XXVI. CHAP. portion. Skrzynecki made a very different stand from Kosciusko, and a quarter of its old territory and population maintained, for the first time, in 1831, an equal contest with the forces of the Czar. 1830. But this very circumstance of the increased strength and improved condition of the people only rendered more intense the desire for independence, and more galling the sense of subjugation. The sight of the Polish arms over the public edifices, of the Polish uniform on the soldiers, of the Polish standards over their ranks, perpetually recalled the days of their independence; while the sense of the growing prosperity and resources of the country inspired the hope of at length succeeding in re-establishing it. The reviews of Constantine's guards and the garrison of Warsaw, often twenty thousand strong; the magnificent squadrons of the cavalry, the steady ranks of the infantry, the splendid trains of the artillery, all in the Polish uniform, composed of national troops, and in the finest possible state of discipline and equipment, inspired them with an overweening idea of their own strength. No force on earth seemed capable, to their fond and ardent imaginations, of resisting the gallant arrays of armed men, equal to the élite of the French or Russian Guards, which were constantly passing before their eyes. The military spirit became universal, from the frequent exhibitions of its most attractive spectacles; patriotic ardour widespread, from the progressive revival of its hopes. The officers of the Polish regiments, composed entirely of the nobles, in whom the passion for independence burned most strongly, mutually encouraged each other in these sentiments; the young men at the military schools and the university of Warsaw, all drawn from the same class, embraced them with still more inconsiderate and generous ardour. Out of the rising prosperity of Poland, and the gradual removal of its grievances, sprung very naturally a consciousness of national strength, and a desire for the restoration of national independence. It XXVI. 1830. is a mistake to suppose that the most serious insurrec- CHAP. tions arise from the extremity of suffering; it breaks rather than excites the spirit. It is true, as Lord Bacon says, that the worst rebellions come from the stomach; but it is not when it is most sorely pinched that they arise. It is when the pinching is coming on, or going off, that they are most to be dreaded. 12. cieties in chap. viii. Ever since the year 1825, when the great rebellion broke out in the Russian army, which was repressed, as Secret soalready recounted, by the vigour and intrepidity of Nicho- Poland. las,1 and even before that time, an immense secret society 1 Ante, had existed in Poland, having for its principal object to $129. restore the national independence. It was not so much directed, like the Carbonari of Italy, the Red Republicans of France, or the Ribbonmen of Ireland, to objects of social change or disorder, as to the grand object of replacing Poland in its ancient place in the European family. Accordingly, it embraced a greater number of classes, was actuated by more generous sentiments, and was less likely to be stained by crime. It was a fixed principle in these societies, that nothing should ever be committed to writing, but everything trusted to the fidelity and honour of the affiliated. And so worthy did they prove of the trust, that the existence of the gigantic organisation, which had its ramifications not only in the kingdom of Poland, but in Gallicia and the grand-duchy of Posen, the portions which had fallen to Austria and Prussia on the final partition, was not even suspected when its designs were approaching maturity. There is no example recorded in history of so great a conspiracy, Roman embracing so many thousand individuals, having been so Soltyk, Polong and faithfully kept secret,-a decisive proof of the Revolution ardent spirit and sentiments of honour by which its mem- 24, 27. bers were actuated. 2 The French Revolution of 1830, as might naturally be supposed, excited the warmest sympathy, and produced the most unbounded enthusiasm in Poland; and the sub 2 logne et la en 1830, i. XXVI. 1830. 13. Different plans of rators. Sept. 29. CHAP. sequent democratic movements in Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, still farther fanned the flame. The effervescence soon became such that it was obvious it could not be restrained; and the chiefs of the conspiracy, accordingly, the conspi- held several meetings at Warsaw, in the end of September, at which the plan of operations was discussed and agreed on. Two different projects were laid before the meeting, and their respective chances of success fully discussed. The first was, to embrace not merely the kingdom of Poland, now under the domination of Russia, which was comparatively of very small extent, but the whole ancient provinces of the empire, in the insurrection. According to this plan, not only Poland Proper, but Lithuania, Podolia, Volhynia, the Ukraine, Gallicia, and the grand-duchy of Posen, in all of which the conspiracy had ramifications, would have been embraced in its flame. The conspirators calculated that, taking into view the regular troops in these provinces, all of whom, it was expected, would join them, and the landwehr, which might immediately be rendered available, they might reckon