Government an escape from a peculiarly difficult situation. It is doubtful if any question of gratitude arises under these circumstances. It was a matter of mutual interest, and Abdur Rahman recognised that his lay in absolute fidelity to his pledges to the Indian Government.

The other idea that the Afghans are innately treacherous sprang from the fate of the British Envoy in the first Afghan war. If the history of Indo-Afghan relations since Elphinstone's mission were written without bias we should probably find that the Afghan nation has been greatly misjudged; that the rising which engulfed the British troops was due to popular fury at the desecration of their hearths and homes and not to fanaticism as is commonly supposed. To the British Envoy, who disregarded all warnings of the coming storm, history has been most lenient. Whilst negotiating with the Afghan chiefs for a safe convoy to India, he offered a reward for the head of their principal leader a direct incentive to assassination. He fell into the trap he had himself devised; and paid with his life for his misguided diplomacy. So far as treachery is concerned, there is little to choose on either side."

The time has arrived, I submit, for discarding these ideas which have done so much harm in the past. Lord Minto is fortunate in the opportunity afforded to him of winning the confidence of the Ameer by personal converse; of pointing out to him the way by which he can further develop the resources of his kingdom and make it march on the lines of modern progress. The extensive tour arranged for him, the preparations made to impress him with the power and greatness of the British Empire, indicate that the Indian Government does not under-estimate the importance of Habeeb-ullah Khan's visit. But no amount of spectacular display will attain the object principally in view unless measures are taken to place Indo-Afghan relations on a clearly defined basis in which mutual trust should form the dominating element.

A strong Afghan kingdom united by intimate ties with British India is of the utmost importance to the permanent security of England's Asiatic Empire. The idea that the Anglo-Japanese alliance renders it unnecessary for India to take measures for her safety, or that Russia's internal pre-occupations remove all danger, I consider fantastic-as fantastic in fact as the dream of a real, working AngloRussian entente applicable to the near or middle East. The lessons of history teach us that like causes almost invariably lead to like results; that two nations whose interests do not always run on the same lines, whose political and moral ideals are dissimilar, must at some time or other, in spite of a superficial identity of religion or civilisation, come into conflict. Ameer Abdur Rahman, who was better acquainted

• The curious reader will find an interesting article on the diplomacy of the time in the Calcutta Review for 1850, vol. xiv. p. 296.

than most men with Central Asian politics, firmly believed in a collision, soon or late, between England and Russia. Such also was the conviction of Sirdar Shere Ali of Candahar, and such is the apprehension of most Indians whose minds are not warped by theories and who remember the hand Russia had in working up the Mutiny.

Whether the conflict will is a matter of small concern. What fate has in store for the former country it is difficult to tell. After centuries of stupor she is awaken ing into life. Her new 'Parliament' has been ridiculed; her efforts to breathe under healthier conditions are viewed with indifference. The Persian National Council does not even receive the credit so lavishly bestowed on the suppressed Duma. It has proved its patriotism and a knowledge of the trend of events by refusing so far to sanction the joint loan proffered by England and Russia. And now it is proving its political insight by discharging the arrears of pay to the troops by a national subscription. Russia, with General Ignatieff as her instrument, helped in suppressing the Turkish Parliament. Whether the Persian Parliament will be allowed to exist when there is a question of loan involved remains to be seen. Afghanistan has so far avoided the entangle. ments of loans.' Her foreign relations are in the charge of a great Power, which avoids complications. Even the unwillingness of the ruler to open the country to railway enterprise or to grant concessions to outsiders for purposes of exploitation is not without a certain advantage. It prevents all the trouble which besets most other Oriental countries overrun by foreigners.

take place over Persia or Afghanistan

Our first effort, then, should be to win the entire confidence of our visitor, and to disabuse him of the idea of any arrière-pense on our part. No Afghan is free from that idea: mistrust on one side breeds suspicion on the other. As we do not fully trust them, they imagine that the Indian Government has some design which is kept in the background, and the frequent talk about spheres of influence in Persia and the joint offer of the loan add to their mistrust. Again, the fact that in spite of the Dane' Treaty we do not accord to the Amcer the coveted kingly title is regarded as a proof of insincerity.

