PART VI

THE CHANNEL SQUADRON

APRIL 1800 TO FEBRUARY 1801

SECTION I. SIR ALAN GARDNER'S PROTEST

SECTION II.

OPERATIONS ON THE COASTS OF
FRANCE AND SPAIN

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

IN April 1800 St. Vincent relieved Bridport as 'Commander-in-chief of a squadron of his Majesty's ships employed and to be employed in the Channel Soundings. or wherever else his Majesty's service may require,' as he put it in his Journal on 22nd April. The flag officers under his orders were Sir Alan Gardner, Sir Charles Cotton, Cuthbert Collingwood, J. Hawkins Whitshed, the Hon. George Berkeley and Sir John Borlase Warren. The first-named of these, deeply disappointed at not being appointed to the command, speedily made his sentiments known to Spencer by letter and to St. Vincent by outrageous' conduct. It is remarkable that, in view of St. Vincent's letters, Gardner should have been kept in the fleet for nearly another five months, during the whole of which time he vented his displeasure on his Commander. St. Vincent's description of him was 'He is a zealous and brave man, with the worst nerves possible, and full of doubts as to the precision of other men.'

The correspondence on the subject between Gardner, Spencer and St. Vincent forms the first section of the following series.

The second section deals with the more important subject of the operations. The general situation in the beginning of 1800 was one of no small difficulty. A new orientation for British strategy was being sought, and this was rendered peculiarly difficult by the ruined condition of the army and the long drawn out difficulties with our ally Austria. The war had witnessed several curious interpretations of strategy. The West Indian

phase had been brought to an end with the evacuation of San Domingo in the summer of 1798, and the Caribbean no longer constituted a major theatre of the British effort. The defence of the West Indies now centred principally in the Bay, and was a constant preoccupation of the Admiralty; not a movement was made by the French squadrons that was not reflected in instructions for safe-guarding those valuable possessions.1 The Helder, representing another idea, had come to its unhappy end in October 1799, though the idea of an attack in Holland was still in the mind of Popham, whose memorandum, written before Marengo, and sent to Spencer on 11th July, gives broadly one line of thought that informs this conception of policy. The proposals to attack Brest, with the object of capturing the combined enemy fleet that had collected there at the end of Bruix's cruise in August 1799, were dropped in January. A decision as to the next step had now to be made, and this occupied the ministry for some time.

On the continent, Bonaparte had returned to France. The Second Coalition had collapsed totally. A total breach had been created between Austria and Russia owing to Thugut's jealous policy, which was largely responsible for the failure of Suwarrow's campaign in Switzerland. The difficulties with Austria made it almost impossible to prearrange a military plan in the Mediterranean, Grenville, writing to Minto on August 19,

* F.. instructions to Bridport to put to sea immediately, in consequence of information that the Brest Fleet was about to mov To keep 28 of the line and all frigates with him. It the enemy detached a part of his force, Bridport to make a corresponding detachment. Your Lordship will direct the officer commanding the squadron you detach to follow the enemy to any part of the world to which it may go as long as he shall be able to obtain information on which he may with certainty depend of the route it has taken; and if it has gone to the West Indies he is in that case to repair with all possible expedition to Martinique, and not hearing of them there, to make the best of his way to Jamaica and follow the orders of Sir Hyde Parker.' Other similar cases occur. In January 1801, when Ganteaume escaped. Calder was sent to the West Indies—whither the French squadron had not gone-in pursuit.

1800, said: 'If Mr. Thugut could have brought his mind to act with us as Allies and to say distinctly that he might want our assistance in Italy, Sir R. Abercromby and his army, at the present amount, might have arrived before Genoa as soon as the Austrian operations began there, and would unquestionably have saved Italy.' It did not therefore appear that there was any employment for a British force in those parts. In France a new revolt was stirring in the Vendée, and some thoughts were given to conduct an active campaign in assistance of the Chouans, in which the Russian troops that had wintered in the Channel Islands after their service at the Helder were to take part. The Czar, when asked to employ them in that service, replied that he was ready to fight but not to co-operate. His troops and Makaroff's squadron might be employed as proposed, but only between the limits of Bordeaux and the Sables d'Olonne; his troops must be under their own officers; and he specifically stipulated that the Duke of York should not command the British forces. But the plan did not develop, and the troops returned to Russia in the spring; the squadron went to the Mediterranean.

Negotiations with Austria, who hoped that Russia's withdrawal would lead to herself receiving a greater subsidy, proceeded slowly; and it was not until February 1800 that a definition of the main lines was arrived at; nor was that definition happy. Austria was to be assisted by British expeditions to the coast of France. This decision, according to Dundas, was in agreement with the wishes of Austria, who was not anxious, after her first successes in the campaign, to have British troops acting in immediate co-operation, but preferred that they should operate diversionally on the western coast of France.

Preparations for these expeditions are to be seen in the letters of Pitt and Dundas in February and March. Belleisle was the first objective selected. This decision seems to have been made about May. Belleisle was to be the base from which the attacks would be developed, Dropmore Papers, vol. vi. p. 300.

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