XXVI. few hundred yards of ground, yet, when the firing ceased, CHAP. their ranks were unbroken, their courage unsubdued, and they had lost neither prisoners, cannon, nor standards in the fight. 1831. 50. Praga. and 25. To have maintained so obstinate a conflict with forces. so superior was not less honourable to the Polish arms Battle of than advantageous to their cause; but the Russians Feb. 24 were numerous, ably led, and inured to victory; and as they had driven the enemy a short distance from the field of battle, they attributed to themselves, not without reason, the advantage. The resistance of the Poles, however, had been so obstinate that Diebitch did not venture to renew the offensive till he had called up his whole right wing, which again raised his forces to nearly 80,000 men. Radziwil, on his side, had also repaired his losses, though chiefly with new levies, little inured to discipline. In making the movement from the Russian right to its centre, where Diebitch was concentrating his forces, the Russian division Szachoffskoi was attacked and worsted by the Poles under Krukowieckski, but they nevertheless continued their march, and by nightfall were in line with Diebitch in front of the Polish army, which maintained its old position in front of PRAGA. There it was attacked on the following day by the Russians in the same position which it had occupied on the 20th, with this difference, that SKRZYNECKI with his division was in the centre, and the left, under Zimirski and Krukowieckski, were on the left, and occupied in 1Ann. Hist. strength a little wood which had been obstinately con- 491; Rom. tested in the preceding action, and became the theatre of 288. a still more murderous conflict in that which succeeded.1 xiv. 490, Solt. i. 287, and bloody nature of The battle began at daybreak, and continued with the 51. utmost obstinacy and various success the whole day. Desperate There was little generalship or manoeuvring on either side: like Waterloo in former years, it was a regular stand-up fight between two gallant nations; like Inkermann in after days, it was a stand-up fight rather than a battle the conflict. CHAP. of manœuvres. XXVI. 1831. The The principal efforts of both parties were directed to get possession of the little wood on the Polish left, and it was repeatedly carried and again lost during the strife. At length, after a bloody conflict of two hours' duration, it was carried by Diebitch, who succeeded in bringing eighty pieces of cannon to bear upon it, and fairly shelled the Poles out. Some of his aides-de-camp having come to Chlopicki, who commanded there, to ask for orders, he replied, "Go and ask Radziwil; for myself, I only seek death." He did not find it, but was soon after severely wounded, and carried off the field of battle in an insensible state. General Zimirski, who tried to regain the wood, soon after fell, desperately wounded; and Szachoffskoi, who had now effected his junction with the general-in-chief, succeeded in establishing himself in it in a durable manner. Polish army, disheartened by the loss of its chiefs, now fell back on all sides, and took post under the cannon of Praga, still, however, maintaining an undaunted front, and without sustaining any loss in prisoners or cannon. Diebitch endeavoured to convert the retreat into a rout by a vigorous attack of cuirassiers in the centre, but it led to a signal disaster. The Russian horse, by a headlong charge, succeeded in forcing their way through the Polish centre; but, pursuing their advantage, they came within the range of the batteries of Praga, which opened a tremendous fire upon them, and while recoiling in disorder from the terrific cannonade, they were charged in flank by a brigade of Polish cavalry under General Kicki, and almost totally destroyed. The Polish generals, 1 Rom. Solt. however, fearful of having the bridge of boats in their Ann. Hist. rear cut off by the swelling of the Vistula, retreated at night into Warsaw, leaving Praga occupied by a strong rearguard.1 i. 289, 291; xiv. 490, 491. Such were the desperate battles of Grochow and Praga, which signalised the commencement of this terrible strife; and though they terminated, upon the whole, XXVI. to the disadvantage of the Poles, since they were driven CHAP. back into Warsaw, yet they conferred more honour on the vanquished than the victors, and presaged a frightful 52. 1831. these bat contest before the conflict could be terminated. The loss Results of on the opposite sides was nearly equal. The Poles were tles. weakened by eight thousand men, the Russians by ten thousand. Few prisoners, and no guns or colours, were taken on either side, which, considering the prolonged and obstinate nature of the battles, sufficiently evinced the courage and resolution which had been displayed on both sides. The Poles might with reason attribute to themselves, upon the whole, the advantage, since, though driven from the open country, their army in unbroken strength still held the capital; the Vistula had not been passed at any point; Warsaw was not even invested; the tête-depont of Praga was still in their hands, which enabled them to debouch at pleasure on the right bank, and the first effort of a hundred thousand Russians had failed in crushing less than half that number of their opponents. On the other hand, though