in what is known as the Chiengmai treaty, gave up, in return for certain advantages, a large portion of her local extra-territorial rights. An international court was established, in which all local cases in which British subjects are parties have been tried under Siamese law. The experiment has been, on the whole, highly successful, and may serve as a precedent for the future.

The time will come, and that shortly, when Siam will ask for an entire revision of the tariffs settled by treaties, some of them more than half a century old. This is necessary, not as a protective measure, but to enable the Government to carry out the administrative reforms which are needed not only for the Siamese themselves, but also for the general prosperity of trade, and of those foreign residents who are engaged in it. A 3 per cent. import duty is hardly better than none at all, and this was the tariff settled in a treaty signed by Sir John Bowring as long ago as 1855, and which has lasted up to the present time.

A Government which has the courage to give up large revenues derived from gambling tables has a strong claim to charge a sufficient import duty for the purposes of efficient administration. For the future what is more wanted than anything else is that Siam should be given the peaceful opportunity to work out her own salvation in enlightened progress, without threats of absorption from outside, or an excess of intervention in her internal affairs. That she will not listen to, and accept, the advice of experts no one will for one moment assert who knows how much the late Monsieur Rolin Jacquemyns was able to effect during his residence at Bangkok, and how many important reforms have been successfully recommended by the experience, ability, and tact of the present Adviser, Mr. Edward H. Strobel, formerly Professor of International Law at Harvard University.

As in the healthiest and most civilised form of every community the highest test of social advance is that the strongest and the weakest members can live side by side, each enjoying the perfect security of laws which are equal for all and effectual for the protection of all alike, so in the commonwealth of nations the highest form of international civilisation is that which recognises and respects the independence of the smaller, just as completely as that of the most powerful countries, and regards with a genuine sympathy every advance towards a higher national life made by a government whose past history, present conditions, and future aims and ambitions may differ widely from those of the great European Powers.

In conclusion we wish good luck to Siam, and offer a cordial welcome to our honoured guest who for forty years has been the King of that country and the best friend to his people that they have ever had.

FREDERICK VERNEY

(Late Councillor of the Siamese Legation).

THE publication of the White Paper (or, as it should be called, the 'White Flag') which is said to deal with Correspondence relating to the resignation by Sir A. Swettenham of his office as Governor of Jamaica,' has an importance that is of Imperial gravity. The fact that it was issued in the late days of April, and that it is therefore now six weeks old, must not preclude the British public from giving its most serious attention to the manner in which the Colonial Office has seen fit to treat one of the oldest and most faithful of British public servants. The success of our Empire depends, in so far as India and the Crown Colonies are concerned, almost entirely upon the qualities of the members of the Civil Service, and if these Imperial officers, for they are no less, are to be liable to treatment that would not be meted out to the commonest criminal, then it is to be feared that in the future men will hesitate to give their lives or their sons to a service that is exposed to chances such as those which have caused the retirement of Sir Alexander Swettenham.

There is a tendency in high quarters to forget that the Empire belongs not to the Cabinet but to the British nation in the most comprehensive sense of that term; that the making of laws in Parliament belongs to the joint Houses, and not to the Executive of the day; that the Army is not a perquisite of the War Office; that the Colonies are not the peculiar possession of the Secretary of State for the time being; that all these instruments of Imperial power belong, in fact and in truth and in equal degree, to every subject of His Majesty. It is because the Colonial Office does appear to think that the large provinces which it is paid to superintend are in some sort of body-and-soul bondage to the administration of the Colonial Office that it lacks the oversea popularity which it otherwise might enjoy. As with the Colonies, so with the Colonial service; the officials sent out from England to govern at the ends of the world are primarily public servants who, if their superiors betray or forsake them, may claim restitution from the nation for which they have borne the burden and the heat of a lifetime.

The case of Sir Alexander Swettenham is one which calls for examination at the hands of the public. This is felt by every man

who believes in hearing the accused before he is condemned, and who does not allow his conscience to be satisfied by the reading of newspaper reports alone. The expression of this feeling was exhibited by those who moved in the House of Commons for papers dealing with the subject, and who recognised that they must hold their judgment in suspense until official evidence was laid before them. Ultimately the papers were produced, and what did they contain? (1) A newspaper report of Sir A. Swettenham's now notorious letter, and a hectoring addendum from the Colonial Secretary, requiring an apology if the letter were indeed authentic, but not asking for a copy of the document to which it was the answer; (2) Authentic copies of (a) the Admiral's note and (b) Sir A. Swettenham's reply; (3) A full official apology from the Governor of Jamaica to the American Admiral; and (4) An intimation that he will retire from the public service. And upon this selected evidence alone the Colonial Secretary has the assurance to expect that the people of England will mutely acquiesce in yet another snub to a prominent public servant.

I cannot help believing that a full comprehension of even a few of the circumstances carefully eliminated from the White Paper will show Sir A. Swettenham to have been a far better guardian of British honour than the slightly hysterical and very official individual who has caused the retirement of the Governor. For convenience sake I will tabulate the events as they occurred, with such notes as seem desirable to elucidate the position.

The 14th of January.—The earthquake at Kingston; ruin of the city and deplorable loss of life. The Governor wired to Santiago de Cuba to purchase bandages, &c.

The 15th of January.-Parts of Kingston in flames; news probably reached Havana.