within a few weeks on bringing a hundred and eighty thousand men into the field, with two hundred and seventy-six guns; and in six months this force might be doubled. On the other hand, the objection to this plan obviously was, that it would induce the certain hostility of Austria and Prussia, as well as Russia, upon them, and these united powers might, within a few months, bring three hundred thousand men against them. second project was, to confine the insurrection to Poland Proper, make Warsaw its headquarters, and provoke an insurrection only in Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, with which Russia only was concerned. After mature deliberation, it was determined to adopt the latter project, as likely to embroil them, in the first instance at least, with a lesser number of enemies, and as withdrawing more from the ranks of their enemies than it added to those of their friends.1 1 Roman Soltyk, i. 25, 33; Ann. Hist. xiii. 654, 655. The XXVI. 1830. 14. plan, which proved The insurrection was originally fixed for the 20th CHAP. October, on which day the Polish regiment of the Guard would be on service, and occupy all the posts which were held two days alternately by the Poles and Russians. Original Thirty determined young men, armed with pistols, and wrapped in cloaks, were, at the inspection of the troops, abortive. to mingle with the crowd which always surrounded the Viceroy on such occasions, and despatch him; while fifty more, with drawn sabres, were to destroy the Russian generals who surrounded him. The immediate and unanimous support of the Polish Guard, and the whole Polish troops, 10,000 strong, in Warsaw, was confidently relied on; and, with their aid, it was hoped they would, without difficulty, succeed in surrounding and disarming the Russian troops, only seven thousand in number, most of whom were of Polish origin, in the capital. A provisional government was to have been immediately proclaimed by acclamation, the members of which were all fixed on, leaving its formal appointment to flow from the Diet, which was to be immediately convoked. The whole details of this plan were arranged, and it had every prospect of success; but it was prevented by the police having obtained some dark hints of what was in agitation, and arresting some of the leaders. It was fortunate for Poland that it was so; for little could have been expected from an insurrection, even in the most justifiable of all circumstances, which was to have commenced with the murder of the Viceroy and the i. 43, 44. principal persons in the state.1 1 Rom. Solt. 15. of Constan the conspi racy. Meanwhile Constantine, with that mixture of ferocity and insouciance which formed the leading feature of his Supineness character, and is the distinctive mark of savage descent, did tine, and nothing. Though he had taken an active part in several progress of general battles, especially Austerlitz, his personal courage was seriously doubted; of moral courage he was entirely Europe, c. destitute.2 Like most other men who are not gifted with that commanding quality, he persisted in declaring there was no danger, because he could not bear to look it in the 2 Hist. of xl. § 131. XXVL CHAP. face; he made no preparations against it, because he shrunk from its contemplation. Though the police were very 1830. imperfectly informed as to the details of the conspiracy, and entirely ignorant of its extent and formidable character, they knew enough to be aware that serious danger threatened; and they repeatedly warned the Viceroy to be on his guard, and be prepared for an outbreak. But he uniformly declared that there was no danger, and that he was too popular with the troops to render any insurrection possible. Encouraged by this supineness, the conspirators proceeded rapidly with their preparations, and several new clubs were formed, which came to embrace nearly the whole officers in the army, and the whole youth at the university and public schools. In this conduct of Constantine there is nothing extraordinary, considering his character. To look danger calmly in the face, and make preparations to meet it when still afar off, is the mark, not of a timid, but of a resolute mind. The greater part of the want of previous arrangements, which so often doubles 1 Rom. Solt. the weight of misfortune to nations as to individuals, is the result of cowardice. Men are afraid of being afraid, and therefore they do nothing till the evil day has arrived, just as they delay making their wills till it is too late.1 i. 44, 50, Hist. xiii. 655. 16. After having been several times adjourned, the insurInsurrec- rection was finally fixed for the 10th of December, when tion of 29th several events, without and within, made its leaders sensible at Warsaw. that it had become necessary to strike sooner. Numerous November arrests were made by the police, which led the conspirators to apprehend they were discovered, or on the point of being so. The national troops in Gallicia were all withdrawn into Hungary, and replaced by Austrian or Hungarian regiments; while, in the grand-duchy of Posen, the whole landwehr, thirty thousand strong, was either disarmed or removed into the fortresses of Silesia, and their place was supplied by battalions of German troops. These steps at once showed that the objects of the conspiracy were known, and that the powers interested in |