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rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it;-could be truly

said to have constructed the instrument, dis

posed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for, as they were before. IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, i.e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far, brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition, nor dispensed with,

If the difficulty were diminished the further

we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we

may conceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no such tendency, or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question (whatever there may be as to many points), between one series and another; between a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain, composed of an infinite number of links, can no more support

itself, than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured

(though we never can have tried the experiment), because, by increasing the number of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet there may be a

great difference in several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between one

chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is infinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The machine which we are inspecting, demonstrates, by its

construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver; design,

a designer; whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or

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not. That circumstance alters not the case. | That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that alter the case; contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one

preceding it: no alteration still; a contriver

is still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one se

ries, as with another; a series which is finite,

as with a series which is infinite. In what-
ever other respects, they may differ, in this
they do not. In all equally, contrivance and
design are unaccounted for.
The question is not simply, How came

the first watch into existence? which ques

tion, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series of watches thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and consequently to have had nosuch first, for which it was necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the question, if no thing had been before us but an unorganized, unmechanized substance, without mark or indication of contrivance. It might be difficult to show that such substance could

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not have existed from eternity, either in succession (if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another), or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether we had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen contrivance, design; an end, a purpose; means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts, is, whence this contrivance and design? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or succession of substances, destitute of these

properties; nor the more, by increasing that

number to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other's movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded. I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to a use (all which

we discover in the watch), we have any cause
whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign
a series of such causes, or to allege that a se-
ries may be carried back to infinity; for I do
not admit that we have yet any cause at all of
the phaenomena, still less any series of causes
either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance,
but no contriver; proofs of design, but no
designer.
V. Our observer would further also reflect,
that the maker of the watch before him, was,
in truth and reality, the maker of every watch
produced from it; there being no difference
(except that the latter manifests a more €X-

quisite skill) between the making of another

watch with his own hands, by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, &c. and the disposing, fixing, and inserting of these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made in such a manner, as to form a new watch in the course of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools, instead of another.

The conclusion of which the first examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must

have had, for the CallSe and author of that

| construction, an artificer, who understood its -

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