: This object, it is imagined, will be attained, if the Colonies acknowledge the fame King, which involves the power of peace and war, and the rights of mutual naturalization and succession, and this point is at the same time consistent, with the most ample ideas, of a free constitution in each of the Colonies, and even of a Congress, in the nature of a general Parliament, to take care of the general interests of the whole. It is perfectly consistent too, with the idea, of an exclusive power in the Colony Assemblies, and Congress, to impose taxes in that country, and of an exclusive power, to vote the number of troops to be kept up in their respective provinces, fimilar to the control of the British Parliament, upon the Crown, with re. spect to troops in Great Britain; itill more is it consistent, with the idea of their enjoying a trade, almost free from restriction, not only to Great Britain, but to all parts of the world.

• It is difficult to imagine, what any reasonable man in the Colonjes can wih for more; and if Great Britain were willing, as I hope she would be, to give, befides, a share in the general govern. ment of the Empire to these Colonies, by admitting representatives from their respective Assemblies, to a seat in the British House of Commons *, and a vote in all questions (except as to taxes imposed here) it would seem to place the Colonies in the happiest situation, that has ever fallen to the lot of any body of people, since the beginning of time. They would, I apprehend, derive every posible ad. vantage from such a connection, without any one disadvantage which it is poflible to conceive.

• The whole force of Great Britain, and of its navy, would serve to them as a protection and support. The great expence of the civil government here, would fall entirely upon us, and they would be only obliged to defray the very moderate expence, of their own internal governments. Their trade woold not only be free to this country, but would have a natural preference here, to that of other nations ; the large capitals of the merchants of this country, would continue to support and extend their agriculture and improvements of every kind; and, free from the risk of internal discords, or external annoyance, they would enjoy every privilege, pre-eminence, and advantage of British subjects.

On the other hand, every power of injury, or of oppression, from hence, would be at an end. They would not trust to our virtue or good faith; for, by having the exclusive power of voting and levying their own money, and of regulating the number of their troops, the future government of America would be carried on by the consent of the people alone, and by the voice of the representatives chosen by them. The power of voting their own money, and of regulating their military force, would involve a redress of every other possible grievance : it is precisely the control, which the British Parliament has in this country, over the Crown, and for which our ancestors contended successfully, in the reign of Charles the First. The removal of custom house officers named by the Crown, the secu.

•• This point, concerning representation here, is of a delicate nature; but under proper qualifications, I apprehend it would be advantageous to both countries.

rity of charters, the control over judges and governors, which they fo much desired ; in short, every point from which the least jealousy has ever arisen, would naturally follow; nor would the Americans have to dread their being involved in the expence of our wars, fince it would be in their own power, to refuse to contribute to that expence.

• What then would the Colonies lose by giving up their claim of independency. They would give up the power, indeed, of sending Ambassadors to the court of France, to contrive there, the means of humbling and weakening, the mother country, and of exalting the power, of the common enemy of Europe. But they would certainly be exposed, to the risk of having their Affemblies managed, by the intrigues and money of that artful people, and of having the manners of that country, imperceptibly introduced amongst them. They would be exposed, too, to those dissentions and civil wars, which their new, and, I think, very defe&tive constitutions of government, in an extensive continent, would certainly introduce; and they would foon feel, the enormous expence, which by degrees would be entailed upon them, by their new fituation.

“ The body of the people in that country, were made to believe, that, by their new constitutions, the power would be placed in their hands; because every person, it was said, in any trust or authority, was to be chosen, directly or indirectly, by them: but they have already seen, that by laws made by their own representatives, the right of voting can be altered and restrained, so as to model the elections, according to the will of their prefent Rulers; and when to this infringement of their conftitutions, the effects of French money, shall come to be added, the power of the people, will soon be found to be nothing but a phantom.'

