would be encountered. In the meantime, however, the two British battle cruisers, the 'Invincible' and the Inflexible,' under Admiral Sturdee, had steamed in all secrecy from the English Channel, a distance of nearly 7,000 miles, and had arrived at the Falkland Islands on the previous afternoon. They were engaged in coaling when the German ships arrived. The Admiralty had arranged, also unknown either to the German naval authorities or to Admiral von Spee, for several other British ships, besides the 'Canopus' and the Glasgow,' to concentrate on the Falkland Islands, thus giving to the strategic scheme a completeness rare in the history of naval warfare. Without revealing their actions to the enemy, the British authorities brought the right force to the right place at the right moment. If the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible' had left Europe a day later, or if slower ships had been employed, the scheme would have failed, and we should have suffered another reverse. The captain of the light cruiser 'Dresden,' the only German ship which escaped, has communicated to the German Consul at Punta Arenas an illuminating account of the movements of the German force: 'The German Pacific Division left the Pacific to go to the Falkland Islands by way of Cape Horn. The voyage was made without incident. A little before arriving at our destination the commander of the division, Vice-Admiral von Spee, detached one of our cruisers to explore and to discover facts concerning the presence of English ships in the islands. The ship returned and reported that there were two English cruisers. The admiral prepared at once to give battle to the hostile ships, issuing the necessary orders. 'Advancing towards the islands, in a little while we were able to make out the strength of the hostile forces. There were not two cruisers, but six. Our commander kept to his resolution and continued the advance. A little later at the mouth of the bay we noted two Dreadnoughts of the 'Lion' type,* 26,000 tons, more or less, whose presence was unknown before. The conditions were magnificent. The weather was clear and calm. These conditions made impossible a combat with a chance of escape for the German fleet. Admiral von Spee persisted in his resolution to give battle, with the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" acting together, ordering at the same time the dispersal of the three other units, the minor cruisers, "Leipzig," "Dresden," and "Nürnberg." 'Meanwhile the two cruisers above mentioned courageously faced the English Fleet. The latter was attacked by our two cruisers, while the "Leipzig," "Nürnberg," and "Dresden" tried to place themselves outside the range of the enemy's cannon, the only device compatible with the circumstances in view of the number, quality, and size of the English ships. It suffices to remark that the English Dreadnoughts were armed with 34-centimetre cannon, while the German cruisers only had 21-centimetre cannon.' •* (New York Times,' Dec. 18.) It is now known that there was only a slight disparity in the number of ships under the British and German flags respectively when the engagement opened off Coronel, each admiral having two large cruisers; but, whereas Admiral Cradock had with him only one light cruiser, carrying two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns, Admiral von Spee possessed two vessels of this type, mounting, however, nothing bigger than 4·1-inch guns. All the accounts of the subsequent engagement indicate that the action was fought between the big ships and that the smaller vessels took little or no part in it. In other words, two British armoured cruisers engaged two German armoured cruisers. The former were sunk with all hands. Why? It has been suggested that the result was due at least in some measure to the fact that, whereas the German ships had been in commission for some time and had become expert in gunnery, the British ships had been only recently commissioned, and that the British officers and men used their guns less effectively. There is no evidence to support this contention. The only explanation of the decisive outcome of the action is to be found in the fact that the German ships were better armed and had the advantage of speed. One spectator has indeed stated that the British shells fell short of their targets by about three miles. This is probably an exaggeration, but the German ships appear to have come out of the action almost unscathed, while on the other hand the two British cruisers sank, with 1,625 officers and men. In the subsequent action which was fought off the * These two statements are erroneous. The two vessels are of an earlier and less powerful type, carrying 12 in. or 30.5 centimetre, and not 13.5 in. or 34 centimetre guns. Falkland Islands the conditions were completely reversed. The German squadron, which had achieved so complete a victory five weeks before, was surprised by the appearance of two battle cruisers of the 'Invincible' type when they anticipated an encounter with only armoured cruisers. The battle cruisers Invincible' and 'Inflexible' mount sixteen 12-inch and thirty-two 4-inch guns in contrast with sixteen 8.