Philip Schaff, in his "Progress of Religious Freedom," has made the more general assertion that "the Baptists and Quakers alone (and Protestant denominations of later date) were consistent advocates of universal toleration, and put it in their creeds" (p. 55).

None of these statements lacks in positiveness, nor is there one of these historians whose name does not give weight to his assertion; yet, combined, they tend to produce an uncertainty in the public mind.

There are those who say: "The battle is won; why give our attention to it now?" Happy should we be could we know that the battle is won for the entire future. Persecution, though banished, may come back. The struggle of the early church for place and power was rewarded during the reign of Constantine; but an enthroned church soon became an intolerant church. Centuries later a spirit of inquiry arose in Germany and led quickly to active dissent. The right to differ in religious thought from the pope and councils was claimed by Luther; but he soon contended that none ought to differ from him; and to this the docile Melanchthon agreed. Calvin made the same claim of right for himself, and enforced by voice and action the same denial of liberty to others. Beza vehemently denied the right of dissent, while John Knox poured forth a tempest of wrath against those who disagreed with him in the faith. In England scores, now Catholics, now Protestants, were tortured and put to death for their religious beliefs. This violence has passed, and we would fain assure ourselves that complete freedom of conscience, at least among the Anglo-Saxon peoples, has been attained and established as our permanent inheritance.

But that this contest is over is too much to assume. Liberty of conscience cannot be complete while the state relates itself peculiarly to any religious organization. A perfect toleration may be possible under such circumstances, since toleration assumes the existence of the undesirable. Conscience, however, will not have full liberty until the state ceases by active favor or passive attitude to affect matters with which the conscience should be exclusively concerned. The free acceptance of articles

of faith and the untrammeled conduct of life, when that conduct interferes with no other's rights, are yet to be admitted by the British state and the English established church. Until it is admitted that the sovereign has no ecclesiastical prerogative; that the people, of all religious views, are sovereign; and that civil office is exclusively civil, the atmosphere will not be favorable to liberty of conscience. Different classes of common people, one after another, have extorted from an unwilling ruling class, piece by piece, its permission to exercise their rights. The principles which have been the life of this contest for freedom have not yet become infused into the national body. Three and one-half centuries have not been long enough to eradicate the demand for conformity. More than this, the production of sentiment ought not to cease when a mere majority has been led into the truth. Victory in such a struggle as this ought to mean more than gaining an ascendency. It ought to mean the dominance of the victorious principle over the national and social life in general.

To the citizens of the United States of America the historical interest in this struggle is great, as it bears so directly upon the attainment of our highly prized liberties. In general, the Anglo

Saxon contest may be said to be one. It was the Englishman striving for his liberties that formed the warp and woof of the original American social fabric. The literature of the two countries overlapped. The effect of any great movement in either country extended to the utmost boundaries of the English language. Here also it may be said that the principles giving rise to this contest have not yet been generally assimilated into the Christian consciousness. The view of John Robinson, of Pilgrim fame, that new light should yet break forth from God's Word, is not yet generally admitted, even in theory. And heresy seems little less a bugbear to many men now than it did in the times of the reformers, when manners were less polished.

It is certainly a matter of interest to trace this evolution in Christian thought; to watch the shifting motives that animated the contestants, the changing of position in persons and organizations. It is of interest to inquire who in England first

perceived and disclosed this principle of liberty of conscience, how it happened that they discovered it, and especially how it was that they were peculiar in their findings. In so doing we may have our attention healthfully drawn to some sources of truth, and some principles for its discovery, that we may at least apply to the solution of other problems, if not to the further solution of the same problem.

Again, a review of this contest will make possible a more accurate estimate of the characters engaged in it. The relative loftiness of their ideals, and the comparative purity of their motives, as well as the strength or weakness of their purposes, and the refinement or crudeness of their manners, will frequently appear. It will help us to answer the questions: Are Christians advancing or retrograding in ideals, in qualities, and in conduct? Was the Christian character which was developed by the rigors of the Reformation period, or the subsequent periods of persecution, superior to the product of our times of peace?

