battalions, and to give the youths of the country their military training and knowledge. This training should be for one year, or for such other period as might be sufficient. At the expiration of that training the youths would have three courses open to them. Those who wished to enter the army might enlist, those who preferred to return to civil life could do so, but would be required to be inscribed, for from three to five years, in the reserve of their battalions, or they might, for a small retaining fee, be enrolled in the reserve of the regular battalions. During those three or five years they would be required to undergo a certain number of days' training so as to keep alive their military knowledge. That training should be given by their battalion at any time most convenient to them, and that would interfere least with their civil occupations. Or they might join Volunteer corps and thus keep alive their efficiency. By this system we should in five years possess dépôt battalions that could, in case of emergency, call up their reserve and become efficient auxiliaries to the service battalions. Their service would be confined to the United Kingdom, unless they volunteered for active service abroad, either in units or as drafts from the reserve of trained men, which in five years would number over 200,000 fully trained and of the best fighting age. When the regular army is in the field it is mainly drafts and not complete units that are required to reinforce it. When the Duke of Wellington was offered Militia battalions in 1813 he replied that he would prefer drafts to complete the strength of the regiments under his command, rather than fresh units. It has been suggested that the second-line army should be made liable to serve abroad, at the will of the authorities. I agree with the military correspondent of the Times on this question. He says:

It is true by refusing to impose the liability to serve abroad upon the secondline army, we incur certain risk, and harass the souls of strategists who wish to calculate upon definite numbers with a desirable certainty, but we have always been in that position in regard to the Militia, and it has never failed us yet. There is nothing whatever to suggest that the second-line army of the future will be less patriotic.

Those to be trained would consist of all youths between certain ages, say from seventeen to twenty, or whatever ages might be found most suitable and convenient to the public. The exemptions would, no doubt, be those usual in conscript armies, namely, men serving in the army, in the navy, the marines, and the mercantile marine, all physically unfit for military service, clergy, bread-winners and only sons of widows, &c. If the whole of the 124 Militia battalions were retained as training battalions, which probably would not be necessary, they could, if each trained 600 youths, send annually to the reserve some 74,000 trained reservists. Thus in a very few years we should replace our present inefficient Militia battalions by others composed of the 'manhood and intelligence' of the nation trained

for its defence in times of emergency. And in a comparatively short period of time, in the life of a nation, we should become a 'nation trained to arms.' Those under training would have to be fed, clothed and housed at the public expense, and presumably there would be some small allowance as pocket-money, though not as pay. Apart from the Militia battalions forming the dépôts of line regiments, it might be desirable to retain a certain number of battalions as schools for what are known abroad as one-year volunteers. With all it might be desirable that residence in barracks should be optional, just as there are boarders and day scholars in schools. This, unless it were found to interfere with discipline, would smooth the working of the schools and obviate one of the great difficulties incidental to universal training. That training would be enormously facilitated if Lord Roberts's further recommendation were carried out.

In order to ensure a satisfactory standard of efficiency being reached in the short time men could reasonably be expected to undergo military training, [he recommends that] universal physical training of a military character and instruction in the use of the rifle should form part of the curriculum of all schools and, in the case of boys who leave school before eighteen, the continuation of this training up to that age in cadet corps, boys' brigades, and similar institutions under State supervision.

He also recommends the encouragement of rifle clubs and the endeavour to make rifle shooting a national sport.' He truly 'considers that this course would be of inestimable benefit to the boys, physically and morally, in whatever civil calling they may be employed,' while it would reduce the period necessary for battalion training and render that training much more effective. The great difficulty to solve is that of the supply of officers. Lord Roberts says:

One point seems to me absolutely essential, and that is that the conditions should be such that the youths of the educated classes, having gone through their preliminary training, should be stimulated to pass the examination necessary to qualify them to undertake the duties appertaining to officers' rank. It is in this way alone we can hope to get a sufficient supply of officers to meet our requirements.

This end might be promoted by giving commissions in the training battalions and by offering a certain number of commissions in the regular army to those who trained for it, the commissions to be assigned to those who are successful in a competitive qualifying examination.

THE VOLUNTEERS

It would not do to include service in Volunteer corps among the exceptions from compulsory training. To do so would induce many to join Volunteer corps in order to avoid their year's training with the

dépôt battalions. The result would be that their training would be less efficient. On the completion of their training, however, they should be encouraged to join the Volunteers. This would be an advantage to them, as it would keep alive their knowledge, and a great advantage to the Volunteers, as they would obtain a trained, instead of an untrained, recruit. I do not deal with the organisation of the Volunteers, nor with the training of Militia artillery and engineers. The same machinery is available for these arms as for the infantry. The training of cavalry and of men for supply, transport, medical and other departmental services will offer more difficulty. To elaborate these points would be impossible in the space available in these pages. Nor is it necessary to do so, until the principle of universal training has been accepted.

