XXVI. 1831. covite legions were upon them, the Poles had every chance CHAP. of success; but the risk was very great that they would be cut to pieces before they were either disciplined or equipped as real soldiers. Everything depended, in the first instance, on the vigour and secresy of Skrzynecki's blows in the centre, which were to be struck with not more than 25,000 combatants against not less than Rom. Solt. 70,000; and this great inequality could be overcome Ann. Hist. only by the skilful use of a central position, and superior 494. rapidity of concentration. 1 ii. 32, 33; xiv. 493, necki's the centre. Skrzynecki's measures were taken with equal ability 61. and secresy. At midnight, on the 30th March, he set skrzyout from Warsaw at the head of the divisions Rybinski, brilliant Malachowski, and Gielgud, and in the utmost silence success in crossed the bridge of the Vistula, which, with the roads March 31. for a little distance beyond it, had been laid with straw. With such skill was the movement conducted, that the Russians were in total ignorance of what was going forward, and the Polish advanced guard, favoured by a thick fog, was upon them before they were aware that it had crossed the Vistula. The surprise was complete, the success beyond all hopes great. Geismar's corps, which was the first to be reached, was suddenly assailed, when the men were for the most part asleep, and almost entirely destroyed. The few that escaped endeavoured to rally on the corps of Rosen, which was in battle array at Dembewielkie, sixteen miles from Warsaw. The position of the Russians was strong, the left being covered by the marshy banks of a stream which flows into the Vistula, their centre protected by thick brushwood, and their right by a wood. The approach to the position was rendered extremely difficult by the spongy nature 45. of the ground, which was all but impassable for artillery.2 Ann. Hist. 495; Rom. xiv. 494, Solt. ii. 40, of the Rus Vain, however, were all these advantages of position 62. against the heroic valour of the Poles. Part of Mala- Total defeat chowski's division advanced on the right of the chaussée, supported by Skarzynski's horse; while Gielgud's divi sians. March 31. XXVI. 1831. the left. CHAP. sion, and the remainder of Malachowski's, operated on The Russians at first made a stout resistance; the fire, especially of artillery, was soon extremely warm along the whole line; and the contest was prolonged the more that the extreme wetness of the ground almost everywhere prevented the Polish cavalry from charging. The battle continued, with various success, and great loss on both sides, till the evening; but at seven o'clock a brigade of Skarzynski's horse, by a vigorous charge, carried the village of Dembe, broke the enemy's centre, and took nine pieces of cannon. Upon this the whole of Rosen's corps took to flight, and nothing but the darkness of the night, and the extreme exhaustion of the Polish troops, who had marched and fought since the preceding midnight, saved any part of them from destruction. As it was, the Poles took six thousand prisoners, besides inflicting an equal loss in killed and wounded on the enemy, who dispersed in all directions, no longer preserving even the appearance of an army. Such of them as could be reached by the Polish horse surrendered without resistance; the peasants brought in great numbers who were straggling in the woods; and so great was the consternation of the Muscovites, that next morning the extraordinary spectacle was exhibited of two peasants, without ii. 45, 46; arms, bringing to the Polish headquarters twelve Russian soldiers, whom they allowed to carry their muskets, to avoid the trouble of taking them from them! 1 1 Rom. Solt. Ann. Hist. xiv. 494. 63. Poles in the pursuit. April 1. The extreme fatigue of the troops prevented Skrzynecki Great sue from continuing the pursuit far on the 31st; but at daycess of the break on the 1st April it was resumed by Lubienski, with his brigade of cavalry, who, having now got on the highway, pushed on with the utmost vigour, and rendered it totally impossible for the Russians to rally at any point. At the head of his lancers he passed in full trot through the towns of Minsk and Kaluckzyn, amidst the loud cheers of the inhabitants, and, without ever drawing bridle, pushed on above twenty miles, collecting prisoners XXVI. 1831. at every step. So great was the consternation of the CHAP. Russians, that whole battalions threw down their arms, and surrendered at the sight of the Polish advanced squadron. Before he halted for the night he had made six thousand additional prisoners, which was the more important as the greater part of them were Lithuanians, and four thousand of them entered the Polish ranks. Altogether the Poles in these two days made twelve thousand prisoners, besides six thousand of the enemy killed or wounded, and twelve guns taken,-a victory about as great as that which, thirty years before, had broken the strength of Austria in the forest of Hohenlinden.1 1 Rom. Solt. ii. 46, 47; xiv. 494. Ann. Hist. 64. which now Skrzy After this terrible disaster, Rosen retired with the few remains of his troops to Siedlece, and Skrzynecki advanced chances his headquarters to Kaluckzyn, where he was