enough in life, we are continually adding grief to grief, and aggravating the common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another. Every man's natural weight of afflictions is still made more heavy by the envy, malice, treachery, or injustice of his neighbour. At the same time that the storm beats upon the whole species, we are falling foul upon one another.

Half the misery of human life might be extinguished, would men allievate the general curse they lie under, by mutual offices of compaffion, benevolence, and humanity. There is nothing therefore which we ought more to encourage in ourselves and others, than that difpofition of mind which in our language goes under the title of good-nature, and which I shall choose for the fubject of this day's speculation.

Good-nature is more agreeable in conversation than wit, and gives a certain air to the countenance which is more amiable than beauty. It shews virtue in the faireft light, takes off in some measure from the deformity of vice, and makes even folly and impertinence supportable.

There is no fociety or conversation to be kept up in the world without good-nature, or fomething which must bear its appearance, and fupply its place. For this reason mankind have been forced to invent a kind of artificial humanity, which is what we express by the word good-breeding. For if we examine thoroughly the idea of what we call so, we shall find it - to be nothing else but an imitation and mimicry of good-nature, or in other terms, affability, complaifance and easiness of temper reduced into an art.

These exterior shows and appearances of humanity render a man wonderfully popular and beloved when they are founded upon a real good-nature; but without it are like hypocrify in religion, or a bare form of holiness, which when it is discovered, makes a man more detestable than professed impiety.

Good-nature is generally born with us; health, profperity and kind treatment from the world are great cherishers of it where they find it; but nothing is capable of forcing it up, where it does not grow of itself. It is one of the blessings of a happy conftitution, which education may improve but not produce.

Xenophon in the life of his imaginary prince, whom he defcribes as a pattern for real ones, is always celebrating the philanthropy or goodnature of his hero, which he tells us he brought into the world with him, and gives many remarkable instances of it in his childhood, as well as in all the several parts of his life. Nay, on his death-bed, he defcribes him as being pleased, that while his foul returned to him who made it, his body should incorporate with the great mother of all things, and by that means become beneficial to mankind. For which cafon, he gives his fons a postive order not to enshrine it in gold or filver, but to lay it in the earth as foon as the life was gone out of it.

An instance of fuch an overflowing of humanity, fuch an exuberant love to mankind

could not have entered into the imagination of a writer, who had not a foul filled with great ideas, and a general benevolence to mankind.

In that celebrated passage of Saluft, where Cæfar and Cato are placed in fuch beautiful, but opposite lights; Cæfar's character is chiefly made up of good-nature, as it shewed itself in all its forms towards his friends or his enemies, his servants or dependents, the guilty or the distressed. As for Cato's character, it is rather awful than amiable. Justice seems most agreeable to the nature of God, and mercy to that of man. A Being who has nothing to pardon in himself, may reward every man according to his works; but he whose very best actions must be seen with grains of allowance, cannot be too mild, moderate, and forgiving. For this reason, among all the monstrous characters in human nature, there is none so odious, nor indeed so exquisitely ridiculous, as that of a rigid severe temper in a worthless man.

This part of good-nature, however, which confifts in the pardoning and overlooking of faults, is to be exercised only in doing ourselves justice, and that too in the ordinary commerce and occurrences of life; for in the public administrations of justice, mercy to one may be cruelty to others.

It is grown almost into a maxim, that goodnatured men are not always men of the most wit. This observation, in my opinion, has no foundation in nature. The greatest wits I have conversed with are men eminent for their humanity. I take therefore this remark to have been occafioned by two reasons. First, because ill-nature among ordinary observers passes for wit. A spiteful saying gratifies so many little passions in those who hear it, that it generally meets with a good reception. The laugh rifes upon it, and the man who utters it, is looked upon as a shrewd fatirist. This may be one rea son, why a great many pleasant companies appear so surprisingly dull, when they have endeavoured to be merry in print; the public being more just than private clubs or assemblies, in diftinguishing between what is wit and what is ill-nature.

Another reason why the good-natured man may fometimes bring his wit in question, is, perhaps, because he is apt to be moved with compaffion for those misfortunes or infirmities, which another would turn into ridicule, and by that means gain the reputation of a wit. The ill-natured man, though but of equal parts, gives himself a larger field to expatiate in; he exposes those failings in human nature which the other would cast a veil over, laughs at vices which the other either excuses or conceals, gives utterance to reflections which the other stifles, falls indifferently upon friends or enemies, exposes the person who has obliged him, and, in short, sticks at nothing that may establish his character of a wit. It is no wonder therefore he fucceeds in it better than the man of humanity, as a perfon who makes use of indirect methods is more likely to grow rich than the fair trader, Ee

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