This article only purports to describe the principle on which a second-line army should be based. It does not pretend to be a completed scheme. To elaborate it into a completed scheme, if the principle were accepted, could only be accomplished by experts possessed of complete official records and information. Whether the country is yet ripe for its adoption, or whether the Government will have the courage to propose either this or some other system of universal military training, remains to be seen. Its vast importance cannot be overrated. In spite of the 'blue water school' it is now admitted that raids on this country, in considerable force, are well within the bounds of possibility. Should they occur when the country was denuded of its regular army, what would be its fate if it had to rely upon its existing auxiliary forces for defence? Lord Salisbury has told us. Speaking at the Albert Hall in 1900, while urging 'the necessity of precaution in time,' he said:

Remember what has happened to the great maritime powers of the past. ... In every case the great maritime power has been paralysed and killed, not by disasters it may have suffered in its provinces, or its outlying dependencies, in every case it has succumbed to a blow directed at the heart. This is a lesson which a power like Great Britain ought not to neglect. So long as our heart was unstruck, we might look with comparative indifference on the result of any war.... But if our heart is once struck, there is an end to the history of England.

That emphatic warning produced marked effect. The nation now realises the necessity for precaution in time.' The few utterances I have quoted represent a great mass of opinion from all sorts and conditions of men, and from all classes of the nation. They unite in urging universal military training as the one essential precaution in time' that will give security to the country. Mr. Haldane evidently shared this view when he said, 'The nation in arms is the only safeguard to the public interests.' That expression presumably meant the nation trained to the use of arms. Does anyone suppose that we can train the whole nation to arms without making that training part of the compulsory education of the people? Even if

we tried, by high pay, to bribe the nation into universal voluntary training, we should fail, and the cost of our failure would be enormous. If Mr. Haldane still adheres to his patriotic view, it is most important that his hands should be strengthened by unmistakable public support. Do his colleagues share his views? There has been an ominous silence on their part. Are there party reasons, or Cabinet differences, unknown to the public which would explain that silence? If they exist they may induce the Government rather to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of,' and to seek refuge in some compromise that will keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope.'

HALIBURTON.

P.S. The fear that Mr. Haldane might be unable to base his Army Reform on his axiom, that the Nation in Arms is the only safeguard to the public interests' has, alas, proved well founded. His intention to appeal to the manhood of the nation to render this service,' remains unfulfilled. His statement last night, in the House, makes no such provision, and no such appeal. The 'Local Associations' may improve the personnel of the Militia and Volunteers, but they will not give us a Nation in Arms.' The Royal Commissions condemned the Militia and Volunteers because of the insufficiency and inefficiency of the officers, and the deficient training of the men. Their annual training in the future will apparently, in the case of the Militia, be less than in the past. The main difference between my scheme and that of the Government is, that I would draw closer the Cardwell tie between the Regulars and the Militia, making them the Depôt battalions of the Regulars, and assigning to them the duty of training the youth of the nation, so that in a few years we should have the manhood of the Nation in Arms.' Mr. Haldane disestablishes the Militia and completely divorces it from the Regular Army, transferring it and the Volunteers to the administrative control of the 'Local Associations.' He creates, in place of the Militia, new depôt battalions of Regulars to enlist and train non-regular reservists' for the Army. A valuable and essential measure, if universal military training cannot be achieved, but one that will never give us the Nation in Arms, the only safeguard to the public interests.'

26th of February, 1907.

HALIBURTON.

THE BRITISH FLEET AND THE BALANCE OF SEA POWER

On the eve of the presentation of the Navy Estimates to Parliament, a number of official announcements with reference to the fleet have been published which reveal in detail the plans of the Board of Admiralty for maintaining the supremacy of the British Navy in the coming financial year. At the same time it has been notified that Admiral Lord Charles Beresford has accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, and in virtue of this appointment and his seniority he will become practically the British 'admiralissimo,' responsible for the defence of home waters in case of war. This intelligence is of special importance because a redistribution of naval forces in the 'Narrow Seas' is about to take place. It is true that an unveracious story was circulated to the effect that this officer had refused the charge before sailing for the United States, but a swift denial from the Admiralty, as well as from Lord Charles himself, dispelled all doubt. In these circumstances, and in view of the 'negotiations' with this officer which it is admitted preceded his acceptance of his new appointment, an effort may be made to explain exactly what is proposed.

During the month which has just closed sixty battleships and cruisers which constitute the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean fleets of the British Navy, have been assembled off the Portuguese coast, carrying out, in accordance with what has now become a regular routine, combined tactical exercises under the supreme command of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, the senior British admiral at present flying his flag afloat, in association with eight other flag officers.1 Now that these manœuvres are over, a complete redistribution of men-of-war in British waters will take place, and Lord Charles

' In March 1902 Lord Charles Beresford, who has done so much to promote naval efficiency, pointed out that 'strategical manœuvres are totally distinct from tactical manœuvres; the yearly manoeuvres have been strategical manœuvres. Tactical manœuvres are manoeuvres in which one fleet is handled against another fleet, with the object of each trying to get the position of advantage. . . . No captain in the Navy has ever tactically handled a squadron of battleships against another, and only three of our admirals.' Such tactical manoeuvres are now of frequent occurrence.