we can suggest no particular reason, are governed by reasons, which are more general, which lie deeper in the order of second causes, and which on that account, are removed to a greater distance from us.

The doctrine of imperfections, or, as it is called, of evils of imperfection, furnishes an account, founded, like the former, in views of universal nature. The doctrine is briefly this:-It is probable, that creation may be better replenished by sensitive beings of dif ferent sorts, than by sensitive beings all of one sort. It is likewise probable, that it may be better replenished, by different orders of beings rising one above another in gradation, than by beings possessed of equal degrees of perfection. Now, a gradation of such beings, implies a gradation of imperfections. No class can justly complain of the imperfections which belong to its place in the scale, unless it were allowable for it to complain, that a scale of being was appointed in nature; for which appointment there appear to be reasons of wisdom and goodness.

In like manner, finiteness, or what is resolvable into finiteness, in inanimate subjects, can never be a just subject of complaint, because if it were ever so, it would be always so we mean, that we can never rea

sonably demand that things should be larger or more, when the same demand might be made, whatever the quantity or number

was.

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And to me it seems, that the sense of mankind has so far acquiesced in these rea sons, as that we seldom complain of evils of this class, when we clearly perceive them to be such. What I have to add, therefore, is that we ought not to complain of some other evils, which stand upon the same foot of vindication as evils of confessed imperfection. We never complain, that the globe of our earth is too small: nor should we complain! if it were even much smaller. But where is ther differences to us, between a cless globe, and part of the present being uninhabitable? The inhabitants of an islands may be apt enough to murmur at the sterility of some parts of it against its crocks, or sands, or swamps! but no one thinks himself authorizedito murmur, simply because the island is not larger than it is. Yet these are the same griefale o atus dadri ek I The above are the two metaphysical answers which have been given to this great question. They are not the worse for being metaphysical, provided they be founded (which I think they are) in right reasoning:

but they are of a nature too wide to be brought under our survey, and it is often difficult to apply them in the detail. Our speculations, therefore, are perhaps better employed when they confine themselves within a narrower circle.

...The observations which follow, are of this more limited, but more determinate kind.

Of bodily pain, the principal observation, no doubt, is that which we have already made, and already dwelt upon, viz. “ that it is seldom the object of contrivance; that when it is so, the contrivance rests ultimately in good.";

To which, however, may be added, that the annexing of pain to the means of destruc tion is a salutary provision; inasmuch as it teaches vigilance and caution; both gives notice of danger, and excites those endea vours which may be necessary to preservation. The evil consequence, which sometimes arises from the want of that timely intimation of danger which pain gives, is known to the inhabitants of cold countries by the example of frost-bitten limbs. I have conversed with patients who have lost toes and fingers by this cause. They have in general told me, that they were totally unconscious of any local uneasiness at the

time. Some I have heard declare, that, whilst they were about their employment, heither their situation, nor the state of the air, was unpleasant. They felt no pain; they suspected no mischief; till, by the application of warmth, they discovered, too late, the fatal injury which some of their extremities had suffered. I say that this shows the use of pain, and that we stand in need of such a monitor. I believe also that the use extends further than we suppose, or can now trace; that to disagreeable sensations we, and all animals owe, or have owed, many habits of action which are salutary, but which are be come so familiar, as not easily to be referred to their origin.

PAIN also itself is not without its alleviations. It may be violent and frequent; but it is seldom both violent and long-continued: and its pauses and intermissions become positive pleasures. It has the power of shedding a satisfaction over intervals of ease, which, I believe, few enjoyments exceed. A man resting from a fit of the stone or gout, is, for the time, in possession of feelings which undisturbed health cannot impart. They may be dearly bought, but still they are to be set against the price. And, indeed, it depends upon the duration and urgency of

the pain, whether they be dearly bought or not. I am far from being sure, that a man is not a gainer by suffering a moderate interruption of bodily ease for a couple of hours out of the four-and-twenty. Two very common observations favour this opinion: one is, that remissions of pain call forth, from those who experience them, stronger expressions of satisfaction and of gratitude towards both the author and the instruments of their relief, than are excited by advantages of any other kind; the second is, that the spirits of sick men do not sink in proportion to the acuteness of their sufferings; but rather appear to be roused and supported, not by pain, but by the high degree of comfort which they derive from its cessation, or even its subsidency, whenever that occurs: and which they taste with a relish, that diffuses some portion of mental complacency over the whole of that mixed state of sensations in which disease has placed them.

not.

In connexion with bodily pain may be considered bodily disease, whether painful or Few diseases are fatal. I have before me the account of a dispensary in the neighbourhood, which states six years' experience as follows: