CHAP. and yielded a revenue of 40,000,000 florins (£1,000,000) to the government of Berlin. 'XXVI. 1831. 44. Statistics of Lithuania and Russian Poland. 1 Rom. Solt. The vast territories which in the different partitions had fallen to the lot of Russia, viz. Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, the Ukraine, and White Russia, were far from presenting so satisfactory an aspect. Asiatic despotism pressed with its iron hand upon their immense natural springs of prosperity. The population of the whole provinces did not exceed 9,000,000 inhabitants, being a very small increase upon what it had been at the partitions; and, notwithstanding the marvellous fertility of the greater part of their soil, the revenue they yielded was only 50,000,000 florins (£1,250,000). In addition to this, the Polish provinces which had been conquered by Russia before the first partition, viz. Smolensko, Tchernigov, and Starodub, contained 2,000,000 of inhabittants, but they had been so long dismembered from old Poland that their inhabitants had been almost naturalised in Russia. Predial servitude, in all its severity, pressed on these magnificent provinces; the industry of the country was languid, that of cities in its infancy; commerce of every kind in the interior was entirely in the hands of the Jews, who made a lucrative profit of the labour or simplicity of the peasants; and the grain trade of the southern provinces, which had formerly been the main source of the riches of Athens and Venice, was scarcely felt, from want of internal communication, beyond a circuit of seventy miles around Odessa. These provinces were still governed by the ancient Lithuanian code, mingled with Russian ukases; but even in their rude state they presented immense resources in men and horses; and as the Russian domination was to the last degree hated over their whole extent, much might be expected from them, if opportunity could be afforded for shaking off the authority of the Czar.1 The military resources of the contending parties, though disproportionate, were not so much so as might at XXVI. 1831. 45. forces on site sides. first sight have been expected, from the immense differ- CHAP. ence in their material resources. On the side of the Poles, 14,000 old soldiers had repaired to their standards, and increased the regular army to 42,000 infantry and Military 9400 cavalry; the artillery, consisting of 126 pieces the oppomanned by 2500 gunners, and 4000 new levies, presented a total of 58,500 combatants, all regular soldiers, brave, admirably disciplined, and animated by the highest spirit. From this, however, was to be deducted 10,000 men for the garrisons of Praga, Zamosc, and Modlin, and 4500 on detachment, so that not more than 44,000 men could be calculated upon for active service in the field. There was, it is true, a reserve which had been decreed, which was expected to produce 47,600 men; but the greater part of these were still unequipped when the war broke out, and the whole were very imperfectly disciplined. On the other hand, the Russian army, which had been by great exertions collected on the frontiers of Lithuania, under the orders of Field-Marshal Diebitch, consisted of 110,620 men, with 396 pieces, of which i. 259, 272; no less than 23,500 were regular and 4500 Cossack xiv. 489. cavalry.1 1 Rom. Solt. Ann. Hist. 46. cal advan Poles. When the disproportion between the opposite parties was so great, it seems almost impossible that the contest Strategeticould have been of more than a few weeks' duration; tages of the nevertheless, it lasted nine months, was often very nearly balanced, and at last determined only by the active intervention of Prussia in favour of the Muscovite forces. The reason is to be found not merely in the valour of the Polish army, or the ability of their generals, great as they undoubtedly were, but in the military advantages of their situation. Small as the Polish forces were, they had the advantage, like those of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, or Napoleon in Champagne in 1814, of being concentrated: vast as the legions of the Muscovites were, they laboured under the disadvantage, like those of the Allies on both these occasions, of being dis XXVI. 1831. CHAP. persed. The Polish troops, concentrated in a space not much larger than Yorkshire, rested on the fortresses of Warsaw, Zamosc, and Modlin, which were sufficiently fortified to be beyond the reach of a coup-de-main ; while the Vistula, which flowed through its centre, gave them the advantage of water-carriage, and all the bridges over it were in their hands. On the other hand, the Russians, spread over a space of four hundred miles in breadth, from Kowno to Wlodzernierz, were at an immense distance from their magazines and resources, and this distance increased every mile they advanced into the Polish territory. The military resources of the empire had been strained to the uttermost, to produce the army under Diebitch on the frontier; and from the vast distance of the reserves in the interior, no reinforcements of consequence could be looked for for a very considerable time. Add to this, that if the Polish partisans could succeed in lighting up the flames of civil war in Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, they might turn the resources of nine millions of Russian subjects against their enemies, and more than double their own. In these circumstances, much would obviously come to depend on the Russians striking a decisive blow in the outset, and, taking advantage of i. 264, 271; their immense numerical superiority, to destroy the Polish power before it had an opportunity of extending the flame of the insurrection into their own dominions.1 1 Rom. Solt. Ann. Hist. xiv. 489. 