At the beginning of this investigation it is well to bear in mind that those engaged in securing their religious and political rights were not entirely agreed in what they wanted. The various regiments taking part in the onslaught did not form an unbroken line; did not even advance unanimously to storm a given point. The utmost confusion reigned among the defending as well as the attacking combatants. And most of the contesting parties shifted their positions from time to time, and changed the object of their struggles. The objects sought ranged from the narrowest limited toleration possible to the fullest right of private judgment. It may be further added that there were those who sought to obtain indulgence in license even, using the plea of conscientious scruple. Yet this class. made but little gain and never became formidable.

One class claimed the right to a peculiar toleration which it was unready to concede to others. Being firmly convinced that their doctrines alone were true, and at the same time that the enthroned church was invincible to them, they besought special consideration from the existing powers. Their theory had no place in it for liberty, but the exigencies of the time put right ·

under the necessity of seeking toleration of might. From this narrowly limited conception of an exigency, theories of toleration ranged upward to the conception of full freedom of conscience.

The charity of one party was bounded by respectable Protestantism; another included all Protestants except Unitarians. Again, all Christians were hought admissible.

extremists found a place for even the Jew and the Turk.

The

Liberty of conscience is really not a degree of toleration at all; it lies in a different realm. The idea of toleration springs from the theory that the government, the magistrate, has inalienable prerogatives, and that the individual exists for the state. The magistrate is the final authority in church and state, and may impose his views upon all. Thus elevated, the government may condescend to allow certain persons to differ from it in theory. This lenient permission is toleration. The government continues its claim of domination, and its right again to become intolerant. It will exercise this when it chooses. Dr. O. W. Holmes is credited with saying that the idea of toleration is an insult to mankind. This is certainly as true as that the doctrine of the magistrate's ecclesiastical prerogative is an insult to mankind. The position of the tolerating authority was as despotic in theory as any ever held by a tyrant. The condition of those indulged was nothing better than petted serfdom. Toleration implies an inherent inferiority in the subject.1

The idea of liberty of conscience springs from the theory that the final object of the state is man, rather than the reverse. Man is responsible for his action, and, assuming this responsibility, his action accrues to his own debit or credit. The state exists as his servant, and has no right to conflict with his interests in the least. Individual accountability to God in all

In the period of the political agitation of this matter, when the term "toleration " was used almost exclusively and frequently in the sense of liberty, GEORGE WALKER, in his Plea, written with the approval of the dissenting ministers of the Midland district, said: "Now, toleration is but an invidious term, and springs out of abuses, which do no credit to human nature or to religion. It is a mistaken idea that toleration is a grace and favour; it is a restoration to a right which ought never to have been violated; it is on the part of the state, the confession of a wrong which ought never to have been practised."

matters of conscience demands a freedom to act in accordance with conscience. This theory dignifies manhood. It sets in motion the faculties which alone can effect the highest development of the human race.2

Late philosophical treatises on this subject by churchmen, as M. Creighton in his "Persecution and Tolerance," and Phillips Brooks in his lecture on "Tolerance," do not take this distinction into consideration. Under the term "tolerance" they define "liberty of conscience," only conceiving it in its ideal or perfected form. Their action in this regard is not justified by the history of the movement. While not all the advocates of the various degrees of permission or freedom discriminated closely in the use of these terms, enough of them did so to place the student under obligation to recognize this marked difference. Brooks has well considered this perfected idea, and in analysis has found it

composed of two elements, both of which are necessary to its true existence, and on the harmony and proportionate blending of which the quality of tolerance which is the result depends. These elements are, first, positive conviction; and second, sympathy with men whose convictions differ from their

own.

He further defines it as "the willing consent that other men should hold and express opinions with which we disagree, until they are convinced by reason that those opinions are untrue." A very different view from this was held by Charles James Fox, who said that "the only foundation for tolerance is a degree of skepticism." A similar thought is expressed by a speaker whom Bishop Brooks quotes in certain remarks concerning the Puritans in America. He says: "They were intolerant as all men the world over, in all time, have always been, and always will be when they are in solemn earnest for truth or error." The utter falsity of this view is claimed by Frederick Maurice in his statement that "it is the natural feeling of all of us that charity

2 In 1667 THOMAS TOMKINS wrote a pamphlet on The Inconveniences of Toleration, in which he asserted that he is opposing a demand for limited toleration. Though he uses contradictory language, he gives expression to this distinction. He says: "Now Liberty of Conscience is either Absolute or Limited. If it is Limited it is no longer Liberty of Conscience." (P. 1. Newberry Lib.)