If danger to liberty were still to be apprehended by America, Mr. Pulteney confesses that it would admic of an argument, whether the dangerous connection with France ought not to be risqued, as an option between two evils. But it would be as reasonable, he fays, for Scotland or Ireland, to prefer a fimilar connection with France, as it would now be for America. The renouncing Great Britain, therefore, upon the terms now proposed, appears to him, to be the renouncing of that, which ought to be, to America, the object of her most earnest wishes. • It is, he says, to renounce their birthright for a mere phantom, and to throw away the most precious jewel, to grasp with eagerness the most worthless stone.

He goes on to point out the consequences of giving way to the claims of the Congress; consequences, which, if his opinion is well founded, must make every friend to Britain tremble. Little doubt, therefore, he thinks, can remain, that the object of compelling the difaffected part of the Thirteen Colonies to embrace that fair and honourable connection, which is now held out to them, is not only desirable, but essentially necessary, to our own existence, as an independent people. Persons of all ranks, he observes, are interested in this, and however the heat


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of party, and former opinions, may for a time deceive a part of this country, he is convinced, that when they come to consider attentively the train of consequences, necessarily connected with this object, they will forget their animofity, and unite in the proper meafures, for preserving, from such imminent danger, the state to which they belong-GOD GRANT THEY MAY !

• That the object is attainable, continues Mr. Pulteney, I am also most fully convinced, but not unless the adminiltration of public affairs, is directed, by men of fortitude and exertion, equal to the great occasion, by men, who like Lord Chatham, are capable of selecting, and resolute in employing, the most proper officers by sea and land, by men, who are not to be depressed or elated, by every little change of fortune; whose minds are not only capable of taking in the whole views of this great object, and of deciding with wisdom and dispatch upon every occurrence, but of prosecuting with vigor, perseverance, and industry, such plans, as, after full information, are found to be most fit, and with such frugality and veconomy of the public money, as may enable us to perfilt in the contest, as long as shall be necessary.

• Till the late offers of conciliation were made to America, a great part of this kingdom, were averse to the war. The ministers them., felves carried it on with languor and reluctance, and the officers of our fleets and armies, performed their duty, without that ardent zeal, which can alone insure success. The generous temper of an English, man, could not be induced, to act with full vigour, in support of pretenfions, which certainly would have tended, to reduce our fel. low-subjects, to a state unworthy of freemen.-On the other hand, America was in general united, and few were our friends there, at the bottom of their hearts. The contest is now entirely changed, The offers of Great Britain have been such, as became a brave and generous nation, and have left nothing, in point of freedom, to be wished for, by our fellow-subjects. The rejection of these offers by the Congress, has dispelled every doubt, in the minds of impartial men, with respect to the juliice of the war; and the unnatural object, of reducing the power of Great Britain, avowed in the treaty, made by the ariful American deputies, with the government of France, has roused the indignation of every generous Briton ; at the same time, that the great body of the people in America, have now seen, the true object of those, who had till then, profesed the freedom of America, as the sole motive of their conduct. It now appears, that, in fact, they had another and more favourite motive, namely, their private ambition. The severities they have of late been obliged to exercise, upon the people of America, are evident proofs, that now they govern by a faction, and not with the consent of the body of the people, who plainly fee, that their sufferings are disre. garded, whilst they serve as the means of exalting and supporting in authority, a few men, who, by artful pretences, have raised themselves into power and consequence.

In considering this question therefore, how far, the object is attainable, we are not to suppofe, that we have now to contend, with


the united power of America, but only with a part of that people ; a part indeed, who are in possession of the executive power, and have arms in their hands, but who are not supported, by the majority of the people, either with respect to property or numbers.

• France, is no doubt to be added to the scale against us; but I do not conceive it pollible, that either Holland or Spain, are to be numbered in this conteft amongst our enemies; because, if it is pro. posed on our part, to remove, as I think we ought, almost every obstruction to the American trade, with the rest of the world, neither of these powers, can have any possible motive of interest, for fupporting American independence, but directly the contrary, fince it is evidently against the interest of both these powers, to add America to the scale of France.

