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decent, liberal, and candid spirit which becomes the fincere lover of his country. For furely the prefent critical fituation of Britain calls loudly for the exertion of every virtue, and every useful talent, and renders unanimity, vigour, firmness, and wifdom in our public measures, abfolutely neceflary to fave our country from those dangers which threaten it on every fide.

Mr. Pulteney fets out with telling us, that the great load of our public debt has always appeared to him a millstone, which, fooner or later, would endanger almoft the existence of this kingdom; that he thought so at the last peace, and faw with indignation the alarming addition that was then made, to our ordinary expences, commonly called our peace eftablishment: that he has great reason to speak confidently, when he fays, that the enormous amount of our national debt, has been one of the chief causes of the American refiftance; and has, above all other things, encouraged France to engage in the prefent conteft; that it has not only encouraged our enemies, and depreffed our own minds, but that the taxes upon many of the neceffaries of life, which it has occafioned, have cramped the induftry of our people, and thereby diminished our power, as well as our importance.

He goes on to tell us, that as the congrefs is understood to have entered into a treaty, offensive and defenfive, with our natural enemy, no option feems now to be left us, but either to proceed with the utmoft vigour, in profecuting the war, or to submit not only to the claim of American independance, but to fuch further conditions of peace, as France and the Congrefs may think proper to impofe: for it is not to be imagined, he fays, that France, if we were ready to yield, would demand nothing for herself; or that the Congress would, in such a cafe, either difunite themselves from France, or be contented with the fimple acknowledgement of independence:-Befides, it would be difhonourable, Mr. P. obferves, in the highest degree, on our parts, to defert, unconditionally, thofe friends in America, who, from a fenfe of duty and allegiance, have hitherto ftood firmly by us, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes.

In the prefent fituation of our affairs, thofe who are fufficiently detached from party-connections, and are influenced by no other motive, than that intereft, which all men have in the public profperity, are naturally led to confider, whether the object we are now contending for, by the war, deferves to be purfued; and if it does, whether or not it be attainable, and by what means?

The object now, I apprehend, is, to preserve such a connection with the Colonies in North America, as to unite the force of the whole empire, in time of war, for the common fafety; fo that no one part may be thrown into the fcale of a foreign enemy, to the prejudice of the other part.

This object, it is imagined, will be attained, if the Colonies acknowledge the fame King, which involves the power of peace and war, and the rights of mutual naturalization and fucceffion; and this point is at the fame time confiftent, with the most ample ideas, of a free conftitution in each of the Colonies, and even of a Congrefs, in the nature of a general Parliament, to take care of the general interests of the whole. It is perfectly confiftent too, with the idea, of an exclufive power in the Colony Affemblies, and Congrefs, to impofe taxes in that country, and of an exclufive power, to vote the number of troops to be kept up in their respective provinces, fimilar to the control of the British Parliament, upon the Crown, with refpect to troops in Great Britain; ftill more is it confiftent, with the idea of their enjoying a trade, almoft free from reftriction, not only to Great Britain, but to all parts of the world.

It is difficult to imagine, what any reafonable man in the Colonies can wish for more; and if Great Britain were willing, as I hope fhe would be, to give, befides, a fhare in the general government of the Empire to thefe Colonies, by admitting reprefentatives from their refpective Affemblies, to a feat in the British House of Commons, and a vote in all questions (except as to taxes impofed here) it would feem to place the Colonies in the happiest situation, that has ever fallen to the lot of any body of people, fince the beginning of time. They would, I apprehend, derive every poffible advantage from fuch a connection, without any one difadvantage which it is poffible to conceive.

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The whole force of Great Britain, and of its navy, would ferve to them as a protection and fupport. The great expence of the civil government here, would fall entirely upon us, and they would be only obliged to defray the very moderate expence, of their own internal governments. Their trade would not only be free to this country, but would have a natural preference here, to that of other nations; the large capitals of the merchants of this country, would continue to fupport and extend their agriculture and improvements of every kind; and, free from the risk of internal difcords, or external annoyance, they would enjoy every privilege, pre-eminence, and advantage of British fubjects.

