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men too are' fit for bad purposes ; like to like, as the proverb fays. A Tyrant also should shew no favour to a man of Worth
that or a Freeman ; for he should think, that no one deserved to be Dod thought these but himself; for he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority, and the despotism of the Tyrant : such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as destructive to their Government. A Tyrant also
hues should rather admit Strangers to his table and familiarity, than Citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no de
I locke fign against him. These and such-like are the supports of a
ples 1 Tyranny, for it comprehends whatsoever is wicked.
sve u To this extract we shall add the following sentences, selected from different parts of the work, with Mr. Ellis's translation:
OOVIO! Η δε πολιτική ελευθέρων και
A political state is the ίσων αρχή.
government of freemen and
in the Δια το την φυσιν ίσες είναι Nature bas made all men trávlas, önce de xai dixxlov, <' equal, and therefore it is juft,
mlich αγαθόν είδε φαύλον το άρχειν, be the adminiftration good or παντάς αυτ8 μέτέχειν. . bad, that all should partake of
it. "Όλην δείν ευδαιμονα ποίειν The legislator ought to make την πόλιν τον νομοθέτης.
all the citizens happy.
propo Ζητσι δόλως ου το πατριου, ,
All persons ought to endeaαλλά τ' αγαθόν πάντες. . vour to follow what is right,
not what is established. Φανερόν τοίνυν ως όσαι μεν It is evident that all those πολιτείαι το κοινή συμφέρον σκο
governments which have the πεσιν, αύται μεν ορθαι τυγχά- common good in view are 1801, Sodi natá Tó áthws do rightly established, and strictly "Ooan de TO OPÉTepou just; but those which have in
sal μονον των αρχόνων, ήμαρτημέναι view only the good of the ruπάσαι, και παρεκβάσεις των όρ- Iers, are all founded on wrong Bw OTELUV'SECTOTIKEL yap, principles, and are widely dif
δέπολις κοινωνία των ελευθέρων ferent from what a government 55.
ought to be; for they are ty
ge ranny over slaves, whereas a city [state] is a community of
freemen, We have selected these paffages, partly that our learned
V Readers may form some judgment of the merit of the translation, but chiefly to shew that Mr. Locke and his followers might quote Aristotle, as well as appeal to reason, in support of their unfashionable doctrines.
ART. II. Dialogues concerning innate Prixciples. Containing an Exa
mination of Mr. Locke's Doćirine on ihai Subject. By the Author of " Three Dialogues concerving Liberty *.” 8vo. Dodfley. 1779 HIS ingenious Writer, to whose merit we have, on a
former occasion, borne our testimony (see Three Dialogues on Liberty, vol. lv. p. 218) undertakes, in these Dialogues, to refute Mr. Locke's doctrine concerning innate principles. For this purpose he fets out with observing, that Mr. Locke has been led to conclude that there are no innate principles, by mistaking certain moral propofitions, perceived as true by the understanding, for the internal sentiments on which those propositions are founded. Nothing, he remarks, can be more obvious, than that the former, considered merely as propofitions, formed by our rational faculty after a due confideration of things, as all true propositions must be, are not innate. But in the nature of things there must be principles, which had existence anterior to the formation of the axioms and propositions which arise from them. These principles bear no resemblance to any propositions whatsoever. Benevolence is pleasant, and malevolence painful, because there are principles in human nature which render them fo. The truth or falsehood of moral propofitions can only be judged of by appealing to our internal sense, which perceives the just or unjust, the right or wrong of actions. All created beings have certain principles, neceffaJily innate, which constitute their natures what they are.
If. it be allowed that ideas are not innate, it will follow that no propositions can be innate, but not that we have no innate principles; for the moral principles are the foundation of our moral ideas, and must exist prior to them. Prejudice and paffion may diftort men's ideas, and prevent them from clearly discerning moral truth; but the principles on which they are grounded, have their existence in nature, and must still remain the fame.
Our Author proceeds to observe, that by principles we are to understand such properties, qualities, energies, or laws, as are necessarily inherent in any being, and constitute its nature. The general laws by which every kind of being exists, and is moved and acts, are the general principles of that kind : the particular laws by which every species exists differently, and is moved and actuated differently, are the particular principles of that species. Very different from these, are those beginnings of human reafoning, data, axioms, maxims, rules, &c. which are some times called principles. · These are only inventions of the human mind to affift its progress in the search of truth. Moral
* For the Three Dialogues on Liberty, fee Monthly Revicw, vol. Iv. p. 218 and 258.
maxims, if true, must be founded on moral principles originally and independently inherent in man: for reasoning could never make a man devoid of innate moral principles perceive the justice or truth of any moral maxim. Indeed, without such principles he could never know any thing at all of moral max. ims ; for when any such are proposed to us, we judge of their truth or falsehood by obferving their agreement or disagreement with our innate moral sentiments. These are the same in kind in every man, and the diversity of men's opinions on moral subjects arises from the different degrees of clearness in their dilçernment, or of strength in their principles.
