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end here, and therefore enough to account for its existence, it would afford no presumption of a better state of things hereafter. To our apprehension a stronger presumptive argument for such a state would arise rather out of the fact that virtue and vice are not always fully rewarded and punished in this world, as it would be inconsistent with the attributes of a just and holy God to suffer either of them to perish without just retribution: but even this argument is founded altogether upon our supposed previous knowlege of those attributes."

Another principle stated in the 'Rationale’ is, that revelation ‘takes for granted the grand fundamental principles of Theism, that there is a God and that Ile is ONE. This principle seems to bear some resemblance to the aponnys of Epicurus,—that there is in the minds of all men a premonition of Deity, or an antecedent information of the fact of His existence; without which nothing can be understood, enquired after, or discoursed upon :i for Mr. Martineau maintains that 'the Scriptures do not, and could not, offer any evidence of the existence and unity of God. Where, then, is that evidence to be found ? In the works of nature no doubt, so that these constitute, according to his system, a sort of apoanyes, or anticipation of revelation. This cannot be denied, since, if the marks of design in the universe around us and our own frames, prove that there is a God, and, if they precede a revelatiou of the Divine will, they must be an anticipation of it-i.e. the evidence derived from them for the existence of Deity must precede that derived from more miraculous attestation, as well as render the latter probable. But no such attestation, the author of the 'Rationale’ maintains, can prove the existence of God, 'a miracle being, simply as a miracle, a memento, not a proof, of God.' Suppose we meet, however, with the following sublime declaration in a book professing to contain a revelation from God, the authority of which rests on miracles-'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,'—ought we not to believe it on the evidence of that revelation ? No, says Mr. Martineau, 'for the existence of mind is to be evidenced, not by displays of power, but by symptoms of design.' But may it not be evidenced by both ? Power appears to us, to be as much an evidence of mind as contrivance. We see it

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h“ But what would have been the cffect of our perceiving the irreconcileableness of the present government of the world with the perfection of the Divine attributes, except on the supposition of a future life, if all our knowlege of those attributes were gained, as it must have been in absence of revelation, from the course of events, in the natural and the moral world? Is it more likely that we should have been convinced of the reality of a future life as the only supposition which secured the wisdom and benevolence of God; or that we should have been perplexed with additional doubts respecting his character and dispositions, seeing no proof of the existence of that state of retribution without which his proceedings are so mysterious ? I apprehend he knows little of the human mind, or does not consider in what state of the judgment and the feelings these doubts would occur to it, who does not see that scepticism of Providence would be the result, instead of a belief in the immortality of man. We first suppose ourselves possessed of a knowlege of the Divine character, which we never should have had without Christianity, and then argue Christianity to be unnecessary, because, having this knowlege, we can deduce from it the existence of a future state.The necessity of Revelation to teach the Doctrine of a fulure life. By John Kenrick, M. A. p. 20-21.


i Cic. De Natura Decorum. Lib. i. 16.


is such, as manifested in the operations of man-formed machines, the known productions of intelligence, and still more in the actions of all created Lodies in the universe, where also the power is no doubt the result of contrivance. Contrivance and power, indeed, seem to be so intimately connected, as cause and effect, that the one can scarcely be separated in thought from the other: whenever a powerful effect is produced, it must be the result of a powerful cause—it is, therefore, u proof of the existence of that cause. Now a miracle, whether it be giving of sight to the blind, or the restoration of the dead to life, being a most powerful effect, beyond all conceivable human power, must be attributed to a supernatural and intelligent Agent; we cannot indeed conceive it to be produced by any other. We cannot conceive of any interruption of the established laws of nature by a less intervention than that of the creating Mind that formed them: hence a miracle is a proof of the existence of that Mind, as well as a memento of its power. Thus, as it appears to us, one of the grand principles of Theism, viz. that there is a God, may be established by a revelation attested by miracles. The other great principle, that God is One, seems equally capable of being proved by the same means: for, tho‘supernatural facts might exist where there is a multitude of supernatural powers,' we have surely the best reason to conclude there is no such multitude, when the supernatural facts are themselves brought forward in evidence of their non-existence, and in proof of the supreme dominion of One omnipotent Deity. As we cannot separate the miracle from its meaning, or the Messenger from his Message, miraculous announcement could be overthrown only by antagonist miracles of equal magnitude and authority, performed for the express purpose of establishing the existence of other Deities : but if no second series of miracles are wrought for this purpose, the first must be considered as amply sufficient to establish the unity of God. Revelation has, moreover, expressly taught this great truth both in the Old and New Testaments—it is the doctrine both of Moses and Jesus. 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord' (Mark xii. 29.) [This is a quotation in the Septuagint Greek Translation (generally used by the Jews in the time of Christ) of the sublime declaration of Moses to the Israelites, recorded in Deut. vi. 4, ‘Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God is ONE Jehovah. is actually recorded in which the existence of Jehovah as the only living and trne God, in opposition to idols, is actually put to the test of miracle, and established upon supernatural evidence. We allude to the challenge of Elijah to the priests of Baal and the prophets of the groves, to meet him on Mount Carmel, in order to decide there in the presence of ‘all Israel,' whether Jehovah or Baal was the true God:-this great question, by the consent of the people, was to be settled by miraculous attestation-viz. the emission of fire from heaven :-and was so settled, to the confusion of the idolators, who could not (according to the record) produce such evidence,-to the triumph of Elijah who did, and to the perfect satisfaction of the people who saw the miracle (1 Kings, xvii). This passage proves that the assertion in the 'Rationale,' that 'the Scriptures did not, and could not, offer any such evidence,is contrary to fuct, and that it is contrary to reason we have previously endeavored to show.

