of the surrender of Malta, which I hope cannot hold out much longer, as the approach of the bad weather may much increase the difficulty of the blockade. You will receive a copy of a communication on the subject of this island from the Secretary of State which was left with Lord Keith by Lord St. Vincent, and from the circumstances under which the former quitted the Mediterranean had not been transmitted to your Lordship. I have only to add to what you will collect from that paper, that the utmost importance is attached by his Majesty's Government to the object of carefully avoiding to do anything which may raise any jealousies in the mind of the Emperor of Russia, who is particularly bent on this point of restoring under some new regulations the Order of Malta; and whose conduct ever on this subject, though one on which he may perhaps have been suspected by the world of entertaining more ambitious views, has been, as far as we are enabled to judge of it, of the most disinterested and honourable kind.

I trust this letter will find you in good health and spirits, and shall conclude with assuring you

that

I am very faithfully,

Your obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

PART III

THE PROPOSAL TO ATTACK

BREST

JULY 1799 TO OCTOBER 1799

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE proposals to attack Brest were a definite part of the policy of making war against the naval power of France. When the Franco-Spanish fleet returned to Brest in August 1799, after causing intense anxiety throughout the preceding three months, it was not unnatural for those who looked upon the destruction of the French navy as Britain's primary object in the war, to propose to seize the opportunity to destroy it at one stroke.

The French were not unprepared for such an attempt. On 1st December General Hédonville warned the Ministry that a British expedition of 25,000 men was being prepared, with the object, he presumed, of assisting the Vendean rebels. Its first stroke would probably be a bold attempt upon Brest; the army would capture the forts that defended the anchorage, and the French fleet would then fall into the hands of the British combined force. But he expressed confidence in his power of coping with the danger. 'D'après les renseignements qui m'ont étés fournis sur les projets des Anglo-Russes sur les côtes de l'ouest... j'ai fait toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour rendre leurs dispositions infructueuses.' Thirty thousand men were deemed sufficient to safeguard the coast from Havre to Pontivy. (Desbrière, Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Iles Britanniques, vol. ii. P. 244 et seq.)