It is no objection, our Author remarks, that the ideas and knowledge arising from them is progressive. “Do we say, that the sense of hearing is not innate, because we are not born perfectly accomplished in music? Do we infer, that our sight is not innate, because we are not born opticians ? - Certainly not, Why, ther, should we presume, that our conscience is not innate, because we are not born moral philosophers ? If, to the fight, to the hearing, and to the other senfes, time and experience be allowed necessary; and if, to adjust properly the ideas and thoughts they convey to us, understanding, attention, and judgment be wanting; why may we not, as reasonably, allow, the same time and experience; the fame understanding, attention, and judgment, to be requisite to the nature and proper conduct of our innate moral sense? --It seems reasonable, anfwered I. • In the imbecility of infancy, and giddiness of childhood
, continued he, we are but poorly qualified, for making nice observations on our sensations and ideas of any sort : but much less on those of the moral kind; because the nature of our condition is, then, such as scarcely, if at all, places us in the circumstances of moral agents. In infancy, it is out of the queltion: and in childhood, there are but few calls for the exercise of conscience, which is wisely ordered, for then we have but little judgment to observe its effects. God has naturally placed us, at these times, and much longer, under the care and tuition of parents; clearly indicating thereby, our inexperience and want of capacity to govern ourselves. In short, in morals, as in every thing else, our knowledge is progreffive : and whoever desires to be a proficient in that science, will find, that experience, application, and good sense, are, at least, as requisite, as they are to the learning of any other inferior art or science. Nor do the nature and circumstances of human life, by any means, require, what Mr. Locke assumes to be necessary as an evidence of innate moral principles, i.e. that they should be fo born with us, as to be instantaneously perceptible in the forms of indisputably true propositions. For though all our faculties
of mind and body, be born with us; yet, as the most perfect use, and highest perfection, of any one of them, is not natate, rally requisite, or useful, in infancy or childhood; God having created both our minds and bodies in a progressive, and not in a perfect or full grown, ftate ; to object against any one of them, as not inpate, because it is not born with us, perfect or full-grown; is only to object against it, because it is not, what it was never intended to be: and the same objection may, as reasonably, be made against the innateness of every part or faculty of a man's body. Your senses may be as strong, as clear, and as perfect, as ever human senses were; your moral sense, may be as true, and as just; and though all be innate, yet is the knowledge acquired by them progressive; and perfected, if ever perfected, by slow degrees: nor do I see the least reason for excluding the moral sense out of this predicament. For my part, I can perceive nothing in all this, but what is intirely natural, and quite consonant to the condition and circumstances of hua manity.''
Such is the substance of the Author's reasoning on the subject of innate principles, the existence of which, according to his definition of them, he has, in our opinion, fully established. The whole piece is written with a degree of precision and correctness, both in thought and expression, which will render it highly acceptable to those who are fond of metaphysical disquifitions.
Art. III. The Sadducee : A Poem. Occafioned by several Publica
tions, and particularly Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, by Joseph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 4to. 18. Fielding. 1778. : INCE the days of Blackmore, the Father and indeed the
Homer of the Bathos--we have met with few proficients in the true profound, who have excelled the Writer of the present Poem. In imitation of our venerable predecessor, the learned and facetious Martinus Scriblerus, we shall execute our critical task by selecting certain characteristical specimens; confining ourselves principally to a few of the many passages in which our Poet exhibitech the subject of his poem under various forms or similitudes, either in the way of description or comparison. He
compares him to Lucifer~We suppose he means old Beel. zebub himself, with whose character he makes very free, by suggesting that he too-the Devil-would have killed his own father :
• Like him thou art
He questions whether the Doctor be a man, or a beaft.-Apoftrophising him, he says,
. For man, too foolish! and, for beast, too wise!' He next likens him to an ass-and a skittish one too !-if all be true that our Poet avers in his allufion to Balaam, and his afinine poney,---where he makes a strong effort towards wit and humour :
• He patient bore the prophet! Not so thou
. For thou'lt no prophet bear-Nor false-Nor true ! He questions, however, whether he is not too tall for an als:
I crave thy mercy, should I thee miscall!
• But, can't thou be an ass; and yet so tall :' In another place, he doubts whether he be a man;-and yet we have heard that the Doctor hath begotten several children:
• Vain man! and vain thy works ! If man thou be!' Next, however, he is an archer--and shooting at high game indeed!
• Thy shafts shot upwards, aimed at God the Son,
• Fall on thyself; and thou art quite undone !
. Yet spite of heaven !-Will this proud emmet 'nibble
. Now, in divinity, thou’rt just like him,' To a robber :
• First of my God-next of my soul bereft!
• Thus robb'd by thee,.alas! what have I left!' --Not much indeed, poor Gentleman! if he even leaves you the last !
Towards the end, our Poet grows downright scurrilous; calls the Doctor a fool, and a liar; calls his mother a wh-re, and him a bastard:
• Thy Disquisitions, spirit to decry
• Thyself legitimate, well born, and bred'
The only inftance of modeity that our Poet betrays is ex. hibited in a single line, where he thus addresleth himself to the man he has been so unconscionably abusing :
• Teach me good common sense, and clear my pate.'