XXVI. 1831. good their passage, however, to Zamosc, which they CHAP. reached on the 14th, from whence Chrzanowski made various excursions into Volhynia, which had no decisive result, as the defeat of Dwernicki had extinguished all the hopes of the insurgents in that quarter. May 14. 73. Skrzynecki Russian right. While these operations were taking place on the right, Skrzynecki was engaged in a movement ably conceived, March of and which was likely to be attended with the most im- against the portant results. His object was to force back the Russian right, the headquarters of which were at Ostrolenka, and thereby open the communication with Lithuania, where the insurrection was making considerable progress, and which he intended to support by an entire Polish division, eight thousand strong, under Gielgud. This project was not without its dangers, as it left Warsaw nearly uncovered; but the prospect of rousing the great strength of Lithuania for the national cause, and the paramount necessity of moving the seat of war out of the Polish territory, which was well-nigh exhausted, rendered it advisable to run the risk. In effect, though with severe loss to the Poles, it in the main succeeded. The Polish army, forty-six thousand strong, with one hundred guns, broke up on the 12th May from their position in front May 12. of Kostrzyn, and advanced against the Russian Guards, who were cantoned in and around OSTROLENKA, hoping to overwhelm them before the remainder of Diebitch's corps could come up to their relief. Uminski, with six thousand men, was left to make head against Diebitch, who, little suspecting what was going on on his right, advanced with twenty-four thousand men against him, expecting to encounter the bulk of Skrzynecki's army. Finding that the Guards were unconscious of his approach, Skrzynecki, after reaching Sicrosk, which he did on the 16th, formed his troops into three corps of attack, May 16. which was fixed for the following day. The Russians, however, though they embraced the élite of the Guards, did not venture to await the attack even in the intrench XXVI. 1831. May 21. CHAP. ments they had raised around Ostrolenka, and retired towards Bialystok, closely followed by Skrzynecki, who on the 21st attacked and defeated their rear-guard with great slaughter at Tykoczyn, which fell into his hands. 1 Ann. Hist. By this advance the Russian right was so far driven back 498; Rom. that the road to Lithuania was thrown open, and Chlapowski, with a Polish division four thousand strong, was immediately pushed forward into that province.1 xiv. 497, Solt. ii. 167, 178. 74. Diebitch marches against the Polish rear. 2 Ante, c. xv. § 126. May 21. So far great success had attended this bold and wellconceived movement of Skrzynecki, and in its main object that of opening up a communication with, and throwing succours into Lithuania-it may be said it had answered every expectation. But the difficulty was for the Polish army to get back and regain its communications with Warsaw after having gained this advantage. Diebitch resolved to concentrate his forces and attack them, as he had done the Turks at Kouleftcha, when striving to regain their stronghold in Schumla two years before.2 With this view, having drawn together all his disposable troops, amounting to sixty-five thousand men, he marched against Skrzynecki, who, after the detachments he had made, could not collect above forty thousand. Fearful of being assailed in rear by this superior force, the Polish general rapidly retired, crossed the Narew, and occupied Ostrolenka with part of his forces. But the advance of Diebitch had been so swift that it had in a manner cut the Polish army in two. The divisions of Gielgud and Lubienski were separated from the remainder of the army in Ostrolenka. Having, by a nightmarch between the 25th and 26th, come close up to the two last Polish divisions, who were by no means aware of his approach, he commenced a vigorous attack on Lubienski's division with forces four times his own.3 3 Rom. Solt. Only two bridges were in the hands of the Poles to Ann. Hist. effect their retreat over the Narew, and if Diebitch's ii. 181, 187; xiv. 498, 499. attack had been as vigorous as his night-march had been rapid, Lubienski's division would have been totally de XXVI. stroyed. But so completely had the Polish victories dis- CHAP. concerted the Russian commanders, that they attacked with so little vigour as gave Pac time to issue from Ostrolenka, recross the Narew, and advance to his support. 1831. 75. Ostrolenka. This brought on a general battle. Lubienski, seeing his communications so seriously threatened, and that Battle of certain destruction awaited him if his retreat were turned May 26. into a rout, made the most vigorous efforts to keep his ground. He was long seconded by the steady valour of his troops, but at length they were overwhelmed by numbers and driven back in disorder to the bridges over the Narew, which the Russians passed pêle-mêle with the last of the fugitives. The bulk of Lubienski's men got safely over, and drew up in two lines in good order on the left bank of the river. The Russians, however, crossed rapidly over, and supported the passage by two powerful batteries, one of thirty-four and another of thirty-six guns, on the right bank of the stream, and which thundered with