• Neither can I suppose, that, in the present state of the contest, which certainly is, whether America shall be thrown into the scale of the most ambitious power in Europe, we can want alliances. At all events, if Spain should take part with France, we could not fail, in such a case, to derive the most effectual assistance, from those maritime powers in the North, whose evident interest it would be, to prevent the balance of naval power, from preponderating in favour of France and Spain.

• If the object be worth coatending for, and can hardly be purchased at too high a price; if it be intimately connected with our existence, as an independent nation; and if it be attainable, not. withstanding all that has hitherto befallen us, the next question is, with respect to the means to be employed.

• I will not take upon me, to encer into an examination, of the proper military operations, either by sea or land, which will require to be discussed by an abler hand; all that I shall say upon that subject is, that, without the most unprejudiced and unremitting attention, in the choice of our commanders in chief by sea and land, and without the most determined firmness, to enquire into, and to punish, misconduct of every kind, accompanied with a noble eagerness to reward diftinguished merit, it will be in vain, after so long a peace, to expect those animated exertions, which, in fora mer times, have so often distinguished the British nation.

.. But fuppofing, every proper measure to be adopted, both in the civil and military line, as well as with respect to foreign alliances, another most interesting and important question remains: Whether the resources of this nation, are still fufficient, to support a war against America, united with France and Spain ? and whether there is any probability, of raising the annual supplies, for the length of time that may become neceffary? That it will not be sufficient to raise these fupplies for a year or two, is but too evident; we must be prepared to hold out for many years, and must decidedly take our arrangements upon that fooring, otherwise we may expect, that our enemies will continue to perfevere in the contest, from the flattering hope, of our being soon exhausted.'

After some senlible and obvious remarks upon the subject of our finances, and the inconveniences of having recoarse to money-lenders, to support the public expences, Mr. Pulteney tells us, 'that it becomes the spirit of a free country, in an hour K


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of imminent danger, to lay aside, for a time, the pradlice of borrowing, and to call upon the individuals of the kingdom, for a direct aid; equal to the public occasions. This aid, he thinks, may be given, by every person's paying a certain rate or portion of his real capital or income, and if the money were raised in this manner, it would fall much lighter, he says, than in the mode of borrowing.

In order to judge whether it is practicable to raise, in time of war, the necessary supplies within the year, he endeavours to form some calculation of the national wealth, and mentions one or two modes by which this computation may be made. He then says, that li per cent. of every man's capital, to be paido by instalments, in the course of two years, would be fully adequate to the purpose of supporting, with the ordinary supplies, a vigorous war of two years at least.

But for what he says, in support of his opinion upon this.
fubject, we must refer our Readers to the Considerations at large,
and fhall only observe that, though his plan will generally be
looked upon as chimerical, yet if it could be carried into exe-
cution, it would, in all probability, have a decisive effect on
our national affairs, and make this country the object of admi-
ration to every European power.--BUT ALAS!
ART. VIII. ISAIAH. A new Translation; with a Preliminary Dis-

fertation, and Notes critical, philological, and explanatory. By
Robert Lowth, D.D. F. R. ss. Lond. and Goetting Lord
Bishop of London. 460. 18 s. Boards. Dodsley, &c. 1778.
BERHAPS there never was a work, of so critical a nature,

and which fo peculiarly relates to biblical and hebraical. literature, that hath excited a greater expectation than the prefent performance. This hath been owing to the high and just reputation of the Author, from whose genius, taste, and learning, the Public had every thing to hope for, on the subject he had undertaken. But those would be the most pleased with the Bishop of London's having chosen the Book of Isaiah for the object of his illustration, who were best acquainted with his Lordship’s lectures on the facred poetry of the Hebrews. We speak from a very particular study of that work, when we give it as our opinion, that, from the elegance of its composition, the ingenuity and justness of its remarks, the accuracy and beauty of its translations, and the new light it throws on the poetical writings of the Jews, and on many important parts of the Old Testament, it is the first critical production of the age. Though it hath been much read, it has, nevertheless, not been fo universally attended to, as it deserves. Even some good claßical scholars have been deterred from studying it, from an apprehenfion that they could not reap the benefits of it, unless


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