joined two awaited days after by General Milberg with seven thousand men, neck which much more than repaired the losses of the preceding actions. A great career now awaited the Polish general, and he was strongly urged by his generals to adopt it. This was, to draw together all his disposable troops, which would have amounted to full forty thousand men, and attack the enemy in Lublin; and, after taking it, advance and assail the rear of the corps commanded by Diebitch in person, which, shut in between the Wieprz, the Vistula, and the Polish army, would have been in the most perilous situation. A council of war was held on the subject. "I have completely beaten," said Skrzynecki, a part of the Russian army; I have got the command of the centre of operations, and it is in my power either to push forward my left, pass the Bug at Nur, and attack the Russian guard which is opposed to it; or turn to my right, and take Diebitch in flank, who has not had time to collect the troops cantoned between the Vistula and the Wieprz. But the roads are impracticable for artillery; my information on that subject is positive; I am chained to the great road of Siedlece; I cannot profit by my ii. 39, 40. victory." 2 66 2 Rom. Solt. CHAP. 1831. 65. Prondzyn ski and others, which is ed. The other generals did not estimate so strongly the difficulties of an immediate advance either to the right or left. "We cannot," said Prondzynski, "it is true, carry Opinion of with us our guns, but the Russians are in the same situation ; they have the same difficulties to contend with that we have. If we cannot drag forward our cannon, they not adopt cannot take theirs away, or bring them up to the front; our relative position is unchanged: let us then instantly advance; let us take advantage of the consternation into which the enemy has been thrown. We shall meet them with the ascendant of victory, and fortune will crown our efforts." Had Skrzynecki been supported by the resources of the French Republic, or even had the despotic authority which Napoleon wielded in Italy, he would probably have followed this bold advice, and possibly success as decisive might have attended his efforts as had done those of that great commander in Lombardy in 1796. But he had no reserves behind him; his army was the last hope of Poland; a single reverse might at once prove fatal; and Skrzynecki with reason feared that, if he pushed further forward on the great road without having his flank secured, Diebitch would collect his troops and cut off his communication with Warsaw by occupying Minsk or Dembe in his rear. Roman Soltyk strongly urged an immediate advance to Siedlece, where the Russian grand park of artillery was placed, and which would fall an easy prey, as it was not defended by more than ten thousand men; adding that this would be sure to draw on Diebitch, and expose him to a flank attack while striving to cut off the Polish communications. But this step was deemed by Skrzynecki too hazardous, and without moving further forward, or advancing to Siedlece, he remained inactive on the great road, though Uminski ii. 49, 51. with his division of cavalry joined him in the night between the 3d and 4th.1 1 Rom. Solt. At length having drawn together every disposable XXVI. 1831. 66. the Poles at April 10. sabre and bayonet, and adequately secured his rear, CHAP. Skrzynecki determined on a forward movement, and for this purpose advanced with twenty-five thousand of his best troops against Rosen, who was in position with an Victory of equal force on the Kostrzyn, covering the approach to Iganie. Siedlece. The Polish plan of attack, which was very ably combined, was as follows: Prondzynski was to march by Jerusalem and Wodyrice with nine thousand men, so as to turn Rosen's left, while Skrzynecki himself with eleven thousand assailed him by the high-road in front, and Chrzanowski was to advance with five thousand men to Stoczek, so as to threaten Diebitch in person, and lead him to suppose the attack was to be directed against him, so as to prevent him from sending succours to his menaced lieutenant. If these attacks succeeded, Rosen would be thrown back on the Livrie, a river flowing through marshy beds, and overwhelmed at the crossing of the bridge of Iganie. Had these plans been carried out as proposed, beyond all doubt Rosen's corps would have been totally destroyed. But by one of those chances so common in war, he had withdrawn the bulk of his forces from their position on the Kostrzyn before the attack was made, and half of them had defiled in retreat over the bridge of Iganie before Prondzynski was upon them. That general, too, had only six thousand men in hand when he commenced the attack on fifteen thousand, and Skrzynecki was not yet come up. Thus his position was critical, but such was the valour of the Poles that they overcame all opposition. Putting themselves at the head of their troops, the Polish chiefs advanced courageously against the enemy, of nearly double their strength, with twenty-four guns placed in battery. So disheartened were the Russians by their previous defeats that they made very little resistance, but fled tumultuously to the bridge, abandoning half of their guns and fifteen hundred prisoners to the victorious Poles. |