The position of Habeeb-ullah Khan, as already pointed out, is very different from that of the Ameers who preceded Abdur Rahman. Though his kingdom is smaller and he has an engagement with England which controls his relations with other foreign States, his hold and his influence over his people are greater than even that of Ahmed Shah Durrani. The kingdom is better organised, the tribal chiefs in better order than even under that monarch. Dost Mohammed Khan had modestly declined the designation of Shah offered to him after the battle of Candahar when he overthrew Shah Shuja and his British auxiliaries. Abdur Rahman and Habeeb-ullah have both been acclaimed by the people as their legitimate rulers. It would be a graceful concession to the sentiments of the Afghan nation if we willingly regularised his

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status by according to him the kingly title. It would probably pave the way for a friendly discussion of other and more important subjects. But the two questions which will, in all probability, occupy the serious attention of the Viceroy and the Ameer are those relating to the import of arms by the Afghan Government through British territories, and the guarantee to Afghanistan against outside attack. The one hinges on the other. The Afghan ruler wants an absolute guarantee, an assurance of help, in case of an unprovoked attack, not hedged round by qualifications or reservations. Is there any reason for not revising the old engagements so as to make the guarantee more effective in Afghan eyes? Again, would it not strengthen our own position in Afghanistan?

The Ameer must be perfectly aware of the fact that his country cannot safely do without the support and protection of England. In these circumstances it cannot be difficult for statesmen to devise an arrangement that would satisfy both parties.

If a well-ordered and well-organised Afghanistan is necessary to India, the import of arms by the Afghan Government to keep its troops in a proper state of efficiency seems equally necessary. Either that country must be sufficiently strong to serve the purpose towards which our policy is directed, or it must not. The latter view, though intelligible, may be regarded as beyond the range of practical politics. Inadequate preparation on her part to meet the danger we apprehend is almost worse than none-for it gives rise to a false sense of security. So long as Afghanistan is faithful to her pledges, the solution of the question ought to offer no difficulty. In all probability, when the Ameer is convinced of the straightforwardness and disinterested character of our policy, he might be inclined to withdraw his father's restriction on the use by his subjects of the Chaman Railway.

But it seems more than doubtful whether, under present conditions, he would entertain the project of organising his military resources with the help of British agency. The introduction into the country of British officers on any but an inconsiderable scale will be viewed by the people as part of a sinister design on their independence and will be resented accordingly.

The late Ameer did not favour the idea of sending young Afghans to Europe for education; he considered, not without reason, that, left to themselves, they imbibed with much that was wholesome a good deal that was not salutary to their moral development. Habeebullah Khan does not, if report speaks correctly, share his father's extreme views; and, although anxious to promote education among his subjects by the establishment of polytechnics and schools, he is not indisposed, it is said, to encourage their proceeding to foreign countries in quest of knowledge. As a possible solution, then, to the difficulty of training the Afghan forces by outside help, I venture to suggest that the Ameer should be invited to send a selected number

of promising young men to receive a thorough military education in England and British India. And the invitation need not be confined to the military line; youths might be sent also for scientific and technical education. Afghanistan would thus in time come to possess her own engineers and craftsmen, her own scientific experts capable of developing her economic resources. Considering that these young men would naturally become the pioneers of modern progress in their country, British India might well undertake a part of the expense of their education. And if they are well treated and kept under proper supervision there is no reason why they should come under any unhealthy or demoralising influences in the West.

These remarks are offered by way of a plea for better defined and more cordial relations with a State whose safety is so closely allied to that of India.

AMEER ALI.

THE EDUCATION OF INDIAN PRINCES

THE education and training of young Indian princes and their near relatives are among the many problems of the present day; the matter is of sufficient importance to call for the serious attention of those concerned. There seems to be much difference of opinion as to the best manner in which young Indians, of the ruling class, should be educated so as to render them fitted to fill the future position they will eventually hold with credit to themselves and advantage to their people.

The different ways of educating these boys are:

At home, under private tutors; at Chiefs' Colleges, established in different parts of India; or, lastly, by sending them to Europe.

The question that remains undecided is, Which of these three methods of education will be most effectual?

The real advantages and objects of education are to thoroughly train the mind, mould the character, and make the boys in every respect broad and open minded; in short, to make them true and thorough gentlemen, so as to enable them to hold their own in any position in life which circumstances may oblige them to face.

Can this result be obtained in India? I decidedly think not, and this I will endeavour to demonstrate below.

The chief drawbacks of the first system of education are, to my mind, the impossibility of keeping the boys free from the evil influences of their surroundings in their homes, and these cannot, in any circumstances, be avoided. A few may have the natural strength of character to resist undesirable influences and remain unaffected; but a large number succumb, and deplorable results ensue, as is commonly known. Such misfortunes are constantly occurring, and the reason is not far to seek. In cases of boys being left minors, an English tutor, or guardian, is appointed, who usually remains in contact with his pupils during the period of their lessons and games only. During his absence the boys are forced into the company of interested persons whose sole object seems to be to poison the minds of the innocent children against their relatives and the officials in their respective States, and whose self-interest predominates over all other considerations. What is still more reprehensible is that these so-called