XXV. into the shade the influence of the nobles; and the dis- CHAP. penser of £50,000,000 annual revenue might soon be able to despise the impotent resistance of the legislature 1831. which was to record his decrees. Yet, while the Liberals destroyed the hereditary aristocracy, the last barrier against despotism, they concurred in all measures likely to increase the power of the executive. "The triumph Louis of the bourgeoisie," says the republican historian, “ was 333. complete, but its ruin was hidden in its victory."1 1 Blanc, iii. degradation age. Not less remarkable was the mode by which this great 105. democratic triumph was effected, or the lesson which it Previous taught to the friends of freedom in future times less of the hereimportant. From the first breaking out of the Revolution ditary peerin 1789, every era had been marked by successive blows to the power of the aristocracy, and every one had been followed by a vast increase of the power of the executive, but no addition to the liberties of the people. By the union of the Chambers, and the abolition of nobility, its power had been totally destroyed in the commencement of the struggle, and then ensued the tyranny of the Convention, the despotism of Napoleon. With the restoration of the Upper House, and the rights of hereditary succession by the charter of Louis XVIII., a mixed constitution was given to the country during fifteen years-the only period, according to the confession of all the liberal historians, when real liberty was enjoyed in France. But during this period successive coups d'etat weakened the power of the Upper House, and numerous creations of peers at once destroyed its independence and lessened its respectability. The placing of Louis XVIII. on the throne was immediately followed by the creation of eighty-two peers, required to neutralise the influence of the Napoleonists in the Senate.2 The famous coup d'etat of 5th September 1816, which changed the constitution of the Lower House, was carried through the Upper Chamber by a creation of sixty-three peers." Charles X. signalised his accession xvi. § 69. by a creation of seventy-six peers; and then followed, 3 2 Ante, c. iii. § 20. 3 Ante, c. vi. § 96. 4 Ante, c. XXV. CHAP. within a few years afterwards, the Polignac ministry, and Ordonnances of July. The seizure of the throne by Louis 1831. Philippe was immediately succeeded by the expulsion of all these new members from the House of Peers; and within eighteen months after, the popular voice had become so strong that thirty-six were created to destroy their own hereditary rights! It will appear in the sequel whether the cause of balanced freedom gained anything by this step, and whether the remainder of the reign of Louis Philippe was anything more than a continued struggle of the people against the executive, now rendered well-nigh irresistible by the destruction of the last barrier against its influence. It is a singular circumstance, indicative of the inability of the lessons of experience to teach wisdom to a heated generation, that, at the very moment that the creation of peers was the engine employed to destroy the last barrier of constitutional freedom in France, the same step was vehemently pressed upon the King of England to lay the foundation, as it was thought, of general liberty in this country. 106. of Great regard to a heredi age. Probably the wit of man, to the end of the world, will Experience add little to the arguments, of which an abstract has now Britain in been given, drawn from general considerations, for and against the abolition of a hereditary peerage. But, withtary peer- out being so presumptuous as to attempt what is obviously hopeless, the English historian may be permitted to observe, that experience in his own country has added much to the strength of the arguments advanced against the abolition. What is very remarkable, it has done so, chiefly by adopting, and reducing to practice, the strongest reasons adduced for that measure. No one can doubt that the interest of society requires that as able a body of legislators as possible should be secured for an independent branch of the legislature; but experience has now proved, contrary to what was generally supposed, that this is not to be done by vesting its nomination for life either in the sovereign or the people. The House of XXV. 1831. Peers of England has not only exhibited for a century CHAP. past, but exhibits now, an amount of statesmanlike talent and capacity which we will look for in vain either in the nominees of the French Emperor, or in the popularly elected Senate of America. If any one doubts this, let him read the debates on any of the great questions which have been agitated in the country, during the last halfcentury, in the Peers and the Commons: the superiority of the former is self-evident. The proof of the reality of this superiority is decisive. By the Reform Bill, the middle class in the towns have gained the entire command of the country; they have enjoyed for twenty-five years the appointment of the Cabinet, and by successive small creations of peers they have obtained the majority in the Upper, as, by the influence of the borough members, they have of the Lower House. The prerogative of the Crown, the votes of both branches of the legislature, have been at their disposal; but they have never yet been able to form a government of their own. The more liberal the party has been which was called to the helm, the greater has always been the number of the noblemen in its Cabinet. The abolition of the corn laws, and the imposition of the tax on landed succession, and many other measures, prove that this has not been owing to the want of power in the popular party, so far as votes are concerned. It has been entirely owing to the want of power in debate and statesmanlike wisdom in its leaders in Parliament. 