On the other hand, every power of injury, or of oppreffion, from hence, would be at an end. They would not truft to our virtue or good faith; for, by having the exclufive power of voting and levying their own money, and of regulating the number of their troops, the future government of America would be carried on by the confent of the people alone, and by the voice of the reprefentatives chosen by them. The power of voting their own money, and of regulating their military force, would involve a redrefs of every other poffible grievance: it is precifely the control, which the British Parliament has in this country, over the Crown, and for which our ancestors contended fuccefsfully, in the reign of Charles the First. The removal of custom house officers named by the Crown, the fecu

This point, concerning representation here, is of a delicate nature; but under proper qualifications, I apprehend it would be advantageous to both countries.

rity of charters, the control over judges and governors, which they fo much defired; in fhort, every point from which the leaft jealoufy has ever arifen, would naturally follow; nor would the Americans have to dread their being involved in the expence of our wars, fince it would be in their own power, to refuse to contribute to that expence.

• What then would the Colonies lofe by giving up their claim of independency? They would give up the power, indeed, of fending Ambassadors to the court of France, to contrive there, the means of humbling and weakening, the mother-country, and of exalting the power, of the common enemy of Europe. But they would certainly be expofed, to the risk of having their Affemblies managed, by the intrigues and money of that artful people, and of having the manners of that country, imperceptibly introduced amongst them. They would be expofed, too, to thofe diffentions and civil wars, which their new, and, I think, very defective conftitutions of government, in an extenfive continent, would certainly introduce; and they would foon feel, the enormous expence, which by degrees would be entailed upon them, by their new fituation.

The body of the people in that country, were made to believe, that, by their new conftitutions, the power would be placed in their hands; because every perfon, it was faid, in any truft or authority, was to be chofen, directly or indirectly, by them: but they have already feen, that by laws made by their own reprefentatives, the right of voting can be altered and reftrained, fo as to model the elections, according to the will of their prefent Rulers; and when to this infringement of their conftitutions, the effects of French money, fhall come to be added, the power of the people, will foon be found to be nothing but a phantom.'

If danger to liberty were ftill to be apprehended by America, Mr. Pulteney confefles that it would admit of an argument, whether the dangerous connection with France ought not to be rifqued, as an option between two evils. But it would be as reasonable, he fays, for Scotland or Ireland, to prefer a fimilar connection with France, as it would now be for America. The renouncing Great Britain, therefore, upon the terms now propofed, appears to him, to be the renouncing of that, which ought to be, to America, the object of her most earnest wifhes. It is, he fays, to renounce their birthright for a mere phantom, and to throw away the most precious jewel, to grafp with eagerness the moft worthlefs ftone."

He goes on to point out the confequences of giving way to the claims of the Congrefs; confequences, which, if his opinion is well founded, muft make every friend to Britain tremble. Little doubt, therefore, he thinks, can remain, that the object of compelling the difaffected part of the Thirteen Colonies to embrace that fair and honourable connection, which is now held out to them, is not only defirable, but effentially neceffary, to our own exiftence, as an independent people. Perfons of all ranks, he obferves, are interested in this, and however the heat

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of party, and former opinions, may for a time deceive a part of this country, he is convinced, that when they come to confider attentively the train of confequences, neceffarily connected with this object, they will forget their animofity, and unite in the proper meafures, for preferving, from fuch imminent danger, the ftate to which they belong-GOD GRANT THEY MAY!

That the object is attainable, continues Mr. Pulteney, I am alfo moft fully convinced; but not unless the administration of public affairs, is directed, by men of fortitude and exertion, equal to the great occafion, by men, who like Lord Chatham, are capable of felecting, and refolute in employing, the moft proper officers by fea and land, by men, who are not to be depreffed or elated, by every little change of fortune; whofe minds are not only capable of taking in the whole views of this great object, and of deciding with wisdom and dispatch upon every occurrence, but of profecuting with vigor, perfeverance, and industry, fuch plans, as, after full information, are found to be most fit, and with fuch frugality and economy of the public money, as may enable us to perfift in the conteft, as long as fhall be neceffary.

