should be within reach; otherwise nobody who is not ignorant of war, or foolish, or something worse, can imagine or pretend that success is certain. The attitude of the Press, or at least a certain section of it, is therefore much to be regretted. Thoughtful officers at the front regard it with something like dismay. An officer wrote recently :

'I do hate the cheap papers on the war. I am sure this tends to stop recruiting. ... The papers ought to put things as they are, viz., that we are up against a brave, determined, and ferocious enemy, who use their brains, and are without any very nice scruples; that it takes the French .. and ourselves. ... all our time to match them, and that we want more men, and highly-trained men-especially highly-trained men—and every ingenious device and method that can be suggested to defeat them.' ('Morning Post, Dec. 30.)

Other letters have been written to the same effect. Recently an officer, whose duties give him a somewhat extended view, said to the present writer when home for a few days' leave, 'I can't read the papers. It makes one sick to think that such pernicious stuff can be published.'

For the optimistic attitude referred to, the methods of the Censorship are in some degree responsible. Facts and statements have been suppressed merely because they related to some event or circumstance that was not entirely advantageous, and not because they were either incorrect or calculated to be of service to the enemy. On the other hand, statements have been allowed to pass which, though manifestly incorrect, represented matters in a favourable light. The inevitable consequence of such action is that a distorted view of things is presented to the public. The results are far-reaching, because the Press is forced to conform to the principle thus tactically laid down, namely, that nothing must be published wbich does not represent things in a rosy aspect.

There is also, no doubt, an inclination on the part of the Press to take its cue from foreign newspapers. The foreign Press is subject to control, its influence being utilised to promote the national interests. It is unnecessary to remark that the Press of Germany is notoriously subject to such direction. But the conditions in Great Britain and in Continental countries are essentially different. The Continental Press best favours national interests by an optimistic attitude. The system of national military service assures the supply of recruits; what is necessary to ensure the resolute prosecution of the war is the maintenance of national enthusiasm and the avoidance of anything that might cause depression.


With our voluntary system, when the normal sources of supply have been exhausted, recruiting must be stimulated either by offering special inducements or by making the nation see-or, at least, permitting it to see-the gravity of the situation. The first great rush of recruits synchronised with the publication of a Press report which, till officially contradicted, caused general alarm, and which, even after it was contradicted, left a feeling of uneasiness. So far as can be judged from outward signs, a large section of the public has now relapsed into an apathetic attitude which is detrimental both to recruiting and to the vigorous prosecution of the war. It is the duty of our Press to help the people to form a just appreciation of the situation and to realise the need for an effort that will bring the war to a speedy conclusion. The existing state of deadlock is pregnant with danger.

Let us consider the situation. The Germans have overrun nearly all Belgium, and a not inconsiderable part of northern France. These territories they hold with their entrenched armies. Opposed to them is the

. Allied army, also entrenched.

also entrenched. Neither army has, during nearly three months' fighting, made any appreciable impression on the other. This is the state of things which has been picturesquely described as the blockade of Germany. It might, with a nearer approach to truth, be described as a blockade of the Allies. Germany took Belgium by assault, is holding it, and means to keep it. So far the advantage rests with the Germans, who have both conquered territory and kept the war on their enemies' soil. In the eastern theatre of war they occupy a considerable part of Poland, where there are indications that they contemplate attempting a similar blockade. As a Berlin paper recently observed, 'We have a large portion of the enemy's country in our hands as a safe pledge.' Only in East Prussia and Galicia have the Allies trodden German soil.

Meanwhile Germany is busy training new troops, for

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which purpose she has available the facilities of her elaborate territorial system. It is agreed by those who have gone into the question so far as it can be examined with the information available, that she has already put all her trained men into the field, amounting to about 44 millions, including non-combatant services. Many of these have been killed, taken prisoner, or wounded. There remain between five and six million men of military age, who were untrained at the outbreak

Of these most, if not all, who are fit for service, are now being trained, and will be put into the field when the moment is considered opportune. The situation of Austria is similar, but her casualties have probably been relatively greater. She is believed to have put between two and three million men into the field, and to have an equal number in reserve who were untrained at the beginning of the war. The provision of officers, guns, and equipment is the chief difficulty that confronts all countries in raising new armies. This difficulty is probably greatest in the case of Russia, which has in other respects the greatest resources.