We are convinced that the revelation of these important truths was necessary

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And an instance .[יהוה אלהינו יהוה אחד In the Hebrew


to the establishment of true religion in the world: the natural evidence for the existence and unity of God not being sufficient, alone, to preserve mankind from the grossest mistakes as to these 'fundamental principles.' It is true, as the Apostle says, that the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead' (Romans, i. 20); but it is equally true that, notwithstanding this natural revelation of the Deity in His works, mankind, unable to see or understand its testimony, 'changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things—and worshipt the creature more than the Creator.' In our opinion it is probable that a revelation of, and from God, was made to man at, or soon after, his creation, and that his knowlege of the Deity was originally derived from this revelation, and not from the works of nature : for it appears that more correct notions of God and His moral government were prevalent in the earlier periods of the world than in later times, after men became more enlightened on other subjects. It is an undoubted fact that the world by wisdoin knew not God’(1 Cor. i. 21), and, in the most civilized nations, the wisest men fell into the grossest mistakes as to His nature. Of these mistakes we have, in an admirable treatise of Cicero, abundant instances: it appears from his work, 'on the nature of the Gods,' and from other ancient documents, that even the existence of the Deity was denied by some of the philosophers, either openly or covertly, and doubted of by others. Their notions of Deity, even when his existence was admitted, were very erroneous and absurd: so that they are justly denominated non philosophorum judicia sed delirantinm somnia, j 'not the opinions of philosophers, but the dreams of dotards. Some contended for a Plurality, others for a Quaternity, k others for an Octo-ility' of Gods ; by one the Deity was indentified with the world, by another with innumerable worlds ; by these heaven and earth were regarded as Gods, by those men, and things destitute of life. Cicero himself seems to have been quite doubtful as to the nature of the Deity:m for he says in the commencement of the De Natura Deorum, 'if any one shall be found to have discovered what is truth, I shall look upon the Academy as arrogant,' and 'that the great disagreement amongst the learned on this most important subject compels even those who imagine they have something of certainty to doubt." The altar at Athens,


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j De Natura Deorum. Lib. i. 16. Empedocles--quatuor naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinos esse vult. Id. 12.


1 Xenocrates-Deos octo esse dicit. Id. 13.

m Cicero carried his Pvrrhonism to such an excess as to doubt whether man was the work of an Intelligent Power: Etiamne hoc affirmare potes, Luculle, esse antiquam vim, cum prudentia et concilio scilicet, quce finxerit, vel, ut tuo verbo utar, quæ fabricata sit hominem?--Quest. Acad. iv. 27.

* Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissentio, --De Rerum Natura. Lib. i. 6,


dedicated 'to the unknown God,' was truly characteristic of the ignorance of the Heathen world, even in its seats of learning, respecting the Deity, and nothing could more strongly evince the necessity of a supernatural revelation of Himself to mankind. The general polytheism, it seems, could be removed only by such a revelation declaring that there is only one God. The knowlege of this great truth we owe entirely to the Jewish and Christian revelations: the light of nature had failed to make it known; we are chiefly indebted for it to the light of the gospel. *This light,' says Locke, 'the world needed, and this light it received from himo (our Saviour), that there is but one God, and he eternal and invisible, not like to any visible objects, nor to be represented by them.'p

A third principle in the 'Rationale,' which seems rather imaginary than rational, is, that Christianity will exhibit new developments in future ages :

“No one, indeed, can look at the vast portions of mankind yet unreclaimed by its power, or reflect what a mere point two decades of ages may be in the whole of providential design, without being prepared for new and startiing developments of this religion, as it falls upon modifications of character which it has never tried, and conditions of society yet uncreated.”'

