The purpose of these operations, regarded from the point of view of the Germanic Alliance, scarcely admits of doubt. The recovery of the Carpathians, the ejection of the Russians from Galicia, and, incidentally, the relief of Przemysl were adequate objects to justify a campaign undertaken in the depth of winter, when snow lay deep in the higher regions, and frequent blizzards swept the frost-bound plains and valleys. The operations were complementary to those on the East Prussian front, and formed part of the general plan for holding back the Russian armies while a final bid should be made for victory in France.

The Russians, when confronted with the formidable concentration of German and Austrian troops in the Eastern Carpathians, suffered the disadvantages which are incidental to the defence of a mountain range. The entire front cannot be held in strength. The only practicable course is to hold all likely points of attack by fortified posts, and to place reserves at convenient places on the lateral communications in rear, from which they may be moved to threatened localities. The lateral movement of reserves is, however, hampered by the spurs which project from the main ridge; and the lateral roads usually, and railways invariably, keep to the more level country beyond the extremities of these spurs. Troops moving from point to point may, therefore, have to make considerable detours. On the other hand, the army which assumes the offensive enjoys the great advantage of being able to select the point of attack, where it can assemble secretly behind the mountain screen while making feints at other points. The locality of the real attack may be determined too late to enable the advanced position in the passes to be saved. When the problem of the defence is applied to the Russian front in the Carpathians, which had an extent of nearly 250 miles, the difficulties need no demonstration. They were much enhanced by the Russians being themselves engaged in an offensive against the DuklaLupkow front, where they had concentrated the bulk of their forces for the invasion of Hungary by the most direct route; while the scene of the enemy's concentration was 150 miles distant, in the locality where the Russian front was weakest. It is not, therefore,

い

་་་

surprising that our Allies were taken at a disadvantage, and that the Austrians made considerable progress in Eastern Galicia before they could be opposed in adequate strength.

The operations were admirably conceived, and it seemed for some time that they might be crowned with success. The advance from the Bukowina nearly as far as Stanislau was rapid, and was effected without much difficulty. The columns which descended from the Carpathian passes were in a position to turn the right flank of the Russian forces opposing the advance; while, having the passes open in their rear, they were themselves secure against being cut off. On reaching the vicinity of Stanislau, however, the conditions were changed; the advance came to a standstill, and the Austrians were defeated in several engagements. The details of the operations have not been disclosed, and the exact course of events can only be conjectured. It seems safe to conclude that the sudden collapse of an offensive which up to this point had been remarkably successful was due to two principal causes. The Russian arrangements for the redistribution of troops having begun to take effect, the Austrians found themselves confronted by formidable forces. The resistance thus encountered might have been overcome but for the failure of the flanking columns, which had secured the passes on the left of the advance, to carry the Russian positions on the lower spurs which barred their progress. Chief among these positions were those in the region of Koziowa, which a considerable German force had assailed almost without intermission since Feb. 8, but without success. Had these positions been carried, an attack would soon have been developed against the right flank of the Russian army in the Stanislau region, which would probably have been decisive. This suffices to explain the desperation of the German attacks on the Koziowa-Wyskow line, and the stubborn determination of the Russian defence which undoubtedly saved the situation.

So far as can be seen at present the only effect of the Austro-German offensive in Eastern Galicia has been to stop the advance of the Russians on the Dukla-Lupkow front, throwing them on the defensive; and to oblige

the Russians to effect a considerable redistribution of their troops, in order to concentrate large forces in Eastern Galicia. The invasion of Hungary, which seemed imminent in January, has, in consequence, been deferred. When the Austro-German army has been expelled from Eastern Galicia, the Russians will, however, be as well situated as in January to resume the offensive, having succeeded in retaining their advanced positions in the Ondava-Laborcz region, which the further progress of the enemy's offensive would soon have obliged them to relinquish.