The prolongation of the war may lead to other difficulties than those to be encountered in the field. The insidious methods of German spies and agencies seem to be producing their intended effect on the opinion and attitude of neutral nations. Some attempts have been made to counteract their baleful influence; and it is no doubt easy to overdo this species of activity. Reports from various countries indicate that the results of the German press-campaign have been the reverse of successful. But it is equally clear that we cannot afford to dispense with

nergetic and wisely-directed efforts in this direction. What is especially needed is to provide the neutral public with true versions of incidents that are habitually perverted, and to inculcate just views regarding the world-wide issues at stake and the possible consequences of the war. Unhappily, in the case of the country which most nearly concerns us, where, with more candour, we might have received more sympathy, there is reason to fear that any measure of this kind is now belated. For among the public in question, our secretive methods have undoubtedly aroused suspicion with regard to information officially supplied. There are people who, being neither lawyers nor logicians, find it difficult to differentiate between the suppression of fact and the suggestion of falsehood.



Four intimately associated incidents in the war on the seas—the action off Coronel, the engagement near the Falkland Islands, the lightning bombardment of unfortified Yorkshire towns by German cruisers, and the aerial raid on Cuxhaven, one of Germany's naval basesare likely to exercise a profound and permanent influence on the future of naval warfare and to lead to some modification of theories which met with considerable acceptance before hostilities occurred. Though no naval battle has been fought in the North Sea, light has been shed by these events on some problems of the first rank. Not a few popular misconceptions have been removed ; and it is probable that naval officers will have to revise their standards of conduct and belief which have rested mainly upon tradition.

If we would extract their legitimate meaning from the two cruiser actions—the destruction of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron (to which reference has already been made in this Review) and the practical annihilation of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee's force-they must be examined as two scenes in a single act of a great drama. After defeating Admiral Cradock, Vice-Admiral von Spee appears to have come to the conclusion that powerful British and Japanese squadrons would search for him in the Pacific. He evidently thought himself justified in concluding that, after destroying the only two British ships in the Atlantic which he had reason to fear meeting, he could operate in that ocean in comparative safety for a time. It is possible, moreover, that he learnt that the old battleship Canopus' and the light cruiser Glasgow,' which had formed part of Admiral Cradock's force, had left Pacific waters with the apparent intention of rounding Cape Horn and coaling at the Falkland Islands, the most lonely and most undefended of all British possessions. He determined to follow them, assured of gaining further glory.



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In the meantime the naval authorities in London had not been inactive. In all secrecy--and secrecy is the basis of the work of all competent strategists—they determined to trap and overwhelm the German force. It may be assumed that the orders given to the 'Canopus' and the Glasgow,' which constituted these ships decoys, formed part of the general scheme. Simultaneously instructions were issued to two battle cruisers in home waters, the Invincible' and the Inflexible,' to prepare to go south; and in one of these Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, who had been Chief of the Admiralty War Staff since the opening of hostilities, was instructed to hoist his flag. While the Admiralty, under the new First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, attached importance to secrecy, it was realised that time was also of the essence of a successful issue. The naval authorities insisted there was not an hour to be lost if the scheme was not to miscarry; hence the employment of two of the swiftest armoured ships under the White Ensign and the haste with which they left Europe, without, indeed, completing their stores.

There is a widespread impression that the enemy possesses agents at all the great naval ports, and that these persons have means of communicating swiftly with Germany. A movement such as the despatch of these two battle cruisers, under the orders of the Chief of the War Staff, could not be carried out without many persons sharing the secret; and yet for several weeks the secret remained inviolate. The first news which Admiral von Spee obtained of the Admiralty's decision was when he was confronted with these two powerful men-of-war off the Falkland Islands; and everything points to the conclusion that the German naval authorities were also in ignorance until they learnt that four of the five ships under Admiral von Spee had been sunk.

In accordance with the German admirals' decision the Pacific Division left the Chilian island of Juan Fernandez on Nov. 15, heading for Cape Horn, with the apparent intention of seizing the Falkland Islands and gaining possession of the wireless station, which would have put Admiral von Spee in a position of strategic advantage. The ships arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of Dec. 8, under the impression that no serious opposition

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