If our holy religion be essentially, as we believe, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever'; and if human nature, under all modifications, be pretty much the same, what can these new developments’ be ? If Mr. Martineau, by this phrase, means merely to intimate that the truths of the gospel, as they exist in the sacred volume and not in human creeds, will be more developed in the course of time, when the sacred records are universally acknowleged as the only standard of Christianity, and established systems of theology, with all the prejudices and interests connected with them, adverse to truth, are abolished, we can have nothing to object to this position; but, then, we must protest against the development of new principles or doctrines not contained in the Scriptures, as inconsistent with the unchangeable nature of the Christian revelation, which, like its Divine Author, has in it no 'variableness, neither shadow of turning' Science and philosophy cannot add one new principle, doctrine, or precept to revelation; neither can they modify, in the least, its eternal truths: what Infinite Wisdom has made known to us, no discoveries of finite intelligence can change, or improve. “God cannot lie,' and, therefore, His word must ‘stand fast for ever,' unaffected by the revolutions of time, the alternations of human opinion, or the progress of human knowlege. “The gospel,' to use the words of an elegant writer and accomplished scholar, from whom we have already borrowed, “is no fluctuating system of truths and precepts perpetually enlarged and modified by subsequent revelations : such as it now is, it was given to the world by its blessed Founder, and such it shall be to the end of time.'

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o 'The Reasonableness of Christianity.'

p It received it from Moses first, i.e, by Divine Revelation, subsequently confirmed by Christ: both Prophets bore testimony to the same great fact, viz. that God was One and that there was only One God.


Galileo Galilei. A Tragedy: by SAMUEL BROWNE, M.D. James Hogg, Edinburgh. 1850.

LL men, says Emerson, 'are poets at heart.' But all men have not the ability to utter this poetry. Hitherto we have looked upon Dr. Brown as a man of science

as one whose mind was analytic-gifted with powers of research and investigation; but here he appears before us in a new phase of being. That his soul is deeply imbued with the spirit of poesy there can be no doubt. Witness his paper in the North British Review, on the late David Scott, of Edinburgh, that herald of a new epoch of Art; still so little did we dream of his coming before as a dramatist, that we remember well, when he read to us, some eighteen months ago, the prologue to Galileo, of looking upon it as a species of pastime forced upon him by a period of confinement, which would be quickly forgotten when returning strength enabled him to resume his laboratory investigations. Here, however, as if to rebuke our hasty conclusions, comes the Drama, teeming with fresh aud vivid imagery, and abounding in pure and lofty thought. Faults it may have, but these are so rare and distant, compared to the beauties, that we scarcely take them into account, as we proceed thrö scenes pregnant with interest.

The characters are few, but firmly drawn: the most important being Galileo himself, his daughter Marina, and Agostino, the pupil of the Astronomer and bethrothed of his daughter. There are, besides, the Duke of Tuscany and his Sister the Princess, whose characters become interesting thrö the interest they feel in the Astronomer. The character of Galileo is admirably handled thröout; some strokes of the burine telling with wondrous power. We seem to look into the mind of this master spirit of his age-to scrutinize his very soul. Listen to its chafings :

O God, O God, how dreadful this perforce !
Hunted on every side, where'er I turn
Some spear ironical or mocking mouth
Is ready for my blood, my spirit's blood.
Man is not free:-O make me then content,
And freely bend to what I cannot break-
And freely bend? impossible, but true!
The willing captive of his chains is free :
The world's consenting child were free indeed.
Thy will be done, then, Lord of tyrant fate!
Give me obedient love for servile hate.

Speaking of the great


This is his soul's bitterness, but listen to its hero-worship.
Copernicus, he says:-

No, no: My first religion o’er, I praised,
Almost adored, the person of the Pole;
Hymned him in sounding dityrambhic odes;
Made them bepaint him as the loved of time,
And carve his image for my patron saint !
My foolish heart was drunk, idolatrous.

O’er his loves he grows young again. His heart, swelling with gratitude that so large a

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