Some points of resemblance may be observed between the strategical conception of the German invasion of Poland in November and the recent offensive on the Carpathian front. It was pointed out in the last article how, in the former case, the Russians were obliged by the nature of the German attack to abandon their project of invading Silesia, and to withdraw the troops which they had been concentrating for that purpose in the neighbourhood of Cracow. In the latter case the Austrian advance in Eastern Galicia stopped the invasion of Hungary because it jeopardised the lines of communication of the Russian armies in Western Galicia and the Carpathians. The danger threatening the communications was more imminent than any conceivable consequences of the invasion of Hungary. The Austrians could afford to ignore the latter, because, had the Russians persisted in their offensive, their communications would have been cut long before they could make any sensible impression on the Austrian army or territory. This is a consequence of the relation between the line of the Carpathians and the Russian line of communication Lemberg-Sanok. The former flanks the latter in such a degree that the Austrians, while operating against the rear of the Russian army, were able to ensure the safety of several alternative lines of retreat.

The situation in Eastern Galicia at the time of writing is not very clear. The official reports indicate that subsequent to March 15 the fighting south of the Dniester became less severe, and that since March 20 only isolated engagements have occurred. The coincidence of this change with the beginning of the thaw suggests the

explanation that the swollen condition of the rivers has necessitated the suspension of operations. About the same period the Russians resumed their offensive in the Dukla-Lupkow region, extending their front so as to embrace Bartfeld on the west and the Uzok Pass on the east. Success in the latter direction would soon oblige the enemy to withdraw from the Beskid Pass; and our Allies would then have control of the three principal railways leading across the Carpathians to Homonna, Ungvar and Munkacs respectively. Unofficial reports indicate that the Germans, appreciating the gravity of the situation, have despatched further reinforcements, probably consisting of new formations, to the assistance of their Allies.

The prolonged resistance of Przemysl, and the successful defence of the third-class fortress of Ossowetz against the Germans' heaviest siege artillery, stand out in sharp contrast to the speedy subjugation of Antwerp and other strong places in the West. In the case of Przemysl the Russian artillery appears to have been out-ranged and out-classed by the guns of the fortress, which were able to keep the Russian guns beyond effective range. It is stated that at the period of the Balkan wars, when there was some prospect of Austria becoming involved, the defences had been brought up to date, and that guns of the newest design and of great power had been mounted. Accounts are, however, somewhat conflicting, for there have been reports on several occasions of out-lying forts having been reduced and captured, which could not have been accomplished without effective artillery bombardment. In the case of Ossowetz it has been stated officially that the armoured cupolas providing shelter for the heavy guns escaped scatheless, which can only be explained by supposing either that the fortress artillery overmastered that of the attack, or that the latter failed to determine the range and position of the cupolas. It seems probable that both these causes contributed to the result. Owing to swamps and forests the country round Ossowetz provides few practicable positions for artillery, and the ranges of these had, no doubt, been accurately determined. On the other hand, the Germans probably

lacked the information regarding the effect of their fire which, certainly at Maubeuge and probably at other places, they obtained through such agencies as spies and subterranean telephone communication.

While Ossowetz has successfully filled its rôle by preventing the enemy from gaining the line of the Upper Bobr, thus setting the Russian field army free to deal with the formidable German concentration in the Przasnyz region, where the country, under normal conditions of weather, is more favourable for military operations than elsewhere in North Poland, Przemysl has been of little, if any, assistance to the Austrians at any stage of the war in Galicia. Its situation at the angle formed by the course of the River San was theoretically admirable both for defence and to serve as a pivot of manoeuvre for a field army actively defending Galicia. In the latter rôle it failed signally. It did not enable the Austrians to make a stand during the retreat after the battle fought near Lemberg in September, nor does it seem to have helped them materially in the fighting on the line of the San in the following month. Its usefulness appears to have been restricted to blocking the main line of railway Lemberg-Przemysl-Jaroslav -Cracow, thus obliging the Russians to rely on the cross-country line Lemberg-Rawarusska-Jaroslav for the supply of their army in Western Galicia. Its defence absorbed a large number of troops who are now finally lost through its fall; while the army of investment provides a timely reinforcement for the Russian forces on the Carpathian front.

Before dismissing the subject of the Russian campaign, it may be well to observe that there is another theory, alternative to that suggested in the preceding pages, which may be thought to provide the solution of the German operations. It is this-that the Germans hope, by inflicting a series of blows on the Russian armies, to bring about a situation which may lead the Russian Government to abandon the Alliance and treat separately for peace. Having regard to the German doctrine concerning the sanctity of international obligations, this theory is not devoid of plausibility; but, being political rather than military in character, it will not be discussed here.