47. Advance of Diebitch towards Warsaw. Feb. 5-7. Diebitch broke up from his quarters in Lithuania on the 5th February, and advanced in three columns towards Warsaw. The right wing, under Generals Szachoffskoi and Manderstein, twenty thousand five hundred strong, entered the Polish territory by Kowno and Grodno, so celebrated in the wars of Napoleon. The left, ten thousand strong, consisting almost entirely of cavalry, with forty-eight guns, under General Geismar, debouched by Wlodawa, and moved upon Lukow and Lublin; while the centre, eighty thousand strong, with two hundred and eighty guns, under Diebitch in person, and divided into XXVI. 1831. four corps, under the orders of General Pahlen, Rosen, CHAP. the Grand-duke Constantine, and General Dewitt, advanced by Tykoczyn, on the direct road to Warsaw. The whole of these troops were admirably organised, and provided with everything necessary for an active campaign. Unable to contend against forces so immense, Radziwil wisely retired, without attempting any resistance, towards the capital, in the hope that the invaders might be weakened by the waste and fatigues of the march, as Napoleon Rom. Solt. had been in the advance to Moscow, and that an oppor- Ann. Hist. tunity might occur near Warsaw for engaging the enemy 490. on terms more nearly approaching to equality.1 1 i. 269, 272; xiv. 489, 48. and forces But the dimensions of the kingdom of Poland were very different from those of the empire of Russia, and the Position Poles soon found that they had retreated as far as was on the oppossible, and that a stand must be made to defend the site sides. capital. No serious resistance was experienced at the passage of the Bug, and the Polish army, gradually retiring, but in perfect order, took post, on the evening of the 18th February, a league in advance of Warsaw, near the village of GROCHOW. The forces on the opposite sides, though still disproportionate, were not so much so as might have been anticipated from the great difference between them which existed at the opening of the campaign. Diebitch had not more than seventy-four thousand men, as his centre and part of the wings alone was in the field; while the army of Radziwil had been raised, by reinforcements drawn from the national guards and depots, to forty-eight thousand men. But the Russians had a great superiority in artillery, which amounted to two hundred and seventy-six pieces, while the Poles had only one hundred and twenty-six. The Russian army was divided into two columns: the right, twenty-seven thousand strong, was under the orders of Rosen; the left, of no less than fifty thousand combatants, was under Count Pahlen and General Dewitt. The Polish army was drawn up in battle array in front of the woods XXVI. 1831. CHAP. which environ the village of Grochow: the right, under Szembek, rested on the marshes which adjoin the Vistula; the centre, under Radziwil in person, occupied in force the great road to Warsaw; the left, under Skrzynecki, extended as far as the village of Grodzisk. The cavalry, with the exception of three regiments which occupied that village, was all in reserve behind the infantry. The Russians had the advantage of the position, for they 1 Rom. Solt. had the forest in rear, in which their columns would find Ann. Hist. shelter in case of disaster; while the Poles, with their i. 270, 280; xiv. 489, 490. 49. Battle of Grochow. Feb. 19. backs to the Vistula, traversed by the single bridge of Praga, were exposed to total ruin in the event of defeat.1 The battle commenced at ten in the morning, by an attack by Pahlen, who debouched from the forest by the great road, and, turning to the left, attacked Szembek's men; but he was received with so warm a fire from the Polish right that his troops fell into confusion, and a charge from the Polish hussars, who were brought up from the rear, drove them back headlong into the wood. Upon this Rosen's corps, which had by this time debouched from the wood, advanced to its aid, and took Szembek's corps, which had advanced considerably in pursuit of Pahlen's men from the ground it had occupied at the commencement of the action, in flank. In consequence Szembek fell back to his original ground; and, as the whole Russian army had by this time got clear of the wood, and deployed in its front, directly opposite to the Poles, the battle became general along the whole line. Diebitch, taking advantage of his immense superiority in men and guns, made the utmost efforts to force the centre, where the great road to Warsaw passed through both ? Diebitch's armies; but although above a hundred pieces of cannon Despatch, were brought to bear on that point, to which the Poles 1831; Ann. could not oppose more than half the number, the Russians 490; Rom. were unable to gain any decisive advantage.2 The Poles 282. fought with the most heroic resolution, and although, 2 Feb. 21, Hist. xiv. Solt. i, 280, towards the evening, after combating all day, they lost a |