The 16th of January.—At midnight two United States battleships and a cruiser, under command of Rear-Admiral Davies, arrived in Kingston harbour. The officers went immediately on board the Port Kingston, escorted thither by the Governor himself, who made it plain that he desired no salute.

the

The 17th of January.—The United States ships fired a salute; Admiral landed fifty armed men and working parties; the United States flag was hoisted in a field on British territory and an American hospital was installed.

This done the Admiral writes to the Governor explaining that the visiting navy let off its guns by mistake, and then proceeds to 'propose' and 'judge' and 'direct' concerning the situation, as though there were no such person as a British Governor within a thousand miles.

The reason given, on account of age,' is an official and recognised formula; a pension might be withheld from a Civil Servant retiring in a fit of pique but not from one who resigns under medical advice or on account of age.'

I landed working parties from both ships to-day [he writes]. I propose to land parties to-morrow unless you expressly desire me not to do so... I judge the police surveillance of the city is not adequate. . . . I shall direct the medical officers of my squadron. . . . I trust that you will justify me in the matter. . . .

...

Later in the day the Admiral wires to his Chief-in-Command at Havana to the effect that

Sir A. Swettenham is a man of great power; declined my offer to land working parties to assist in hospital, to police streets, clear away débris and bury the dead. . . . Later by request [Query-by whose request ?] I landed fifty men under arms to prevent a mutiny in the penitentiary.

There was no mutiny; both inside and outside the penitentiary the populace preserved an attitude of admirable composure under the circumstances, so these troops were withdrawn by request of the Governor, who had never authorised their landing,

as he has assured me [continues the Admiral] he is capable of controlling the situation. He has West Indian Regiment 1,000 strong, and two companies of artillery besides insular constabulary. . . . I consider it my duty to remain for the present at least. Situation is too confusing, and conflicting stories, reports, complaints, and rumours too contradictory to enable me at present to form a clear judgment of actual situation.

From this unique document it will be seen that Governor Swettenham's assurances that he was quite able to look after Kingston impressed the Admiral very little; and that the latter was quite prepared to take yet another island in the Caribbean Sea under the sheltering wing of the American eagle. He felt, however, that he would require justification for his action, and therefore he asked for it in his letter to the Governor. From a communication supplied later by Admiral Evans to the Navy Department we learn that on this date (the 17th of January) Admiral Davies received a reply of thanks from the Governor, who thinks that he has the situation well in hand.'

The 18th of January.-Lord Elgin telegraphs that he does not desire to fetter the Governor's discretion, &c.

President Roosevelt offers official assistance.

Admiral Davies cables for more dressings for the wounded.

Sir A. Swettenham replies to Admiral Davies's letter.

It must be remembered that the Governor had already courteously thanked the Admiral on the previous day for his assistance, even though he had not invoked it. He also knew that the Admiral entirely mistrusted his reading of the situation, and was becoming a difficult problem in a situation already sufficiently complicated. He never doubted the bona fides of the sentence in the Admiral's letter: 'I shall land troops to-morrow unless you expressly desire me not to do so,' any more than he questioned the humanity and kindliness of the Admiral's intentions. But he had to get rid of these armed parties of American sailors, whose presence among negroes was both

profoundly unpopular and also a serious danger; moreover he had to prove to a questioning world that Britain can still manage Jamaica without outside help. And so, trying to combine frankness with some jocularity, he wrote the private letter beginning 'Dear Admiral Davies.' I am not concerned to defend the epistolary style of Sir A. Swettenham; possibly his humour was less suited to the occasion than the directness of his request that a foreign force should leave the island. But the public is anxious to know how it is that an obviously private letter found its way into the public Press, and then became incorporated in a Parliamentary paper. Who gave that letter to the pressman who sent it over the wires? My own information from Jamaica, which is accurate though unofficial, goes to show that the name of the individuals concerned are well known in the West Indies, and that the slightest investigation would disclose them. One other point about this letter deserves notice; if it was a private letter, the man who made it public under such circumstances deserves to be ostracised from decent society on both sides of the Atlantic; if it was an official letter, it should have been forwarded in cipher to be dealt with by the Navy Department or the State Secretary at Washington. Of this I am certain; if, believing a document to be an official communication of a very grave nature, any British officer had been responsible for it reaching the Press before it reached the Admiralty, he would have been instantly relieved of his command.

The 19th of January.-Sir Edward Grey telegraphed, by Sir A. Swettenham's desire, his thanks for the prompt and powerful assistance given by Admiral Davies.

Upon this same date (the 19th of January) two other letters were written which the Colonial Office has deemed it prudent not to publish. Mr. Churchill declined, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, to divulge their purport. We are therefore driven for our information to an obscure newspaper called the Jamaica Gleaner, which, in a limited edition, published the following correspondence. This edition is not now obtainable in Jamaica.

REAR-ADMIRAL DAVIES, U.S.N.

U.S.S. Missouri, Kingston, January 19, 1907.

SIR,-On behalf of the Mayor and Council as well as all the citizens of this stricken city, I desire to express my deep and sincere regret that any unpleasantness should have arisen to cause you to decide to withdraw the valuable assistance which you have voluntarily and so generously been rendering to this country and my unfortunate fellow-citizens.

Whatever may have been the cause which has induced you to decide to withdraw, we deeply regret it, and we do not approve or take any part in it; so we ask you not to withdraw your valuable assistance or take offence at the conduct of one man, if, at a time when, overwrought by responsibility and calamity, he has acted in a manner that he himself will regret on reflection; and in particular, I ask you not to let the sick, wounded and destitute call in vain