the waiting cruisers, and three by submarines, while the seventh was rescued by a Dutch trawler.

In this wise the British fleet, by taking the offensive in Germany's own waters, once more reminded the world that, though British battleships and battle cruisers are not stretched as insecure isolated units along the 700 miles of our eastern littoral, it exercises effective control over the North Sea. The British ships, although attacked, remained for three consecutive hours in Germany's own waters, until their purpose had been completed, and only then retired. The raid of the German cruisers on our east coast was an act of devilry; the aerial operations over Cuxhaven constituted a legitimate act of war. The naval authorities could have provided no more effective contrast between British and German methods than this Christmas Day incident afforded, while at the same time they corrected effectually any unfounded impression which the east coast raid may have produced on the minds of those uninstructed in the principles underlying the effective exercise of sea control.

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Two other incidents have occurred, both, unhappily, involving heavy loss of life, but neither of military importance as affecting the final issue. Two sister battleships, the Bulwark' and the Formidable,' have been destroyed; and in each case the cause is somewhat obscure. The 'Bulwark' was in the River Medway on Nov. 26 when she was blown to pieces. Observers state that an explosion occurred and that, when the smoke cleared away, the ship, with all her officers and men, had disappeared. The inevitable suggestion that the loss was due to foul play on the part of an enemy has been officially discredited; and the assurance has been given that the disaster was due to an accident in the interior of the vessel, though of its exact character nothing has been revealed, apparently because nothing is known. The circumstances in which the Formidable was lost are hardly less mysterious. This vessel was steaming down Channel in a gale with high seas running. In the morning of Jan. 1, shortly after 2 A.M., an explosion occurred on her starboard side abreast the foremost funnel. About fifteen minutes later another explosion took place. In the only announcement made

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by the Admiralty it was stated that it was not certain whether the ship was struck by a submarine or a mine. Some days later the German naval authorities claimed that it was the work of one of their underwater craft; but, departing from the usual procedure, they failed to give the vessel's number. At any rate the battleship settled down and sank after about two hours. Of the complement of nearly 800 officers and men only 199 were saved.

Of all the incidents in the naval war this is the most disquieting, if indeed the 'Formidable' was sunk by a German submarine. The attack was made at night, when it was thought by most instructed persons that an underwater vessel was blind; it was carried out when a gale was blowing and even large ships were navigated under difficulties, when the Formidable' was apparently steaming at about 16 knots, and at a point off the Devonshire coast, 800 or 900 miles from the nearest German base. The last point is of no real importance, because a submarine of large size has a radius of action of from 2000 to 4000 miles. We cannot doubt that the enemy has made a careful study of submarine tactics, and that, well supplied with provisions and fuel, these vessels can hover in one spot for days, if not weeks, remaining submerged by day, and coming to the surface for air by night, when there is little chance of their presence being discovered. The other conditions are disquieting, because they suggest that the latest types of underwater craft have sea-keeping qualities far in excess of what they were believed to possess, and that even at night they are far from blind. It was thought, moreover, that a battleship steaming at a speed four or five knots in excess of that of a submarine secured a large measure of immunity. In this connexion the only explanation which can be offered is that the submarine was waiting in readiness for the attack when the battleship passed her. The first torpedo robbed the battleship of propulsive power, and apparently the submarine, still unseen, so far as is known, by any one on board, manoeuvred to the port side and discharged the second weapon at the stationary target.

The whole of the circumstances, it will be seen, are somewhat shrouded in mystery; all that can be stated is that, if the destructive agency was a couple of torpedoes from one of the enemy's submarines, discharged in the dark and with high seas running, these craft are far more formidable in their offensive powers, in their seakeeping qualities, in their mobility, and in their endurance than was commonly believed.


Any naval constructor will also admit that the sinking, in about two hours, of a ship so well designed and well built is in conflict with the theories which before the war were generally accepted in this and other countries. On the other hand, it will be advisable not to rush to the conclusion that the destruction of the Formidable' and other vessels heralds the disappearance of the battleship. So far, in spite of incidents which may seem to point in an opposite direction, the most authoritative evidence, as well as the inactivity of the German battle fleet, second only in strength to our own, supports the belief that, in the words of Admiral Charles J. Badger, late Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States Navy, the control of the sea will be maintained in this war and in all future wars by the nation having the most powerful sea-going and sea-keeping fleet?

.' Because of a few daring and successful exploits of what all acknowledge to be useful and powerful adjuncts of the fleet, we should not,' he has urged, 'rush to the decision that the submarine, as at present developed, has proved itself powerful enough to control the sea, which control must be the end and aim of all great naval wars.'

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No. 443.- APRIL, 1915.



I.-As ILLUSTRATED BY GERMAN SCIENCE. The present war has directed the attention of thinking men to the mental and moral outlook of the German nation. What kind of men must they be, who have deliberately involved practically the whole of Europe in a terrible strife? What are their ideals? What are

their objects?


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So far as one can learn, they think that they have a mission to disseminate what they term 'Kultur' among the human race by force of arms.

This leads to the enquiry-what is Kultur'? Now, the word Kultur' has the same origin as our culture,' yet the conceptions conveyed by these two words must obviously be very different. There is a German equivalent, too, for “culture'; it is approximately •Bildung': formation of character, and of a correct taste, by education. It will be attempted, in the following pages, to define German Kultur,' as illustrated by German scientific achievements in the realm of pure and applied science.

Everyone is agreed that it is desirable that the human race should progress—that is, everyone of the western nations, for the natives of India have not this ideal; that people is, as a whole, content to live as of old. There are two absolutely different views as to how progress may best be made. One is individualism ; it postulates that, left to himself, man will gain by the struggle for existence; that his best qualities will be strengthened by personal effort. The other view is that progress is more rapidly and satisfactorily made by Vol. 223.-No. 443.





collectivism ; that by combining together, men achieve more than by separate effort. One form of collectivism is Socialism. The Socialist sees that effort is not always equally rewarded—that some possess much, while others are poor; and he looks forward to a day when equality of effort will always gain equality of wealth, when there shall be universal brotherhood, and strife will cease. Most of us believe that he seeks an unattainable Utopia ; and we doubt whether this Utopia can be reached without leaders so unselfish that they will subdue all claim to special reward for their special powers. Such leaders will be hard to find.

The other form of collectivism is · Kultur.' The leaders of the German nation, having learned that much can be done by organisation, have made it a fetish, Theirs is a kind of socialism, inculcated from above by self-elected rulers. They have spent more than a century in gaining experience in organising their army and their education; they have more recently organised their trade; and they now believe that the world is to be reformed only by having this system thrust upon it, by German methods, and by German bayonets.

The general opinion as to the origin of this war held in Germany, and by nearly all Germans, is that it is due to envy, and to jealousy of their superior powers. That the nation as a whole is and has long been disliked, cannot be denied; but no other nation has wished to adopt their system. It has tended towards what is generally held to be dishonesty, immorality, and suppression of individual initiative. And in no branch of affairs is this so clearly illustrated as by their doings in pure and in applied science, during the last half-century, since the prepossession of their infallibility began to gain credence among themselves. For the Germans of fifty years ago were a kindly, plodding, somewhat dull race, among whom there were a few


men, as indeed there were also remarkable men in every other European country. The race has now lost its kindly feelings; it still remains plodding, dull, and bourgeois.

This national catastrophe (for it is a catastrophe when a nation suddenly throws civilisation to the winds, and engages in an immoral attack upon peaceful neighbours) has excited our horror, and has amazed us. The

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