Till the late offers of conciliation were made to America, a great part of this kingdom, were averfe to the war. The minifters themfelves carried it on with languor and reluctance, and the officers of our fleets and armies, performed their duty, without that ardent zeal, which can alone infure fuccefs. The generous temper of an Englishman, could not be induced, to act with full vigour, in fupport of pretenfions, which certainly would have tended, to reduce our fellow-fubjects, to a ftate unworthy of freemen.-On the other hand, America was in general united, and few were our friends there, at the bottom of their hearts.-The conteft is now entirely changed. The offers of Great Britain have been fuch, as became a brave and generous nation, and have left nothing, in point of freedom, to be wished for, by our fellow-fubjects. The rejection of thefe offers by the Congrefs, has difpelled every doubt, in the minds of impartial men, with respect to the jullice of the war; and the unnatural object, of reducing the power of Great Britain, avowed in the treaty, made by the artful American deputies, with the government of France, has roufed the indignation of every generous Briton; at the fame time, that the great body of the people in America, have now feen, the true object of thofe, who had till then, profeffed the freedom of America, as the fole motive of their conduct. It now appears, that, in fact, they had another and more favourite motive, namely, their private ambition. The feverities they have of late been obliged to exercife, upon the people of America, are evident proofs, that now they govern by a faction, and not with the confent of the body of the people, who plainly fee, that their fufferings are difregarded, whilft they ferve as the means of exalting and fupporting in authority, a few men, who, by artful pretences, have raised themfelves into power and confequence.

In confidering this question therefore, how far, the object is attainable, we are not to fuppofe, that we have now to contend, with

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the united power of America, but only with a part of that people; a part indeed, who are in poffeffion of the executive power, and have arms in their hands, but who are not fupported, by the majority of the people, either with refpect to property or numbers.

France, is no doubt to be added to the scale against us; but I do not conceive it poffible, that either Holland or Spain, are to be numbered in this conteft amongst our enemies; because, if it is propofed on our part, to remove, as I think we ought, almost every obstruction to the American trade, with the rest of the world, neither of these powers, can have any poffible motive of intereft, for fupporting American independence, but directly the contrary, fince it is evidently against the interest of both these powers, to add America to the scale of France.

Neither can I fuppofe, that, in the prefent ftate of the conteft, which certainly is, whether America fhall be thrown into the scale of the most ambitious power in Europe, we can want alliances. At all events, if Spain fhould take part with France, we could not fail, in fuch a case, to derive the most effectual affiftance, from those maritime powers in the North, whose evident interest it would be, to prevent the balance of naval power, from preponderating in favour of France and Spain.

If the object be worth contending for, and can hardly be purchafed at too high a price; if it be intimately connected with our existence, as an independent nation; and if it be attainable, notwithstanding all that has hitherto befallen us, the next question is, with respect to the means to be employed.

'I will not take upon me, to enter into an examination, of the proper military operations, either by fea or land, which will require to be difcuffed by an abler hand; all that I fhall fay upon that fubject is, that, without the most unprejudiced and unremitting attention, in the choice of our commanders in chief by fea and land, and without the most determined firmness, to enquire into, and to punish, mifconduct of every kind, accompanied with a noble eagerness to reward distinguished merit, it will be in vain, after fo long a peace, to expect those animated exertions, which, in former times, have so often diftinguished the British nation.

But fuppofing, every proper measure to be adopted, both in the civil and military line, as well as with refpect to foreign alliances, another most interesting and important question remains: Whether the refources of this nation, are ftill fufficient, to fupport a war against America, united with France and Spain? and whether there is any probability, of raifing the annual fupplies, for the length of time that may become neceffary? That it will not be fufficient to raise these supplies for a year or two, is but too evident; we must be prepared to hold out for many years, and must decidedly take our arrangements upon that footing, otherwife we may expect, that our enemies will continue to perfevere in the conteft, from the flattering hope, of our being foon exhausted.'

After fome fenfible and obvious remarks upon the subject of our finances, and the inconveniences of having recourfe to money-lenders, to fupport the public expences, Mr. Pulteney tells us, that it becomes the fpirit of a free country, in an hour K

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