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns possessed by the Germans. Whereas, however, the British ships could bring to bear all their sixteen battle guns, the broadside of the German ships comprised only twelve of the weaker guns. The German flagship and her consort, which resembled her in all respects, were well armoured, possessing 6-inch belts, tapering to 4 inches and 4 inches towards the bow and stern respectively. In the matter of protection the enemy's ships were not much inferior to the British ships. The explanation of the fact that the German ships were sunk and the British battle cruisers emerged from the action practically uninjured cannot be found in any suggestion that the Gneisenau' and the 'Scharnhorst' had either been newly commissioned or possessed ill-trained gun crews. The difference lay not in personnel, but in materiel; in other words, the advantages in effective range and in weight of metal were on this occasion with the ships flying the white ensign; and in this condition, in association with superior speed, is to be found the cause of the complete destruction of the German flagship and her sister vessel. It may be assumed that the other British cruisers which were present exercised little influence on the course of events so far as the two principal German ships were concerned. The 'Kent' and the 'Cornwall' are sister ships of the 'Monmouth,' carrying nothing bigger than the 6-inch gun-fourteen each. The 'Carnarvon' could bring into action four 7.5-inch weapons in addition to half a dozen 6-inch quick-firers. The 'Bristol' and the Glasgow' each mount two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns. They apparently took no part in the major operation. From the fact that the seven British ships lost only seven killed and four wounded, and that the German vessels were the best shooting ships in their navy, it must be assumed that the main encounter was מוד decided at a range at which even the 8-2-inch guns of the Scharnhorst' and the Gneisenau' were ineffective, and that the annihilation of these two well-armoured and well-gunned ships is traceable to the fact that they were opposed by two overwhelmingly better armed British vessels. From first to last, in other words, the German big guns were outranged and their small guns ineffective; and Admiral von Spee suffered annihilation under much the same conditions as did Admiral Cradock, and for the same reasons. These two cruiser actions constitute an interesting commentary upon theories advanced by Admiral Sir and Reginald Custance. Commenting upon the battle of Tsu Shima, this officer wrote: * ere 'These facts confirm previous war experience that the danger to flotation and stability is not great. Is it worth while to divert from the guns the great weight required to give effective armour protection to the water-line, when the chances are that the battle will culminate before it is hit? Will it not suffice to make sure that the magazines are safe from direct blows, and for the rest to trust to water-tight subdivision, to armour only so far as it may limit the size of such holes as may be made, and above all to gun-fire to beat down that of the enemy? Is it not more important to disarm the enemy than to sink him? Are not the protection of your own water-line and the perforation of that of the enemy secondary considerations in settling the armour and guns to be carried? 'Now the main object in battle is to make the enemy believe that he is beaten. The most effective way to do this is to disable his personnel and silence his guns. The above results seem to indicate that the smaller gun is by no means to be neglected as an instrument for this purpose. The effect produced depends not only on the size of the projectile, but on the place where it hits. A small shell on the right spot is more effective than a large shell in the wrong one; but to hit the right spot is difficult. Hence, in determining the armament of a ship, a careful balance must be maintained between the number and sizes of the guns carried. Again, the facts show that it is misleading to compare the gun power of ships by the total weights of their respective broadsides. To do so is to assume that on the average an 850-lb. 12-inch shell will damage the fighting efficiency of the ship as much as will eight 100-lb. The Ship of the Line in Battle,' pp. 188, 190 (Blackwood, 1912). 6-inch. Such an assumption seems not to be true. When the guns in ships of the line were all about the same size, the method was legitimate; but it is believed to be entirely misleading at the present time when they differ so much, some being, perhaps, unnecessarily large and others too small for the work to be done. Are not the numbers and sizes of the guns carried the best and only safe standard of comparison?' Thus we see that, whether we consider the difficulty of hitting or the comparative effect produced by shells of different calibres, there are grave doubts whether batteries of comparatively few large guns form the most effective armaments. In the case of the two German ships Admiral von Spee never admitted that he was beaten, nor for that matter did Admiral Cradock. In the action off Coronel and in the subsequent engagement in the neighbourhood of the Falkland Islands, the smaller gun proved negligible. Indeed, though the vessels engaged carried many of these weapons, there is no indication that a single shell from them was effective because the bigger gun asserted its superiority. The superior speed of the Germans on the first occasion and of the British vessels on the second enabled the admiral possessing the longest range guns to choose the distance at which fighting should take place, and in each case the result was the same-annihilation due to the big gun. The encounter on Dec. 8 between the smaller British and German cruisers bears significant testimony to the same effect. Admiral von Spee had under his orders three small cruisers, mounting thirty 4.1-inch guns. The five British ships which were opposed to them mounted four 7.5-inch, thirty-eight 6-inch, and twenty 4-inch guns. What was the result of the flying action which took place when the German light cruisers scattered on the opening of the main action? Two of the three German ships, the Leipzig' and the 'Nürnberg,' were sunk, and the other one was able to escape the same fate because the pursuers, it is reported, ran short of coal. Here again nothing indicates that there was a marked superiority in personnel. The British ships carried a heavier broadside; and the heavier broadside triumphed. The Germans had not apparently read Sir Reginald Custance's declaration and did not recognise |