107. the supe statesmen. The reason of this is apparent to any one who considers the structure of English society, and the mental Reason of training requisite for success in representative assemblies. riority in The sons of the hereditary aristocracy have proved them- the aristoselves superior to those of the middle or working class in cracy as the arena of Parliament, for the same reason that their ancestors were superior in the tournament. It is their business to joust, and practice improves the natural powers not less in the tilts of the mind than in those of the body. No amount of natural talent or of practice, or success in XXV. 1831. CHAP. other professions, can supply the want of this essential requisite. The common observation, that even the most eminent lawyers seldom attain any great success in Parliament, is a proof that even the profession, the habits of which are most akin to those required in representative assemblies, does not afford the requisite training for their direction. No one supposes that a Cabinet could be formed out of the Manchester school, or the mercantile representatives of great towns; they are valuable, from their local or peculiar information, in Parliament, but they are incapable of taking a lead in it. The reason is, they have not been trained to its contests in their early years. Success in the other walks of life is not an earnest of eminence in Parliament, but a bar to it, because it has arisen from a long-continued bent of the mind in another direction. It is as impossible for great success at the bar, in the army, or in commerce, to qualify a person, even of the greatest talents, to obtain the lead in Parliament, as it is for the lead in Parliament to qualify for a surgical operation, or the command of the Channel fleet, or the direction of the siege of Sebastopol. 108. Increased vigour and capacity this gives to the higher branches of the aris tocracy. While this cause of lasting influence renders the existence of a hereditary class of legislators the best security for capacity in the direction of affairs, by training a body of men to that direction as their end and aim in life, it operates not less powerfully in elevating the character and improving the talents of that class, and qualifying them for the direction of affairs. Foreigners often express surprise at the long-continued ascendancy of the English aristocracy in the affairs of their country, so different from the fate which has overtaken that order in so many Continental states; but whoever is acquainted with the different strata of society in the British empire will have no difficulty in discerning the reason. They have kept the lead so long, because the constitution had made them legislators, and thus trained them to its duties. Had they been as politically nullified as the nobles of France XXV. 1831. and Spain were under the old régime, they would have CHAP. been equally inefficient. If any one will compare the capacity and conversation of the landed proprietors, and still more of their wives and daughters, below the line of Parliament and above it, the difference will appear extreme. The moment we emerge from the class in which hunting, shooting, and fishing form the great objects of life, and rise into that in which political questions are the subject of thought and conversation, we feel as if in another world. 109. of the interests of the peers being with those tion. Add to this, that it is of the last importance that one branch at least of the legislature should be for the most Importance part composed of those whose position is fixed-who have not their fortune to make, whose interests are hereditary identified with those of production, and who have an identified inheritance to leave to their descendants which might of producbe endangered by precipitate innovation. A fly-wheel is required in the political not less than the mechanical machine. Without it the very force of the generated power may in critical periods tear it in pieces. The great danger in an old, wealthy, and mixed community is, that the inhabitants of towns will, from their superior wealth, concentration, and intelligence, get the command of those of the country, and in consequence pursue a series of measures, for their own immediate advantage, fatal in the end to the best interests of society, and ruinous to the national independence. Without asserting that the existence of a separate legislature, composed of a hereditary legislature, is able entirely to obviate this danger, which seems inherent in the very structure of society, it may at least safely be affirmed, that it tends greatly to lessen it, and that if perpetually recruited, as the English aristocracy is, by accessions of talent and energy from the middle classes of society, it may long serve as a barrier alike against the despotism of the executive and the madness of the people. |