the Poles had inflicted a loss on their adversaries greater than they themselves had Ann. Reg. sustained, their own loss was the more sensibly felt, from 491; Rom. the inferior strength of their army, and less consider- 288. able resources from which it might be recruited.1 1 xiv. 490. Solt. i. 287, success of on the While these dreadful battles were signalising the com- 53. mencement of the war on the Russian right and centre, a Splendid most brilliant success attended the opening of the cam- Dwernicki paign on the Polish right. There Dwernicki, with not Polish more than two thousand eight hundred foot and horse, right. and six guns, was left to make head against Geismar, who had nine thousand three hundred horse and forty-eight pieces of horse-artillery under his orders. It seemed scarcely possible for the weaker party, with such a disproportion, to avoid destruction; nevertheless, such was the talent of the Polish general, and the heroism of his followers, that he achieved the most brilliant success. Geismar's great superiority of force induced him to form XXVI. 1831. CHAP. the design of surrounding his opponent, and with this view he arranged his troops into two columns-the first of which, consisting of 4480 horse and twenty-four guns, met Dwernicki on the 13th February, who had crossed the Vistula on the ice near Sieroczyn. The second column, which was intended to attack the Poles in flank and rear, was sent round by a circuit, at such a distance as to be unable to lend aid to the first in a sudden fight; but as each column was of greater strength than the whole Poles, it was thought there was no danger in making the division. But Geismar little knew the quality of the troops with whom he had to deal; and Dwernicki, with the eye of a real general, instantly resolved to assume the offensive, and attack the one division before the other came up. Forming his horse, which consisted only of nine squadrons, about one thousand strong, into two columns, he charged Geismar's men with the utmost vigour, who awaited the attack with their twenty-four guns advantageously placed in battery. Such was the vigour of the Polish horse, whose exploits rivalled those of the Paladins of former days, that both attacks proved entirely successful. In a few minutes the first column routed the cavalry opposed to it, and took three guns; while the second, disregarding the showers of grape which fell upon them, threw themselves on the guns, captured eight, and, passing through them, charged twelve Russian squadrons drawn up behind, with such impetuosity that they were totally routed, and their commander slain by a sabrestroke from Lieut. Dunin, one of Dwernicki's aides-decamp. Upon this the whole Russian division took to flight, leaving in the hands of the Poles eleven guns and i. 295, 300. three hundred and eighty prisoners, taken in fair fight, besides four hundred killed and wounded.1 1 Rom. Solt. It is a curious circumstance, indicative of the lasting impress which nature has put upon all the families of the European race compared with the Asiatic, that these battles of Grochow and Sieroczyn bear the closest resem XXVI. 1831. 54. Grochow zyn with klava. blance to those of Inkermann and Balaklava in after CHAP. times. The Poles resisted the enormous masses of the Russians with the same intrepidity and firmness, in front of Praga, that the English did their assailants, five times Parallel of their own number, in front of Sebastopol; and if a gallant and Sierocallied force had come up at the close of the day, to ren- Inkermann der the balance somewhat more equal, the result would and Balahave been the same on both occasions. The Polish squadrons threw themselves on the Muscovite artillery with the same intrepidity as the English light horse, in after days, on the shores of the Crimea; and, like them, after passing through the guns, charged and routed the enemy's cavalry, three times more numerous than their own, in rear. Dwernicki's leading was the prototype of that of Lord Cardigan. These facts lead to a conclusion of great and lasting importance for the interests of civilisation and freedom in future times. This is, that the forces of Europe, animated by the spirit of liberty and the energy of intelligence, are still as superior to the hosts of Asia as they were in the days of Marathon and Platea; and that the ceaseless encroachments and menacing strength of Russia is not owing to any advantage which the Asiatics possess in courage over the Europeans, but to the greater foresight of its government, and unity of purpose in its inhabitants, qualities in which the people of the West, unfortunately, are often as deficient as they are superior in vigour and knowledge. 55. of Dwer the left This brilliant success elevated the Poles as much as it depressed the Russians, and it would have been attended Operations with the most important consequences had the govern- nicki on ment of Warsaw possessed any reserve force to support bank of the it. But as Radziwil's army had been obliged to seek Vistula. shelter behind the cannon of Praga, it was justly deemed too hazardous to allow Dwernicki, with his little band of heroes, to maintain an isolated contest with the immense forces of the Muscovites on the right bank of the Vistula. Add to this, the Polish government were alarmed by the |