous and efficient army, capable of coping, on equal terms, with the great continental armies.

The Adjutant-General, in his evidence before the Royal Commission of 1903, said, speaking of the forces detailed in the annual estimates, ‘I think the country has an impression that this paper army is an effective army, but it is not.' To maintain a voluntary regular army sufficient to garrison and defend the Empire-and only a voluntary organisation is desirable, or possible, for such a service-must necessarily VOL. LXI-No. 361

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involve enormous expenditure. That expenditure may have reached an amount which demands reduction, provided that an efficient second-line army can be created to supplement the regular forces in times of great emergency.

Before considering how such an efficient second-line army can be obtained, it is as well to justify the statement that our existing auxiliary forces are not qualified for that service. The Royal Commission presided over by the Duke of Norfolk, and largely composed of experienced officers of the auxiliary forces, reported that 'The Militia, in its existing condition, is unfit to take the field for the defence of the country.' And of the Volunteers it reported that 'Neither the musketry nor the tactical training of the rank and file would enable it to face, with prospect of success, the troops of a continental army.' 'The Militia and Volunteer forces have not either the strength or the military efficiency required to enable them to fulfil the functions for which they exist.' Much the same evidence was given before the Royal Commission of 1903. Lord Roberts, in speaking of home defence in the absence of the whole or the greater part of the regular army, said: 'It is impossible to rely upon the Volunteers as now constituted, or upon the Militia.' Lord Wolseley, when Commander-in-Chief, pressed for, and obtained, an increase to the regular army on the ground that the three army corps to be maintained should consist entirely of regulars, the Militia not being capable, as then (and now) constituted, to take their place in the first fighting line.

arose.

Look at the condition of the Militia when embodied during the war. When Militia battalions were sent to the Colonies and to South Africa, the question of the minimum age for embarkation The minimum for regulars was twenty. It was proposed to make it nineteen for Militia, but it was found that this would exclude about one-third of the men! The age was reduced to eighteen, which only excluded one-tenth!! There was a deficiency of 303 officers in the sixty-eight battalions selected for service. In one regiment, both battalions of which were employed, there were only eight instead of twenty-four subalterns. In others there were deficiencies ranging from seventeen downwards. In the six months, October 1899 to April 1900, 407 subalterns were appointed to the Militia. Most of these went out with no training and knowing nothing,' and 'many without even being gazetted.' The shortage of officers in 1898 was 505, in 1899 624, in 1902 671, and, apparently we are going from bad to worse as, in 1905 it amounted to 964. The defects of the Militia appear still more glaring when the establishment as a whole is examined. In 1905 the establishment authorised was 131,136 of all ranks. At the training only 96,603 could be mustered, a deficiency of 34,533.

Not only do we fail to get the numbers authorised, we fail equally

to get men fairly representative of the manhood and intelligence' of the nation. We get instead boys of sixteen or seventeen, who join with a view to transfer to the regulars when they reach the age of eighteen, and we retain many old men in the ranks, disqualified by age and infirmities for field service. If these were excluded the deficiency in 'efficients' of 34,533 would be augmented by many thousands. How can the manhood and intelligence ' of the nation be induced to enlist in the Militia? Not, I fear, by appeals to its patriotism. That sentiment could not be relied upon as a permanent factor in Militia recruiting. Can the deficiency in numbers be corrected under the existing organisation? Clearly not by offering increased rates of pay. The initial pay is the same in the Militia as in the line, and if we increased it for the Militia we should be obliged to increase it for the regulars, and the expense would become enormous, and the results nil. We have had during the past sufficient experience of the folly of increasing the soldier's pay with the hope of attracting a different class of recruits.

That the Militia is so inefficient as to render it unfit, as at present organised, to act as a second-line army capable of serving with the regulars in the first line is, I think, beyond question. In the evidence before the recent Royal Commissions the two great defects of the Militia were repeatedly stated to be the deficiency and inefficiency of officers, and the deficient training of the men, especially as regards musketry, There seems little hope of these defects being corrected. Militia recruits train for sixty-three days on enlistment, fourteen of which are devoted to musketry, and subsequently they train with their battalion for twenty-seven days annually. This training has been proved by results to be insufficient, and yet it will probably be found impossible to extend it, sufficiently to produce satisfactory results, without seriously affecting recruiting. The twenty-seven days' annual training tells severely on the men's civil employment, and is very unpopular with the employers of labour.

The cost of the Militia is so extravagant that to expand it, on the existing scale of expenditure, would be financially unjustifiable. This will be clear by comparing our Militia and its cost with that of Switzerland. The 96,603 of all ranks of Militia trained in 1905 were in no sense an army. They were deficient in staff, in artillery, in cavalry and in medical, store, supply and transport services, and yet they cost about 1,946,2801. The Swiss Militia army, numbering 300,000 and completely organised as an efficient army in all arms and services, cost only 1,250,000l. The Swiss thus obtained a force three times greater than ours, and incomparably superior in organisation and training, for an expenditure of three-quarters of a million less than ours. Even our Volunteers, in no sense an army, numbering only 256,671, cost 1,668,9407. against the 1,250,000l. which provides Switzerland with a perfectly organised army of 300,000. Assuming that the Militia and Volunteers,