INTRODUCTORY NOTE THE expedition to the Helder was stated by Dundas in the House of Commons to have had three definite objects. It was to act as a diversion in favour of the Austrians and Russians in Switzerland and Suabia; to expel the French from the United Provinces and restore the Stadtholder; and to disarm the Dutch by the confiscation of their navy, thus preventing them from continuing to give assistance to the French at sea. The expulsion of the French from the United Provinces was a part of the general Allied policy of reducing France to her original dimensions. An Anglo-Russian treaty had been signed in December 1798, according to the terms of which Russia would furnish 45,000 men for employment in whatever theatre they were needed, for which Britain would pay a monthly subsidy. Prussia, it was hoped, would join, and a combined invasion of Holland by the three powers, reinforced possibly by Denmark and Sweden, would be undertaken. In such a case, the expulsion of the French could hardly be in doubt.1 The accession of Sweden to this alliance was of double importance. Militarily, she would furnish eight ships of the line and 8000 men. Economically, her breach with France would deprive the common enemy of the use of a neutral flag to procure the goods she greatly needed, both civil and naval. Although neither Prussia, Denmark nor Sweden joined the coalition, the proposal to act against the French in Holland went forward. Great hopes, based upon reports from agents as trustworthy as agents are 1 J. Holland Rose, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, vol. i. p. 291. likely to be, were entertained of help from the Dutch, who undoubtedly desired greatly to be rid of the French. The Dutch Government was shaky, the army and navy were reported to be disaffected. There were, in fact, all the hopes of a siding on the part of the supporters of the Orange party with which in the history of our own country Stuart supporters had more than once misled, in all honesty, their masters at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Everything contributed towards the belief that a surprise attack of some 50,000 British and Russians, joined by the disaffected Dutch, would be decisive. But while the sympathy of the majority, or of the more active part, of the Dutch people was thus confidently counted upon, the line followed by British policy was calculated effectually to alienate that sympathy. They were given clearly to understand that neither the Cape of Good Hope nor Ceylon would be returned to them; they were told that they must renounce certain rights in commerce, rights which, irksome as their exercise had often been to Britain in war, were of high, even essential importance to themselves; and, with the restoration of the Stadtholder, they would be dependent upon England, through the Stadtholder, for their future. Bright visions, these, as Sheridan pointed out, for a colonising, trading, and freedom-loving people. Not therefore without reason the Dutch looked askance at their proposed deliverers and pictured them less as altruists than engrossers of commerce. Thomas Grenville said that he did what he could to reduce the opposition arising from this view, by taking every opportunity to state how much it is our wish to see re-established in Europe the only commercial nation which in wealth and industry could ever be compared to us.' But his words could only be compared with his country's acts. The influence of the political intentions upon the military situation needs keeping in view when appreciating the Helder expedition. The expedition was gravely affected by the weather. 1 Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, 10th April, 1799. Dropmore Papers. The gale which delayed the sailing and disembarkation was of uncommon severity for August. It is indeed remarkable that the delay was not greater, for over 200 sail of men-of-war and transports had to be handled, scattered ships to be reassembled, and order of sailing restored in this great number. A very high degree of professional skill is obvious. As in all conjunct expeditions, the question of providing sufficient transport was throughout a difficult one. The Russians needed shipping to carry their army, which could not move without British troopships. The withdrawal of the British army was complicated; 1 and, in addition, a fleet of transports was required in the Ems in readiness to transport 2500 men to any part of the Zuyder Zee. The mistake of under-estimating the shipping needed to move large bodies of troops across the water, is a common and a costly one. By imagining the French could invade us in 1756, when there was not transport enough in all the ports of Northern France to carry their army, we lost Minorca; nor is that the last occasion on which insufficient attention to the transport question has given rise to unnecessary fears and precautions. The Government of 1800, in the persons of Dundas and Pitt, claimed that the expedition fulfilled two out of the three objects for which it was designed. According to Dundas it acted as a diversion. The battle of Novi, which drove the French out of northern Italy, would not, he said, have been successful if 40,000 French troops had not been diverted to Holland; in Suabia the Archduke could act with greater vigour; Masséna was hampered in Switzerland. The Helder expedition brought about decisions at Novi, in Suabia, at Tortona, Coni and Philipsburgh. The precise data on which he founded this claim are not given; but there is at least reason to entertain doubt of their legitimacy in one instance The battle of Novi was fought on the 15th August and 1 See Home Popham to Spencer, 17th October; Popham to Huskisson, 12th October; Popham to Spencer, 12th October; Spencer to Popham, 1st July. there was but little French force in Holland until the 10th September. The Dutch fleet was taken, and this was an undoubted gain; for that fleet, though beaten at Camperdown, had not been destroyed, and it remained a respectable force that could not be neglected. Throughout the war it had been, and it still was, a source of anxiety. It afforded the enemy a means of obliging us to dissipate our forces, to take defensive measures and thus proportionately to weaken our offensive efforts. Its surrender brought some 6000 seamen out of the hands of the French. These were successes of a valuable nature; but whether they could not have been attained less expensively was very reasonably asked by Sheridan in a biting speech. We had gained the Dutch fleet, he said; but this was not all we gained: we had made some useful discoveries. We now knew that no reliance could be placed in Pitt's knowledge of human nature; that Holland is a country intersected with dykes, ditches and canals; and that the weather in October is not so good as in June. But we might pay too highly for these additions to our knowledge. That the rescue of Holland was a legitimate object he agreed. 'In proportion, however, as the object was wise and good, must be the criminality of those to whose misconduct its failure is to be attributed. If by their gross negligence, their ignorance and their presumption, we have failed in an undertaking so dear to every British heart, the value of the prize for which we contended only augments the mortification of our disappointment.' Mitchell's letters give a picture of his own feelings, and illustrate his difficulties. St. Vincent, a year later, drew one of his short pictures of him. 'Your Lordship,' he wrote to Spencer, never made a better judgment than of Sir Andrew Mitchell, who is a bullet-headed centurion, and never would have been higher in the best times of the Roman Republic. He is, however, brave, good humoured and obedient; qualities of great estimation.' 1 1 St. Vincent to Spencer, 10th November, 1800. DUNCAN TO SPENCER 6th March, 1799. My dear Lord,-By a letter from Vice-Admiral Dickson he tells me a ship has slipt going into the Texel with wine supposed for the Dutch fleet. As their fleet have always been short of provisions they may possibly try to get them supplied by sea, I therefore beg to suggest whether it would not be right to give orders for any vessels found in those seas with provisions be sent into an English port, for though the Texel I believe still in a state of blockade, yet when ships did not persist in going in we let them go to other ports, and small ports there are near the Texel where provisions may be landed and sent to that port. I have the honour to remain with respect, very humble servant, DUNCAN. SPENCER TO DUNCAN 9th March, 1799. My dear Lord,-I agree with you entirely in thinking that ships carrying carrying provisions to the enemy should not be suffered to pass, and I should have thought that their detention was perfectly justifiable as the orders now stand, especially as the Texel is considered in a state of blockade; it may however perhaps be necessary |