BERKELEY TO SPENCER

Mars, off Rochefort. 18th June, 1799.

My Lord,-The situation in which I am placed must be an apology for this letter, as I cannot publicly offer those observations to the Board, which in a private letter may convey to your Lordship, who is at the head of it, information which perhaps may be acceptable. I imagine this squadron has two objects in view. One to block up the Spanish Squadron; the other to annoy and stop the coasting trade, which is now almost the only commerce which is carried on by the enemy. The first object cannot well be done, in the present manner by the squadron, for if it should be obliged to work off the coast in tempestuous weather, or that the Spanish Admiral was enterprising enough to take advantage of thick weather and an east wind to push to the southward and endeavour to make his escape to Ferrol, or that the pilots would undertake to carry him through the Pertuis Breton with a S.E. wind, for Brest, there is no doubt but it might be effected. It may be thought that a certain way of preventing it would be to anchor the squadron in Basque Road, which would prevent their getting under weigh, but this squadron must be supplied with proper attendant vessels and gunboats to frustrate the attempts of the combined enemy, who from the vicinity of their dockyard at Rochefort, and the nature of the anchorage, would otherwise have the means of annoying the squadron with gunboats, fire-rafts, &c. and it also ought to be ascertained to be a safe road in a westerly wind, for although it is perfectly secure and sheltered

by the Isle of Oleron in south-west gales, I am informed that with the wind at west and northwest, which blows right in, there is a very heavy sea. I mention this anchorage because I think the blocking up this Port otherwise by ships of the line, not only impossible, but attended with the greatest danger to the squadron employed in the service. For although fast sailing frigates are enabled to work off this shore when caught in a gale at west, it is with the utmost difficulty they can accomplish it; but with a squadron of line of battleships, some of which are perhaps the most leewardly in the service, it is so hazardous, that I fairly apprize your Lordship not to be surprised if even in a summer gale at west you should hear of the loss of some of them. I have, it is true, given out in cases of emergency an anchorage off the Isle D'Yeu, but upon conversing with the officers who have served upon this coast, I find it by no means a proper one for the squadron as the ground is very rocky and foul and the anchorage precarious for a squadron, although it might be picked out by a ship or two; but it must be risked, if you determine to keep a squadron off this Port as Belleisle or Quiberon (which are the safest and best roads) cannot be attained with the wind blowing strong at west.

The other object of destroying the coasting trade, cannot be done, but in one manner, for the coast is so intersected with inlets and islands that no cruisers can possibly get near enough to them before they are scattered, for in coming from Bordeaux they pass between the shoals and point de Coubre, and entering the Maumusson passage, round the Islands of Oleron and Rhé get to the harbour of Olonne, where they watch

the opportunity of getting with convoy between the main and Isle d'Yeu, and if necessary pass within Noirmoutier, and so up to Nantes. The same conduct is observed, if bound to Brest, for from the mouth of the Loire they pass under Quiberon within the Isle of Groix and the Glenans, and wait at the Penmarks until they have a clear coast to get through the Raz to Brest; and the same circuitous route is taken in their way back, as I have just witnessed. The manner of stopping this would be to have a squadron of frigates, with a brig or gunboat stationed at the Isle d'Yeu; for as long as possession is maintained of that island and anchorage, no vessel can pass between it and the main; at present there is nothing to hinder it, and the harbour of Isle d'Yeu is a very good one for vessels of a light draft. It is true that a superior force might be sent from Brest to dislodge this squadron, but if Government took possession of the island, and had a regular blockhouse to withstand and prevent a Coup de Main, it would shelter the shipping, and be the most effectual means of cutting off every coast communication between Bordeaux and Brest, and the frigates might always cruise off Belleisle and Quiberon to prevent convoys from Nantes to Brest.1 But unless the station of Isle d'Yeu is taken possession of, it is impossible to prevent their convoys

1 The erection of blockhouses formed the subject of much correspondence. Nepean wrote to Spencer in August, 1800: 'The letter which I have put into the post from Mr. Crew will give your Lordship all the information he is capable of obtaining on the subject of the blockhouses. I have sent a copy of it to Lord St. Vincent, telling him at the same time that I think he could hardly count on their reaching him in less than six weeks or two months, by which time the season would be so far advanced as to render the continuance of the squadron on the coast of France a matter of great uncertainty.'

passing. Whether the attainment of this object would be worth the expense attending it, must remain with your Lordship to consider. I shall not add anything in this letter of my own situation, or of the squadron because the Board are in full possession of the state and condition of the ships, and I have written more fully my private sentiments upon it to Admiral Young.

I am, your Lordship's

very humble servant,

G. BERKELEY.

SPENCER TO PITT

Admiralty. 5th August, 1799.

Dear Sir,-You will have learnt from other quarters of the death of Lord Howe, which happened this morning at half-past nine. There is no quarter, however, in which the arrangement in consequence will be more difficult to make than this, and I therefore trouble you as early as possible with a line on the subject that you may assist me with your ideas upon it. The situation of Admiral of the Fleet goes of course to Sir P. Parker who is next in seniority, and will make it necessary for him to retire from the command at Portsmouth which I am very sorry for, as I am much embarrassed to find a proper successor for him. The Generalship of Marines ought not to go to Sir Peter, but I suppose must go to Barrington, as it would scarce be right to make an officer General of Marines, who is junior to the Lieutenant-General, which Barrington is. The Lieutenant-Generalship of Marines will therefore be disposable, and I do not at all know to whom it can with perfect propriety

be given. If to Lord Bridport, it should be on condition of his resigning his office of ViceAdmiral of England and Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital, or at least one of them; and I confess at any other moment than just the present, I should have been disposed to make use of it as an inducement to him to retire from active service, for which I think his energy and other qualifications are nearly passed by; but if he were to retire it would be impossible to find at this moment another Admiral to command the Channel Fleet which we are collecting and he must therefore go to sea again to endeavour to counteract the operations of these combined fleets, which you will have learned have sailed from Cadiz, and will not improbably be very shortly either in the Channel or on the coast of Ireland.1 If Lord Keith can either come up with them or follow them close, all will be well enough; but should he either be prevented from passing the Straits, or having passed them, miss the enemy, and steer in any wrong direction, we shall be in a scrape. However we have the possibility even under this supposition of mustering about 27 or 28 ships of the line in the course of a very few days, exclusive of the squadron of English and Russians left off the Texel under Lord Duncan.

You will perceive that I have in this respect altered the plan on which I before talked to you of sending our whole North Sea fleet to the westward, and I have done so on this ground, that we should in that case not only expose our Trade (most numerous and valuable at this season of the year) in the North Sea to the depredations of the Dutch fleet, but entirely knock up the

1 Referring to the return of Bruix from his Mediterranean cruise.