terrible effect on the Polish lines on the opposite side. The moment was to the last degree critical; for if the Russians succeeded in establishing themselves in Ostrolenka, the Polish army was cut in two, and Gielgud's division, which was still on the right bank, in all probability would be destroyed. The surprise was complete. Skrzynecki only reckoned on a warm affair of the rearguard when crossing the river, and now he had the bulk of the Russian army upon his 499. hands.1 1 Rom. Solt. Ann. Hist. ii. 181, 190; xiv. 498, the Poles. Though taken unawares in this manner, the Polish 76. general did all that skill and courage could effect to repair Repulse of the check which had been sustained. Both parties brought up fresh forces every minute, and the field of battle, which was extremely narrow, was speedily crowded with combatants; the Poles straining every nerve to drive back the Russians to the left bank, the Russians to make good the footing they had got on the right. The Polish artillery consisted only of twelve pieces, which were quickly VOL. IV. 2 U CHAP. dismounted and silenced; while dense masses of Russians, 1831. XXVI. soon wholly unopposed by artillery, crowded down to the water's edge. In despair, Langerman made a gallant charge with the bayonet, which checked the enemy, and two battalions laid down their arms; but the Poles were unable to collect the prisoners for want of cavalry, and they all escaped. Skrzynecki, who arrived on the field. of battle at eleven o'clock, made the most incessant efforts to prevent the enemy from extending themselves on the right. Wherever danger was greatest he was to be seen, animating the troops by his voice and example; his clothes were pierced with balls, and nearly all his aidesde-camp were killed or wounded. The Polish artillery of Col. Bern, which was at last brought up, replied with effect to the enemy's batteries, and made deep chasms in his ranks. Towards evening the fire slackened on both sides, 1 Rom. Solt. Owing to want of ammunition and the fatigue of the comAnn. Hist. batants; and at nightfall the Russians withdrew all their forces to the left bank of the river, leaving only detachments to guard the têtes-de-pont on the right.1 ji. 189, 193; xiv. 498, 499. 77. In this terrible battle, in which both parties displayed Its results. the most heroic valour, the Poles lost seven thousand men killed and wounded, including Generals Kicki and Kaminsky, who fell gloriously on the field. The Russian loss was not less than ten thousand men, owing to the dense masses in which they fought, and the unerring precision with which the Polish balls fell on their crowded ranks. Yet, although their loss was considerably greater than that of their opponents, and the Russians withdrew from the most, obstinately contested part of the field, the battle was attended, to the Poles, with the consequences of the most serious defeat. Seven thousand men to them was a much greater loss than ten thousand to the Russians; and they found themselves entirely cut off from the division of General Gielgud, eight thousand strong, which was lost to the grand army, and abandoned to a doubtful fate in the forests of Lithuania. So strongly XXVI. 1831. did these circumstances present themselves to the minds CHAP. of the generals, who assembled in a council of war next day, that, with the exception of Skrzynecki, who resolutely maintained they should keep their ground, they all counselled a retreat. The opinion of the majority prevailed, and the army retired leisurely by Pultusk to Praga, without being disquieted in their retreat. But they were permanently severed from the division of Gielgud, who possibly might, by a prolonged stay at Ostro- ii. 192, 193; lenka, have been enabled, by a circuitous march, to rejoin xiv. 499. the army. 1 Rom. Solt. Ann. Hist. Diebitch Grand-duke Diebitch did not long enjoy the gleam of success 78. which closed his long and honourable career. He had Death of been severely chagrined at the previous disasters which and the his troops had undergone, and which had excited great Constanirritation in the breast of the Emperor, who had resolved tine. on his dismissal. The knowledge of this preyed upon. his mind, and he sought a momentary relief in the immoderate use of ardent spirits, to which he was unhappily at all times too much addicted. The consequence was, that he became predisposed to the cholera, which at that time was raging in both armies. He died of that pestilence suddenly at Pultusk on the 10th June, June 10. and this was followed a few weeks afterwards by the June 27. death of the Grand-duke Constantine, who expired at Witepsk, in the arms of his beloved wife, for whom he had sacrificed the throne of Russia. The sudden death, at the same time, of the two men who had borne the most prominent parts in the war in Poland, naturally led to a suspicion of poison or suicide; but there appears nothing to justify this surmise, and the termination of the lives of both is sufficiently accounted for by the pestilence Biog which at that time prevailed with so much violence 487; Ann. in Poland, and the disasters which, by their depressing 500. influence, had so much predisposed both to receive it.2 After the battle of Ostrolenka, the two principal armies remained nearly a month in a state of inaction. 2 Univ. lxii. Hist. xiv. |