SPENCER TO DUNDAS

[Undated draft.] January 1796.

Dear Sir,-The question which will be agitated in the Cabinet on Wednesday when you take under consideration the Drafts you propose for Sir R. Abercromby has already on the original arrangement of this expedition had so full a discussion, that little more seems necessary to do in order to come to a decision upon it now, than to consider how far the change of circumstances has any influence on the grounds upon which it was before determined. The time is unquestionably a very material point in the view of the subject; and upon the whole, after having with as much attention as I am able read over and considered what you say upon it, I am inclined (not without great reluctance) to give the preference to the attack on St. Domingo. I come to this determination with great reluctance because I am persuaded that it involves in it the loss of most if not all of our Islands to windward; for I cannot alter the opinion I had before formed, which everything that has since happened there has only tended to confirm, that while the enemy are in possession of Guadeloupe, and continue to make the use they hitherto have done of that possession, there is no security for any of our İslands (hardly excepting even Barbadoes and Antigua) and it cannot be too often repeated, because I believe it is incontrovertibly true and shall therefore be a principle on which we shall act, that a naval defensive war cannot (under those circumstances) be carried on with success

on that station; and though a little more will be done by a more active Admiral and a little less by a less active one, there is not a sea officer in his senses who will undertake to protect those Islands with any given naval force against the sort of attacks to which they are in the present system exposed. We must, therefore, in my opinion, in coming to this decision, make up our minds to the probable loss of all our Leeward Island dominions, and be prepared to stake the probable acquisition of St. Domingo and consequent security of Jamaica as a sufficient equivalent for that loss. As to any chance of the capture of Guadeloupe by any troops to be afterwards sent from Gibraltar and other parts of Europe, or from St. Domingo, I would not count upon it for a moment. From the two first nothing like a sufficient force could possibly be spared, and the latter will amply occupy all the force you can send against it according to the most favourable calculations, first to conquer the posts and then to maintain them. In your calculations of the force Sir Ralph Abercromby will have the disposal of, I think you are too sanguine; you reckon the British Infantry and Löwenstein's Corps at 14,000 after having deducted 7000 for the Leeward Islands; that is at 21,000 in all. To do that I suppose you take the 16,000 with which he sailed, and the 5000 from Cork. But I am afraid we must make great allowances for the men lost in the last gales of wind, for when I consider that of the 125 sail missing on the 26th ulto.1 not above 40 at most are yet accounted

1 Abercromby and Christian had sailed with about 12,000 men on 3rd December, but were caught in a violent gale and dispersed; some returned to England, but by the 26th December there was still no news of this great number of missing vessels.

for, though I hope the larger part by far of what remains is not to be given up for lost, yet I cannot help fearing that a considerable portion must have suffered; and after all 17,000 men is but a small force for the purpose of taking and maintaining possession of all the strong ports and forts of St. Domingo.

There is another point which must be considered and on which I do not feel at all competent to venture any opinion, that is the probable consequence in respect to bringing on a war with Spain at our proceeding to treat the Spanish part of St. Domingo as a hostile country. That, as you remark, does not affect the main question of the preferable destination of our force, but it does affect comparison between the value of St. Domingo when set against the loss of any other Islands, and upon which depend in a great degree the security of that part of St. Domingo which we already possess or may hereafter take from the French. In order therefore to do the business completely we should certainly consider the whole of that Island as in the possession of the enemy; but then we almost inevitably invoke a rupture with Spain, and I confess that I am not prepared to say that our naval force, however great and expansive, is equal to that contest under the present circumstances of the war. We have, it is true, before contended with the united navies of France, Spain and Holland, and it may now be said that the former and the latter of these three are both in a much worse state in every respect than they then were; but France and Holland had then some trade of their own to protect; they now have nothing else to do but to annoy ours. We had then no necessity for employing a large fleet in the

Mediterranean, having no possessions to guard, and no Allies to support in that part of the world, and consequently in the last war our Mediterranean and Levant trade was almost annihilated; and though we shall now perhaps in that event have what we had not then, a Russian Fleet as an auxiliary force,1 the experience we have lately had of the very bad state of the Russian Navy, which I fear will cost us more than its assistance will be worth, does not tempt me to look upon that circumstance as being so great a resource as I once hoped it would prove; indeed I should very much doubt whether it would even be worth while to employ the Russian ships on any other station than the North Sea or in any other season than the summer. For these reasons I think we ought, if possible, to avoid a Spanish war, but yet I am far from clear that if we determine finally on taking possession of it, it will not be necessary to consider St. Domingo as all French; and I should suppose that after the Treaty of Basle we have very good ground for so doing.

These are the ideas that have suggested themselves to me in reading your dispatches, and I have written them just as they arose.

1 A letter from Duncan to Spencer, of 9th August, 1795, shows that he did not greatly value the co-operation of the Russian Fleet. He expresses at the same time his opinion of combined fleets.

The Russian fleet certainly appears formidable and were they to act by themselves, doubt not they would do very well, but must say and God forbid that the reputation of the British flag I have the honour to bear to should be committed to the uncertain behaviour of any foreign fleet whatever. . . . A combined fleet are not of the consequence they appear, particularly when they do not understand one another's signals, and so voluminous are our signals now that they are not well comprehended in a short time; and every day's experience shows that allies are not to be depended on or trusted.'

There may be several points belonging to the detail of the operations in consequence of this change which may require attention, but I should think none which may not be postponed till the reinforcements to be sent out in the course of this month are nearer sailing. I wish much, if possible, in order to recruit myself completely, to stay here till the latter end of the week, and I shall do so, unless I am absolutely wanted sooner, and if you should see any reason for my coming up before I beg you will not have the least scruple in telling me so.

Yours very truly,

SPENCER.

HYDE PARKER TO SPENCER

Queen, off the Burlings. 21st July, 1796.

My Lord,-On opening the secret orders I met your Lordship's private and secret letter, and cannot but be highly sensible of the confidence you are pleased to place in my zeal and activity. I cannot but perceive the very difficult and delicate situation in which I am placed, arising from the difficult means of obtaining intelligence to enable me to determine upon the choice of the object for my final determination. But it appears to me essential to keep the grand point of my instructions uppermost in my thoughts, so as to be on the spot to counteract their projects at a distance should any doubts arise as to the destination of the enemy; for it is by no means to be taken for a certainty that the combined force may ultimately go to the southward, although